Narrative:

After block out; prior to departure; holding short of runway (WX 100 over 1/4 mile br); and upon doing the control check when exercising the rudder to the left; both the first officer and myself noticed a loud rumbling and shudder through the aircraft; almost as if the rudder was fluttering at its extreme end of travel. The shudder was even felt by a jumpseater. A vibration was felt through the rudder pedals throughout the full range of travel; getting worse at the end of travel. Upon neutralizing the rudder and exercising it to the right; the same problem occurred; but to a lesser degree. (Note -- the rudder check was accomplished very slowly per a critique on an earlier line check). Both crew members exercised the rudder slowly; with the problem getting seemingly worse with each cycle of the rudder. The runway required flaps 15/20; so just as an experiment; the first officer and myself tried exercising the rudder with various flap/slat settings with the same result. I called the gate and informed them I would be returning to the blocks. Upon block in; maintenance boarded the aircraft with the engines running. We demonstrated our rudder check to the mechanic and when he felt and heard the problem; his comment was; 'oh my gosh!' we shut down the aircraft and powered up the hydraulics so the mechanic could observe the rudder from outside. Maintenance told us that the rudder appeared to move further to the left; after it had achieved full travel via the pedal. A log entry was made and a consultation with maintenance control began. The crew received conflicting information from maintenance control. Initially; we were told that they had a bulletin stating that the rudder's excessive vibration was normal if the A300 was light; which it was. Upon receiving a copy of this 'bulletin;' which in reality was a small footnote from a maintenance manual; we learned that weight had nothing to do with this rudder problem; but in fact had to do with the speed of the rudder travel check. In my opinion; maintenance control was insinuating we had exercised the rudder too quickly; which was not the case. I then inquired if there was anything else that could be checked to troubleshoot this problem. We were told by maintenance control that the only other check they were going to do was the same check the mechanic had done for the pre-departure; which involves powering up the hydraulics and accomplishing a normal control check. This check had been done prior to the crews' arrival and no problems were noted. The problem occurred after block out. The mechanic did as maintenance control instructed and the aircraft was signed off as ok to return to service. I was informed by maintenance control that this was all they were going to do; nothing else was necessary. However; the same seemingly abnormally strong rudder vibrations and the shuddering of the aircraft and rudder pedals existed after the mechanic accomplished maintenance control's maintenance procedures. I am concerned that there may have been pressure from maintenance control to accept an aircraft that was exhibiting the same problematic symptoms after the maintenance procedures were accomplished and no further investigation was deemed necessary. Contributing factors in my decision not to depart included the very low WX and the hostile terrain surrounding the airport. After extended conversations; I was informed that we (myself and the first officer) were removed from the flight and a management crew was being sent to rescue the aircraft.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that maintenance operations was contacted by the reporter and after relating the rudder actions; the technician again checked the rudder operation with the same results; shuddering; rumbling; and vibration in the rudder pedals. Maintenance operations made the claim the rudder operation was normal for a lightly loaded airplane and made it appear the rudder was moved rapidly during the test. The rudder inputs were slow and per procedure. The justification for this airplane being serviceable was a small footnote from the maintenance manual that had nothing to do with weight of the aircraft. The reporter's decision to refuse the airplane was tempered by the WX; local terrain and the belief this airplane was not right.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A300 FLT CREW NOTED LOUD RUMBLING AND SHUDDER WITH VIBRATION IN RUDDER PEDALS DURING GND FLT CTL CHK. RETURNED TO THE GATE AND MAINT OBSERVED A RECURRENCE OF THE PROBLEM. ACFT WAS DISPATCHED WITH ANOTHER CREW AFTER ANOMALY WAS ATTRIBUTED TO ACFT WT AND/OR THE MANNER IN WHICH THE RUDDER CHK WAS PERFORMED.

