Narrative:

The dispatcher offered a flight plan for our flight that was not agreeable to me. After the dispatcher and the captain agreed to some changes; the dispatcher later unilaterally changed it back; and had the plane fueled without consulting the captain. The dispatcher failed to comply with operations manual dispatching policy. The original flight plan listed gjt as the alternate. Cos was legal and logical; and much closer. The probability of diverting was very low as the WX forecast was better than CAT I ILS and as good as MVFR; en route times to den were accurate; no flts were holding; and no flts were going around. The operations manual states; 'the likelihood of an actual diversion should be a primary factor in selecting the alternate airport.' thus; cos was better than gjt as the alternate as the likelihood of diverting was very low. After consulting with meteorology; the dispatcher agreed to change the alternate from gjt to cos. But the dispatcher used the word 'reluctantly.' the original flight plan listed 20 mins of hold fuel. There was no reported holding. Operations manual states; 'hold fuel is added for known or anticipated traffic delays at the destination airport per far 121.647.' flts that are not predicted to hold are not planned with hold fuel. In this case; there was ho holding; but the dispatcher would not compromise. So hold fuel remained. The original proposed flight plan had ferry fuel. En route reports indicated that altitudes above FL350 were smoother rides. Also; the WX forecast reported icing conditions on approach to den; wing heat would be needed; thus causing the flight to come close to or exceed the go around performance weight restr. The dispatcher agreed to remove the ferry fuel weight. The original flight plan had 15 mins of standard contingency fuel. Operations manual states; 'this value may be reduced or eliminated with the mutual concurrence of the captain and dispatcher.' in this case; both parties agreed to retain this. With these mutual changes; I agreed to sign the release. Just before pushback; I received this ACARS note: 'on third thought. Don't like publication. Back to gjt.' this caught me by surprise; as publication was not part of our plan. I had already signed the release with cos and this constituted a unilateral change to the flight plan. Operations manual states: 'dispatchers sending amendments after the pilots have verified the release number in ACARS; are required to initiate positive contact with the captain to ensure receipt. This was not done. My signature was for a different plan. The dispatcher basically used my signature to get his original plan back into action without considering my needs; and without consulting me. Had the dispatcher contacted me with his desire to change the alternate back to gjt; and thus add more fuel; he would have learned that our plane was being dispatched with an inoperative automatic speed brake system. He would have also learned that the destination runways were reporting fair to good to fair braking. I did not want unnecessary weight on landing. This is an example of a dispatcher usurping the captain's involvement in the flight planning process. In the dispatcher's own printed words; 'no time to discuss as I am up to my ass in alligators.' here is another of his printed comments; 'today is not the day to save fuel. I want options.' never mind that the dispatcher's options did not take into account reducing the captain's options. Never mind that the dispatcher's options reduced the safety margins planned by the captain. Never mind that the captain studied this flight very closely while the dispatcher was planning many more. It is likely that the dispatcher only gave cursory review to each flight. Instead; the dispatcher believed that his plan was the only good plan; and that it was being changed only to save fuel; not for safety or performance. Dispatchers need to know that once the captain agrees to a plan; any changes must be coordination with; and agreed to; by the captain. In no case should a dispatcher fool the captain into thinking that the plan was mutually changed; and then change it back unilaterally. Recommendation: revise the operations manual to include the requirement that both the captain and the dispatcher must establish communications with each other; and must agree to changes in the flight plan; tacit approval is not allowed. Recommendation: include in the operations manual that should either the captain or dispatcher disagree with the flight's plan; it is within their legal right not to sign the release until such time that both parties agree to the plan in its entirety; and agree to execute the flight as planned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF B767-300 AND DISPATCHER FAIL TO EACH A CONSENSUS ON THE FUEL AND ALTERNATE REQUIREMENTS FOR A 2 HR DOMESTIC FLT.

