Narrative:

On the evening of dec/sun/05; captain and myself were returning from ZZZ for arrival at sea; flight abcd; a B737-900. We were cleared for the husky visual approach from the chins arrival. During the approach we encountered very strong turbulence on final. The turbulence intensified as we descended until at approximately 300-200 ft a go around was executed. Airspeed was +/-10 to 15 KTS and the flaps automatic-retracted to 25 degrees at least twice on final. We received vectors for the bay visual for a second attempt. Captain advised dispatch to develop a divert plan should we not be successful in landing on our second attempt. Conditions on the second approach were much the same with the same turbulence; flap blow up; and airspeed fluctuations. Several preceding aircraft made the comment it was a 'wild ride.' the decision to abort the second landing attempt and go around was made. However this time it seemed the turbulence lasted longer in the go around phase and aircraft roll control was more seriously affected. During this phase; captain pointed out an aircraft turning in front of us (apparently a dash-8 that had taken off runway 16L and was turning right). We maneuvered slightly to keep the aircraft in sight while completing the go around procedures. It was initially difficult to discern the aircraft's direction of flight. Tower called out the traffic but we did not respond as workload did not allow a response. Captain maneuvered the aircraft to pass well above and behind the other aircraft and I was able to maintain visual contact throughout the go around and subsequent maneuvering to assure traffic separation. We were at least 1500 ft or more above and probably over a mi behind the dash-8. As soon as workload permitted I responded to the tower's inquiry as to having sight of the other aircraft. I do not recall a TA and am sure there was no RA. At this point we requested diversion to pdx while coordinating with dispatch. The divert was then adjusted to paine field based on pdx WX and fuel requirements. This change of plans created some problems for seattle in deconflicting us with arrs. During this coordination and high radio traffic environment. I was flying the aircraft and came to an assigned heading of 240 degrees. Seattle queried us as to our heading and advised us to take up a 340 degree heading. Our diversion to paine field was uneventful. Seattle was advised of our minimum fuel status en route to paine field. The turbulence on final was by far the worst I have ever seen in the landing phase anywhere. There was never a windshear warning although at times aircraft control proved difficult. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that they did not hear any other aircraft go around on approach although others made comments about the turbulence. He stated that the B737-900 can be challenging to fly because the airfoil is so clean. He also stated that on both approachs the aircraft was definitely unlandable and that the crew had no option but to go around and because of an impending low fuel state divert to another airport. Supplemental information from acn 681685: my concern at this point was maintaining aircraft control and avoiding the conflicting traffic as opposed to communicating with the tower. I increased our rate of climb and he passed underneath us as he turned out. There was no TCAS alert or RA. At this point I was concerned about getting the aircraft on the ground. Departure initially had us heading for pdx but I quickly determined that we did not have sufficient fuel for pdx. Conferring with dispatch they initially wanted us to go to bfi however the winds there were easterly gusting to 28 KTS and I advised them that that did not work for me. He suggested pae and advised me that the winds there were only 8-10 KTS. We advised ATC we wanted to divert to pae and they started heading us towards pae. Throughout the missed approach and subsequent diversion there were several instances where we were given ATC instructions (headings) that were not complied with immediately or were misconstrued (ie; 240 versus 340). This was an extremely high workload time with fuel becoming critical and moderate turbulence. We did not declare an emergency but advised ATC that we were minimum fuel and were vectoredto a visual approach at pae where we made a routine visual approach and landed to refuel for our return to sea. As a note we did not get any windshear warning or alert during either of our approachs. At some point during our second missed approach when I was trying to explain the conditions we experienced I said that we had severe turbulence. I am not sure if it was when talking to ATC or dispatch. When we landed at pae and I talked with maintenance he read me the actual description of severe turbulence and I agreed that we had not experienced severe turbulence but that the conditions were such that making a safe landing in a B737-900 was not possible when we made our approachs. We conferred with maintenance control regarding whether inspections were required for the flap blow up and overspd. A write-up was put in the book and cleared by local maintenance and we refueled; refiled and returned to sea.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-900 EXPERIENCED SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS TURB TO PREVENT THEIR SAFE LNDG WHILE OTHER ACFT LANDED AT THE SAME ARPT. FLT DIVERTED TO A NEARBY ARPT.

