Narrative:

We were about 10 mins behind schedule. Oak was landing runway 29 with approximately 5 KTS of tailwind component. On the handoff to norcal. Approach; we requested to land on runway 11; traffic permitting. Norcal advised 'unable' and began vectoring us for a visual approach to runway 29. When we were about 15 NM north of oak (at 250 KIAS and leveling off at 4000 ft MSL); norcal asked if we could still accept a visual approach to runway 11. I could see the airfield and realized that we would need to immediately slow down and configure in order to fly a stabilized approach to runway 11. I believed we would be able to do so; and we accepted the visual approach to runway 11. In order to slow down; I immediately extended the speed brakes and then called for the landing gear at 220 KIAS. I then called for the flaps on schedule and the first officer extended them on my command. As the flaps approached 30 degrees; I felt an unusual buffeting and suddenly realized that I had forgotten to retract the speed brakes before I called for the flaps. I immediately retracted the speed brakes and the buffeting stopped. We then flew a stabilized approach to an uneventful landing on runway 11. A mechanic met us at the gate to add engine oil. I told him that we had inadvertently extended the flaps with the speed brakes for less than 1 min. He said that a flap inspection wasn't required; but he would look them over anyway. Analysis and lessons learned. This was leg #6 on a fairly difficult day in dealing with bad WX/icing/turbulence/instrument approachs on the previous 5 legs that morning. Suffice to say that I was a little bit tired and not at the top of my 'game' when this event occurred. When we accepted the visual approach to runway 11; I became concerned with quickly getting the airplane into a position from which we could safety fly a stabilized approach. I believe this caused my attention to become 'channelized;' which resulted in me calling for flaps before I made sure the speed brakes were fully retracted. The first officer also failed to back me up. He should have told me the speed brakes were still extended before he selected the flap setting that I called for. I'm not sure why he didn't back me up. I suspect it was because he is fairly new here; he's been here only 7 months. I also suspect that he was also somewhat tired; and that his attention was focused on helping me get the airplane set up correctly for a stabilized approach and safe landing. I believe that biggest lesson learned from this is the need to be extra vigilant when there is a sudden change in the landing runway. When coupled with fatigue; this can result in a breakdown in normal habit patterns; which can cause us to omit steps or do things out of correct sequence. Supplemental information from acn 683167: this was leg #5 of a fairly difficult day of dealing with poor WX and turbulence. I was tired and so was the captain. When we were unexpectedly cleared for runway 11; we both got into the mind set of getting the aircraft slowed and properly configured; but focused a little too much on the slowing part and not the confign. The captain called for the flaps before the speed brakes were fully retracted; and I failed to check the speed brakes before lowering the flaps.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLRED UNEXPECTEDLY FOR A STRAIGHT-IN APCH; FLT CREW OF B737-300; CONFIGURES FLAPS AND LNDG GEAR FOR LNDG WITH SPD BRAKES STILL EXTENDED. BOTH COMMENT THAT FATIGUE PLAYED A ROLE IN THEIR MENTAL LAPSE.