Narrative: AFTER BLOCK OUT; PRIOR TO DEP; HOLDING SHORT OF RWY (WX 100 OVER 1/4 MILE BR); AND UPON DOING THE CTL CHK WHEN EXERCISING THE RUDDER TO THE LEFT; BOTH THE FO AND MYSELF NOTICED A LOUD RUMBLING AND SHUDDER THROUGH THE ACFT; ALMOST AS IF THE RUDDER WAS FLUTTERING AT ITS EXTREME END OF TRAVEL. THE SHUDDER WAS EVEN FELT BY A JUMPSEATER. A VIBRATION WAS FELT THROUGH THE RUDDER PEDALS THROUGHOUT THE FULL RANGE OF TRAVEL; GETTING WORSE AT THE END OF TRAVEL. UPON NEUTRALIZING THE RUDDER AND EXERCISING IT TO THE R; THE SAME PROBLEM OCCURRED; BUT TO A LESSER DEGREE. (NOTE -- THE RUDDER CHK WAS ACCOMPLISHED VERY SLOWLY PER A CRITIQUE ON AN EARLIER LINE CHK). BOTH CREW MEMBERS EXERCISED THE RUDDER SLOWLY; WITH THE PROBLEM GETTING SEEMINGLY WORSE WITH EACH CYCLE OF THE RUDDER. THE RWY REQUIRED FLAPS 15/20; SO JUST AS AN EXPERIMENT; THE FO AND MYSELF TRIED EXERCISING THE RUDDER WITH VARIOUS FLAP/SLAT SETTINGS WITH THE SAME RESULT. I CALLED THE GATE AND INFORMED THEM I WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE BLOCKS. UPON BLOCK IN; MAINT BOARDED THE ACFT WITH THE ENGS RUNNING. WE DEMONSTRATED OUR RUDDER CHK TO THE MECHANIC AND WHEN HE FELT AND HEARD THE PROBLEM; HIS COMMENT WAS; 'OH MY GOSH!' WE SHUT DOWN THE ACFT AND POWERED UP THE HYDRAULICS SO THE MECHANIC COULD OBSERVE THE RUDDER FROM OUTSIDE. MAINT TOLD US THAT THE RUDDER APPEARED TO MOVE FURTHER TO THE L; AFTER IT HAD ACHIEVED FULL TRAVEL VIA THE PEDAL. A LOG ENTRY WAS MADE AND A CONSULTATION WITH MAINT CTL BEGAN. THE CREW RECEIVED CONFLICTING INFO FROM MAINT CTL. INITIALLY; WE WERE TOLD THAT THEY HAD A BULLETIN STATING THAT THE RUDDER'S EXCESSIVE VIBRATION WAS NORMAL IF THE A300 WAS LIGHT; WHICH IT WAS. UPON RECEIVING A COPY OF THIS 'BULLETIN;' WHICH IN REALITY WAS A SMALL FOOTNOTE FROM A MAINT MANUAL; WE LEARNED THAT WT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS RUDDER PROBLEM; BUT IN FACT HAD TO DO WITH THE SPEED OF THE RUDDER TRAVEL CHK. IN MY OPINION; MAINT CTL WAS INSINUATING WE HAD EXERCISED THE RUDDER TOO QUICKLY; WHICH WAS NOT THE CASE. I THEN INQUIRED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE THAT COULD BE CHKED TO TROUBLESHOOT THIS PROBLEM. WE WERE TOLD BY MAINT CTL THAT THE ONLY OTHER CHK THEY WERE GOING TO DO WAS THE SAME CHK THE MECHANIC HAD DONE FOR THE PRE-DEPARTURE; WHICH INVOLVES POWERING UP THE HYDRAULICS AND ACCOMPLISHING A NORMAL CTL CHK. THIS CHK HAD BEEN DONE PRIOR TO THE CREWS' ARR AND NO PROBLEMS WERE NOTED. THE PROBLEM OCCURRED AFTER BLOCK OUT. THE MECHANIC DID AS MAINT CTL INSTRUCTED AND THE ACFT WAS SIGNED OFF AS OK TO RETURN TO SVC. I WAS INFORMED BY MAINT CTL THAT THIS WAS ALL THEY WERE GOING TO DO; NOTHING ELSE WAS NECESSARY. HOWEVER; THE SAME SEEMINGLY ABNORMALLY STRONG RUDDER VIBRATIONS AND THE SHUDDERING OF THE ACFT AND RUDDER PEDALS EXISTED AFTER THE MECHANIC ACCOMPLISHED MAINT CTL'S MAINT PROCS. I AM CONCERNED THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN PRESSURE FROM MAINT CTL TO ACCEPT AN ACFT THAT WAS EXHIBITING THE SAME PROBLEMATIC SYMPTOMS AFTER THE MAINT PROCS WERE ACCOMPLISHED AND NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION WAS DEEMED NECESSARY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN MY DECISION NOT TO DEPART INCLUDED THE VERY LOW WX AND THE HOSTILE TERRAIN SURROUNDING THE ARPT. AFTER EXTENDED CONVERSATIONS; I WAS INFORMED THAT WE (MYSELF AND THE FO) WERE REMOVED FROM THE FLT AND A MANAGEMENT CREW WAS BEING SENT TO RESCUE THE ACFT.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT MAINT OPS WAS CONTACTED BY THE RPTR AND AFTER RELATING THE RUDDER ACTIONS; THE TECHNICIAN AGAIN CHKED THE RUDDER OPERATION WITH THE SAME RESULTS; SHUDDERING; RUMBLING; AND VIBRATION IN THE RUDDER PEDALS. MAINT OPS MADE THE CLAIM THE RUDDER OPERATION WAS NORMAL FOR A LIGHTLY LOADED AIRPLANE AND MADE IT APPEAR THE RUDDER WAS MOVED RAPIDLY DURING THE TEST. THE RUDDER INPUTS WERE SLOW AND PER PROC. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS AIRPLANE BEING SERVICEABLE WAS A SMALL FOOTNOTE FROM THE MAINT MANUAL THAT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH WT OF THE ACFT. THE RPTR'S DECISION TO REFUSE THE AIRPLANE WAS TEMPERED BY THE WX; LOCAL TERRAIN AND THE BELIEF THIS AIRPLANE WAS NOT RIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.