Narrative: ON THE EVENING OF DEC/SUN/05; CAPT AND MYSELF WERE RETURNING FROM ZZZ FOR ARR AT SEA; FLT ABCD; A B737-900. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE HUSKY VISUAL APCH FROM THE CHINS ARR. DURING THE APCH WE ENCOUNTERED VERY STRONG TURB ON FINAL. THE TURB INTENSIFIED AS WE DSNDED UNTIL AT APPROX 300-200 FT A GAR WAS EXECUTED. AIRSPD WAS +/-10 TO 15 KTS AND THE FLAPS AUTO-RETRACTED TO 25 DEGS AT LEAST TWICE ON FINAL. WE RECEIVED VECTORS FOR THE BAY VISUAL FOR A SECOND ATTEMPT. CAPT ADVISED DISPATCH TO DEVELOP A DIVERT PLAN SHOULD WE NOT BE SUCCESSFUL IN LNDG ON OUR SECOND ATTEMPT. CONDITIONS ON THE SECOND APCH WERE MUCH THE SAME WITH THE SAME TURB; FLAP BLOW UP; AND AIRSPD FLUCTUATIONS. SEVERAL PRECEDING ACFT MADE THE COMMENT IT WAS A 'WILD RIDE.' THE DECISION TO ABORT THE SECOND LNDG ATTEMPT AND GAR WAS MADE. HOWEVER THIS TIME IT SEEMED THE TURB LASTED LONGER IN THE GAR PHASE AND ACFT ROLL CTL WAS MORE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED. DURING THIS PHASE; CAPT POINTED OUT AN ACFT TURNING IN FRONT OF US (APPARENTLY A DASH-8 THAT HAD TAKEN OFF RWY 16L AND WAS TURNING R). WE MANEUVERED SLIGHTLY TO KEEP THE ACFT IN SIGHT WHILE COMPLETING THE GAR PROCS. IT WAS INITIALLY DIFFICULT TO DISCERN THE ACFT'S DIRECTION OF FLT. TWR CALLED OUT THE TFC BUT WE DID NOT RESPOND AS WORKLOAD DID NOT ALLOW A RESPONSE. CAPT MANEUVERED THE ACFT TO PASS WELL ABOVE AND BEHIND THE OTHER ACFT AND I WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT THROUGHOUT THE GAR AND SUBSEQUENT MANEUVERING TO ASSURE TFC SEPARATION. WE WERE AT LEAST 1500 FT OR MORE ABOVE AND PROBABLY OVER A MI BEHIND THE DASH-8. AS SOON AS WORKLOAD PERMITTED I RESPONDED TO THE TWR'S INQUIRY AS TO HAVING SIGHT OF THE OTHER ACFT. I DO NOT RECALL A TA AND AM SURE THERE WAS NO RA. AT THIS POINT WE REQUESTED DIVERSION TO PDX WHILE COORDINATING WITH DISPATCH. THE DIVERT WAS THEN ADJUSTED TO PAINE FIELD BASED ON PDX WX AND FUEL REQUIREMENTS. THIS CHANGE OF PLANS CREATED SOME PROBS FOR SEATTLE IN DECONFLICTING US WITH ARRS. DURING THIS COORD AND HIGH RADIO TFC ENVIRONMENT. I WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND CAME TO AN ASSIGNED HDG OF 240 DEGS. SEATTLE QUERIED US AS TO OUR HDG AND ADVISED US TO TAKE UP A 340 DEG HDG. OUR DIVERSION TO PAINE FIELD WAS UNEVENTFUL. SEATTLE WAS ADVISED OF OUR MINIMUM FUEL STATUS ENRTE TO PAINE FIELD. THE TURB ON FINAL WAS BY FAR THE WORST I HAVE EVER SEEN IN THE LNDG PHASE ANYWHERE. THERE WAS NEVER A WINDSHEAR WARNING ALTHOUGH AT TIMES ACFT CTL PROVED DIFFICULT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THEY