Narrative:

At cruise at FL350 ATC initiated a descent to FL330. First officer pushed for a cruise descent on the altitude selector. Simultaneously; both FMGC's failed; the autoplt and autothrust disengaged; and the map displays went blank. The pfd continued to work normally. First officer began hand flying the airplane. About 15 seconds later; the chief purser called from the back of the airplane to advise us that a female passenger had become unconscious and unresponsive. I was advised that an emt was on board and addressing the passenger. The first officer continued the descent to FL330 and we received a frequency change. Upon completion of the frequency change; I advised ATC that we had a medical emergency developing in the aircraft and a navigation problem happening concurrently; and requested direct to ZZZ while we began to resolve the issues. We were cleared directly to ZZZ1 and the first officer continued to fly the airplane as we addressed the FMGC failure. I requested the main menu on the FMGC; and then selected the flight plan page. The #1 FMGC was again active; but had dumped everything for the flight. The #2 FMGC became active again about 5 mins later. The first officer was able to place the autoplt and autothrust back on the aircraft and continued to fly inbound to ZZZ1. The flight attendants called the cockpit again to inform us that they were about to use the aed. The passenger remained unresponsive at this point and I collected the passenger information at the point to pass on to dispatch. When I rejoined the first officer; he had managed to reload most of the box and restored the map display. ZZZ1 had given us priority and we were now direct ZZZ1 at .80 mach/330 KTS. The flight attendants again called to advise that the passenger was now responsive and they did not need to use the aed. The emt was beginning to provide oxygen to the passenger. We briefed the approach; and continued expedited handling to ZZZ1. I contacted dispatch and advised of the situation on board with the ill passenger. The flight attendants again called to advise that the passenger now appeared to be stable. After brief discussion with dispatch; we agreed to continue to ZZZ1 and land. Emt was advised to utilize dispatch if he needed to speak or pass information to the ZZZ1 medical. Dispatch advised that paramedics would meet the aircraft as a precautionary measure. Had a jumpseater on board and I had him review the fom emergency section to see if there was anything that had been missed. He offered the fom suggested starting the APU immediately on arrival to expedite the arrival procedures. We complied. The rest had been covered in process according to the jumpseater and we continued to what became the visual approach to runway 27L. At the end of the approach we found that the FMGC was unable to calculate an approach speed due to the box weights being dumped. This discovery was not made until short final when managed speed was selected; so there was no time to come up with a new approach speed from the book. Based on past experience; airplane feel; and vls indications on the airspeed tape we determined that an initial approach speed of 141 KTS would be approximately correct given the winds at altitude versus the ground. We later adjusted it down to 134 KTS for the approach for a weight of 130000 pounds flaps full.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 FLT EXPERIENCED DUAL FMGC FAILURES WHILE CONCURRENTLY DEALING WITH AN UNCONSCIOUS PAX.