Narrative: WE WERE ABOUT 10 MINS BEHIND SCHEDULE. OAK WAS LNDG RWY 29 WITH APPROX 5 KTS OF TAILWIND COMPONENT. ON THE HDOF TO NORCAL. APCH; WE REQUESTED TO LAND ON RWY 11; TFC PERMITTING. NORCAL ADVISED 'UNABLE' AND BEGAN VECTORING US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 29. WHEN WE WERE ABOUT 15 NM N OF OAK (AT 250 KIAS AND LEVELING OFF AT 4000 FT MSL); NORCAL ASKED IF WE COULD STILL ACCEPT A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 11. I COULD SEE THE AIRFIELD AND REALIZED THAT WE WOULD NEED TO IMMEDIATELY SLOW DOWN AND CONFIGURE IN ORDER TO FLY A STABILIZED APCH TO RWY 11. I BELIEVED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO; AND WE ACCEPTED THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 11. IN ORDER TO SLOW DOWN; I IMMEDIATELY EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKES AND THEN CALLED FOR THE LNDG GEAR AT 220 KIAS. I THEN CALLED FOR THE FLAPS ON SCHEDULE AND THE FO EXTENDED THEM ON MY COMMAND. AS THE FLAPS APCHED 30 DEGS; I FELT AN UNUSUAL BUFFETING AND SUDDENLY REALIZED THAT I HAD FORGOTTEN TO RETRACT THE SPD BRAKES BEFORE I CALLED FOR THE FLAPS. I IMMEDIATELY RETRACTED THE SPD BRAKES AND THE BUFFETING STOPPED. WE THEN FLEW A STABILIZED APCH TO AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG ON RWY 11. A MECH MET US AT THE GATE TO ADD ENG OIL. I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD INADVERTENTLY EXTENDED THE FLAPS WITH THE SPD BRAKES FOR LESS THAN 1 MIN. HE SAID THAT A FLAP INSPECTION WASN'T REQUIRED; BUT HE WOULD LOOK THEM OVER ANYWAY. ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED. THIS WAS LEG #6 ON A FAIRLY DIFFICULT DAY IN DEALING WITH BAD WX/ICING/TURB/INST APCHS ON THE PREVIOUS 5 LEGS THAT MORNING. SUFFICE TO SAY THAT I WAS A LITTLE BIT TIRED AND NOT AT THE TOP OF MY 'GAME' WHEN THIS EVENT OCCURRED. WHEN WE ACCEPTED THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 11; I BECAME CONCERNED WITH QUICKLY GETTING THE AIRPLANE INTO A POS FROM WHICH WE COULD SAFETY FLY A STABILIZED APCH. I BELIEVE THIS CAUSED MY ATTN TO BECOME 'CHANNELIZED;' WHICH RESULTED IN ME CALLING FOR FLAPS BEFORE I MADE SURE THE SPD BRAKES WERE FULLY RETRACTED. THE FO ALSO FAILED TO BACK ME UP. HE SHOULD HAVE TOLD ME THE SPD BRAKES WERE STILL EXTENDED BEFORE HE SELECTED THE FLAP SETTING THAT I CALLED FOR. I'M NOT SURE WHY HE DIDN'T BACK ME UP. I SUSPECT IT WAS BECAUSE HE IS FAIRLY NEW HERE; HE'S BEEN HERE ONLY 7 MONTHS. I ALSO SUSPECT THAT HE WAS ALSO SOMEWHAT TIRED; AND THAT HIS ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON HELPING ME GET THE AIRPLANE SET UP CORRECTLY FOR A STABILIZED APCH AND SAFE LNDG. I BELIEVE THAT BIGGEST LESSON LEARNED FROM THIS IS THE NEED TO BE EXTRA VIGILANT WHEN THERE IS A SUDDEN CHANGE IN THE LNDG RWY. WHEN COUPLED WITH FATIGUE; THIS CAN RESULT IN A BREAKDOWN IN NORMAL HABIT PATTERNS; WHICH CAN CAUSE US TO OMIT STEPS OR DO THINGS OUT OF CORRECT SEQUENCE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 683167: THIS WAS LEG #5 OF A FAIRLY DIFFICULT DAY OF DEALING WITH POOR WX AND TURB. I WAS TIRED AND SO WAS THE CAPT. WHEN WE WERE UNEXPECTEDLY CLRED FOR RWY 11; WE BOTH GOT INTO THE MIND SET OF GETTING THE ACFT SLOWED AND PROPERLY CONFIGURED; BUT FOCUSED A LITTLE TOO MUCH ON THE SLOWING PART AND NOT THE CONFIGN. THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE FLAPS BEFORE THE SPD BRAKES WERE FULLY RETRACTED; AND I FAILED TO CHK THE SPD BRAKES BEFORE LOWERING THE FLAPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.