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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 885224 |
Time | |
Date | 201004 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Turbine Engine Thrust Reverser |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125 Flight Crew Type 6000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural MEL |
Narrative:
The #2 reverser unlocked light illuminated in flight. The reverser had been MEL'd the day prior for the same problem; but had been cleared overnight. The light extinguished during descent and the thrust reverser operated normally upon landing. Contract maintenance could not find anything wrong. I discussed the situation with dispatch and maintenance; and since the next leg was to a city with company maintenance; we decided to continue on and let maintenance look at it there. En route to our destination; the light illuminated again; extinguished on descent; and the thrust reverser operated normally when we landed.maintenance locked out the #2 thrust reverser and entered the MEL in the logbook. We then flew to our next destination. Upon landing; I raised the #1 thrust reverser handle to reverse idle; but could not get the thrust reverser to deploy. I briefed the outgoing captain and explained what had happened. He said something to the effect of; 'since they were going to a city where the thrust reverser wouldn't be used in calculating stopping margin; he would check it out on the next leg'. I agreed. I failed to write up the #1 thrust reverser for not deploying. The next day I found out that maintenance had in fact disabled both thrust reversers; not just the #2 thrust reverser.whenever there is a problem with the aircraft; the captain needs to investigate thoroughly and find out what's going on. After landing; I should have called maintenance right away and not given the airplane to the next crew until we had determined why the #1 thrust reverser did not work properly.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737-300 Flight Crew failed to properly document the recurrence of a chronic #2 Reverser Unlock warning. In addition they failed to write up the failure of the #1 reverser to deploy to the next flight crew. The latter failure the result of Maintenance in-oping both reversers rather than just the chronic #2.
Narrative: The #2 Reverser Unlocked light illuminated in flight. The reverser had been MEL'd the day prior for the same problem; but had been cleared overnight. The light extinguished during descent and the thrust reverser operated normally upon landing. Contract Maintenance could not find anything wrong. I discussed the situation with Dispatch and Maintenance; and since the next leg was to a city with Company Maintenance; we decided to continue on and let Maintenance look at it there. En route to our destination; the light illuminated again; extinguished on descent; and the thrust reverser operated normally when we landed.Maintenance locked out the #2 thrust reverser and entered the MEL in the logbook. We then flew to our next destination. Upon landing; I raised the #1 thrust reverser handle to reverse idle; but could not get the thrust reverser to deploy. I briefed the outgoing Captain and explained what had happened. He said something to the effect of; 'since they were going to a city where the thrust reverser wouldn't be used in calculating stopping margin; he would check it out on the next leg'. I agreed. I failed to write up the #1 thrust reverser for not deploying. The next day I found out that Maintenance had in fact disabled both thrust reversers; not just the #2 thrust reverser.Whenever there is a problem with the aircraft; the Captain needs to investigate thoroughly and find out what's going on. After landing; I should have called Maintenance right away and not given the airplane to the next crew until we had determined why the #1 thrust reverser did not work properly.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.