DID NOT HEAR ANY OTHER ACFT GO AROUND ON APCH ALTHOUGH OTHERS MADE COMMENTS ABOUT THE TURB. HE STATED THAT THE B737-900 CAN BE CHALLENGING TO FLY BECAUSE THE AIRFOIL IS SO CLEAN. HE ALSO STATED THAT ON BOTH APCHS THE ACFT WAS DEFINITELY UNLANDABLE AND THAT THE CREW HAD NO OPTION BUT TO GO AROUND AND BECAUSE OF AN IMPENDING LOW FUEL STATE DIVERT TO ANOTHER ARPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 681685: MY CONCERN AT THIS POINT WAS MAINTAINING ACFT CTL AND AVOIDING THE CONFLICTING TFC AS OPPOSED TO COMMUNICATING WITH THE TWR. I INCREASED OUR RATE OF CLB AND HE PASSED UNDERNEATH US AS HE TURNED OUT. THERE WAS NO TCAS ALERT OR RA. AT THIS POINT I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT GETTING THE ACFT ON THE GND. DEP INITIALLY HAD US HEADING FOR PDX BUT I QUICKLY DETERMINED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUEL FOR PDX. CONFERRING WITH DISPATCH THEY INITIALLY WANTED US TO GO TO BFI HOWEVER THE WINDS THERE WERE EASTERLY GUSTING TO 28 KTS AND I ADVISED THEM THAT THAT DID NOT WORK FOR ME. HE SUGGESTED PAE AND ADVISED ME THAT THE WINDS THERE WERE ONLY 8-10 KTS. WE ADVISED ATC WE WANTED TO DIVERT TO PAE AND THEY STARTED HEADING US TOWARDS PAE. THROUGHOUT THE MISSED APCH AND SUBSEQUENT DIVERSION THERE WERE SEVERAL INSTANCES WHERE WE WERE GIVEN ATC INSTRUCTIONS (HDGS) THAT WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH IMMEDIATELY OR WERE MISCONSTRUED (IE; 240 VERSUS 340). THIS WAS AN EXTREMELY HIGH WORKLOAD TIME WITH FUEL BECOMING CRITICAL AND MODERATE TURB. WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER BUT ADVISED ATC THAT WE WERE MINIMUM FUEL AND WERE VECTOREDTO A VISUAL APCH AT PAE WHERE WE MADE A ROUTINE VISUAL APCH AND LANDED TO REFUEL FOR OUR RETURN TO SEA. AS A NOTE WE DID NOT GET ANY WINDSHEAR WARNING OR ALERT DURING EITHER OF OUR APCHS. AT SOME POINT DURING OUR SECOND MISSED APCH WHEN I WAS TRYING TO EXPLAIN THE CONDITIONS WE EXPERIENCED I SAID THAT WE HAD SEVERE TURB. I AM NOT SURE IF IT WAS WHEN TALKING TO ATC OR DISPATCH. WHEN WE LANDED AT PAE AND I TALKED WITH MAINT HE READ ME THE ACTUAL DESCRIPTION OF SEVERE TURB AND I AGREED THAT WE HAD NOT EXPERIENCED SEVERE TURB BUT THAT THE CONDITIONS WERE SUCH THAT MAKING A SAFE LNDG IN A B737-900 WAS NOT POSSIBLE WHEN WE MADE OUR APCHS. WE CONFERRED WITH MAINT CTL REGARDING WHETHER INSPECTIONS WERE REQUIRED FOR THE FLAP BLOW UP AND OVERSPD. A WRITE-UP WAS PUT IN THE BOOK AND CLRED BY LCL MAINT AND WE REFUELED; REFILED AND RETURNED TO SEA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.