Narrative: AT CRUISE AT FL350 ATC INITIATED A DSCNT TO FL330. FO PUSHED FOR A CRUISE DSCNT ON THE ALT SELECTOR. SIMULTANEOUSLY; BOTH FMGC'S FAILED; THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHRUST DISENGAGED; AND THE MAP DISPLAYS WENT BLANK. THE PFD CONTINUED TO WORK NORMALLY. FO BEGAN HAND FLYING THE AIRPLANE. ABOUT 15 SECONDS LATER; THE CHIEF PURSER CALLED FROM THE BACK OF THE AIRPLANE TO ADVISE US THAT A FEMALE PAX HAD BECOME UNCONSCIOUS AND UNRESPONSIVE. I WAS ADVISED THAT AN EMT WAS ON BOARD AND ADDRESSING THE PAX. THE FO CONTINUED THE DSCNT TO FL330 AND WE RECEIVED A FREQ CHANGE. UPON COMPLETION OF THE FREQ CHANGE; I ADVISED ATC THAT WE HAD A MEDICAL EMER DEVELOPING IN THE ACFT AND A NAV PROB HAPPENING CONCURRENTLY; AND REQUESTED DIRECT TO ZZZ WHILE WE BEGAN TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES. WE WERE CLRED DIRECTLY TO ZZZ1 AND THE FO CONTINUED TO FLY THE AIRPLANE AS WE ADDRESSED THE FMGC FAILURE. I REQUESTED THE MAIN MENU ON THE FMGC; AND THEN SELECTED THE FLT PLAN PAGE. THE #1 FMGC WAS AGAIN ACTIVE; BUT HAD DUMPED EVERYTHING FOR THE FLT. THE #2 FMGC BECAME ACTIVE AGAIN ABOUT 5 MINS LATER. THE FO WAS ABLE TO PLACE THE AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHRUST BACK ON THE ACFT AND CONTINUED TO FLY INBOUND TO ZZZ1. THE FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED THE COCKPIT AGAIN TO INFORM US THAT THEY WERE ABOUT TO USE THE AED. THE PAX REMAINED UNRESPONSIVE AT THIS POINT AND I COLLECTED THE PAX INFO AT THE POINT TO PASS ON TO DISPATCH. WHEN I REJOINED THE FO; HE HAD MANAGED TO RELOAD MOST OF THE BOX AND RESTORED THE MAP DISPLAY. ZZZ1 HAD GIVEN US PRIORITY AND WE WERE NOW DIRECT ZZZ1 AT .80 MACH/330 KTS. THE FLT ATTENDANTS AGAIN CALLED TO ADVISE THAT THE PAX WAS NOW RESPONSIVE AND THEY DID NOT NEED TO USE THE AED. THE EMT WAS BEGINNING TO PROVIDE OXYGEN TO THE PAX. WE BRIEFED THE APCH; AND CONTINUED EXPEDITED HANDLING TO ZZZ1. I CONTACTED DISPATCH AND ADVISED OF THE SITUATION ON BOARD WITH THE ILL PAX. THE FLT ATTENDANTS AGAIN CALLED TO ADVISE THAT THE PAX NOW APPEARED TO BE STABLE. AFTER BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH DISPATCH; WE AGREED TO CONTINUE TO ZZZ1 AND LAND. EMT WAS ADVISED TO UTILIZE DISPATCH IF HE NEEDED TO SPEAK OR PASS INFO TO THE ZZZ1 MEDICAL. DISPATCH ADVISED THAT PARAMEDICS WOULD MEET THE ACFT AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. HAD A JUMPSEATER ON BOARD AND I HAD HIM REVIEW THE FOM EMER SECTION TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANYTHING THAT HAD BEEN MISSED. HE OFFERED THE FOM SUGGESTED STARTING THE APU IMMEDIATELY ON ARR TO EXPEDITE THE ARR PROCS. WE COMPLIED. THE REST HAD BEEN COVERED IN PROCESS ACCORDING TO THE JUMPSEATER AND WE CONTINUED TO WHAT BECAME THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 27L. AT THE END OF THE APCH WE FOUND THAT THE FMGC WAS UNABLE TO CALCULATE AN APCH SPD DUE TO THE BOX WTS BEING DUMPED. THIS DISCOVERY WAS NOT MADE UNTIL SHORT FINAL WHEN MANAGED SPD WAS SELECTED; SO THERE WAS NO TIME TO COME UP WITH A NEW APCH SPD FROM THE BOOK. BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE; AIRPLANE FEEL; AND VLS INDICATIONS ON THE AIRSPD TAPE WE DETERMINED THAT AN INITIAL APCH SPD OF 141 KTS WOULD BE APPROX CORRECT GIVEN THE WINDS AT ALT VERSUS THE GND. WE LATER ADJUSTED IT DOWN TO 134 KTS FOR THE APCH FOR A WT OF 130000 LBS FLAPS FULL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.