Narrative: THE DISPATCHER OFFERED A FLT PLAN FOR OUR FLT THAT WAS NOT AGREEABLE TO ME. AFTER THE DISPATCHER AND THE CAPT AGREED TO SOME CHANGES; THE DISPATCHER LATER UNILATERALLY CHANGED IT BACK; AND HAD THE PLANE FUELED WITHOUT CONSULTING THE CAPT. THE DISPATCHER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH OPS MANUAL DISPATCHING POLICY. THE ORIGINAL FLT PLAN LISTED GJT AS THE ALTERNATE. COS WAS LEGAL AND LOGICAL; AND MUCH CLOSER. THE PROBABILITY OF DIVERTING WAS VERY LOW AS THE WX FORECAST WAS BETTER THAN CAT I ILS AND AS GOOD AS MVFR; ENRTE TIMES TO DEN WERE ACCURATE; NO FLTS WERE HOLDING; AND NO FLTS WERE GOING AROUND. THE OPS MANUAL STATES; 'THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN ACTUAL DIVERSION SHOULD BE A PRIMARY FACTOR IN SELECTING THE ALTERNATE ARPT.' THUS; COS WAS BETTER THAN GJT AS THE ALTERNATE AS THE LIKELIHOOD OF DIVERTING WAS VERY LOW. AFTER CONSULTING WITH METEOROLOGY; THE DISPATCHER AGREED TO CHANGE THE ALTERNATE FROM GJT TO COS. BUT THE DISPATCHER USED THE WORD 'RELUCTANTLY.' THE ORIGINAL FLT PLAN LISTED 20 MINS OF HOLD FUEL. THERE WAS NO RPTED HOLDING. OPS MANUAL STATES; 'HOLD FUEL IS ADDED FOR KNOWN OR ANTICIPATED TFC DELAYS AT THE DEST ARPT PER FAR 121.647.' FLTS THAT ARE NOT PREDICTED TO HOLD ARE NOT PLANNED WITH HOLD FUEL. IN THIS CASE; THERE WAS HO HOLDING; BUT THE DISPATCHER WOULD NOT COMPROMISE. SO HOLD FUEL REMAINED. THE ORIGINAL PROPOSED FLT PLAN HAD FERRY FUEL. ENRTE RPTS INDICATED THAT ALTS ABOVE FL350 WERE SMOOTHER RIDES. ALSO; THE WX FORECAST RPTED ICING CONDITIONS ON APCH TO DEN; WING HEAT WOULD BE NEEDED; THUS CAUSING THE FLT TO COME CLOSE TO OR EXCEED THE GAR PERFORMANCE WT RESTR. THE DISPATCHER AGREED TO REMOVE THE FERRY FUEL WT. THE ORIGINAL FLT PLAN HAD 15 MINS OF STANDARD CONTINGENCY FUEL. OPS MANUAL STATES; 'THIS VALUE MAY BE REDUCED OR ELIMINATED WITH THE MUTUAL CONCURRENCE OF THE CAPT AND DISPATCHER.' IN THIS CASE; BOTH PARTIES AGREED TO RETAIN THIS. WITH THESE MUTUAL CHANGES; I AGREED TO SIGN THE RELEASE. JUST BEFORE PUSHBACK; I RECEIVED THIS ACARS NOTE: 'ON THIRD THOUGHT. DON'T LIKE PUB. BACK TO GJT.' THIS CAUGHT ME BY SURPRISE; AS PUB WAS NOT PART OF OUR PLAN. I HAD ALREADY SIGNED THE RELEASE WITH COS AND THIS CONSTITUTED A UNILATERAL CHANGE TO THE FLT PLAN. OPS MANUAL STATES: 'DISPATCHERS SENDING AMENDMENTS AFTER THE PLTS HAVE VERIFIED THE RELEASE NUMBER IN ACARS; ARE REQUIRED TO INITIATE POSITIVE CONTACT WITH THE CAPT TO ENSURE RECEIPT. THIS WAS NOT DONE. MY SIGNATURE WAS FOR A DIFFERENT PLAN. THE DISPATCHER BASICALLY USED MY SIGNATURE TO GET HIS ORIGINAL PLAN BACK INTO ACTION WITHOUT CONSIDERING MY NEEDS; AND WITHOUT CONSULTING ME. HAD THE DISPATCHER CONTACTED ME WITH HIS DESIRE TO CHANGE THE ALTERNATE BACK TO GJT; AND THUS ADD MORE FUEL; HE WOULD HAVE LEARNED THAT OUR PLANE WAS BEING DISPATCHED WITH AN INOP AUTO SPD BRAKE SYS. HE WOULD HAVE ALSO LEARNED THAT THE DEST RWYS WERE RPTING FAIR TO GOOD TO FAIR BRAKING. I DID NOT WANT UNNECESSARY WT ON LNDG. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF A DISPATCHER USURPING THE CAPT'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE FLT PLANNING PROCESS. IN THE DISPATCHER'S OWN PRINTED WORDS; 'NO TIME TO DISCUSS AS I AM UP TO MY ASS IN ALLIGATORS.' HERE IS ANOTHER OF HIS PRINTED COMMENTS; 'TODAY IS NOT THE DAY TO SAVE FUEL. I WANT OPTIONS.' NEVER MIND THAT THE DISPATCHER'S OPTIONS DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REDUCING THE CAPT'S OPTIONS. NEVER MIND THAT THE DISPATCHER'S OPTIONS REDUCED THE SAFETY MARGINS PLANNED BY THE CAPT. NEVER MIND THAT THE CAPT STUDIED THIS FLT VERY CLOSELY WHILE THE DISPATCHER WAS PLANNING MANY MORE. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE DISPATCHER ONLY GAVE CURSORY REVIEW TO EACH FLT. INSTEAD; THE DISPATCHER BELIEVED THAT HIS PLAN WAS THE ONLY GOOD PLAN; AND THAT IT WAS BEING CHANGED ONLY TO SAVE FUEL; NOT FOR SAFETY OR PERFORMANCE. DISPATCHERS NEED TO KNOW THAT ONCE THE CAPT AGREES TO A PLAN; ANY CHANGES MUST BE COORD WITH; AND AGREED TO; BY THE CAPT. IN NO CASE SHOULD A DISPATCHER FOOL THE CAPT INTO THINKING THAT THE PLAN WAS MUTUALLY CHANGED; AND THEN CHANGE IT BACK UNILATERALLY. RECOMMENDATION: REVISE THE OPS MANUAL TO INCLUDE THE REQUIREMENT THAT BOTH THE CAPT AND THE DISPATCHER MUST ESTABLISH COMS WITH EACH OTHER; AND MUST AGREE TO CHANGES IN THE FLT PLAN; TACIT APPROVAL IS NOT ALLOWED. RECOMMENDATION: INCLUDE IN THE OPS MANUAL THAT SHOULD EITHER THE CAPT OR DISPATCHER DISAGREE WITH THE FLT'S PLAN; IT IS WITHIN THEIR LEGAL RIGHT NOT TO SIGN THE RELEASE UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT BOTH PARTIES AGREE TO THE PLAN IN ITS ENTIRETY; AND AGREE TO EXECUTE THE FLT AS PLANNED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.