Narrative:

The situation took place during the approach segment of our flight. This was the fourth roundtrip between oakland and vancouver we had performed that week; therefore; the captain and I were prepared for a standard non-eventful conclusion of our trip. After reviewing the ATIS; we briefed the ILS runway 8R for vancouver. Once passing approximately 5000 ft; the captain asked me to call approach and request a close-in base leg to help expedite our approach. The controller granted our request and gave us a right turn to the north that would serve as our base leg. We were then given a series of step-down altitudes to bring us to our final localizer intercept altitude of 1500 ft. Upon reaching 1500 ft; we were given our approach clearance. It was clear at this point that the localizer would be intercepted inside of the FAF and we would be above the glide slope. Then; before we had time to discuss our course of action; the localizer and GS 'came alive.' the captain made a standard-rate turn to the right to intercept the localizer and began a descent to capture the GS. Although we were able to capture and maintain the GS; we were unable to intercept the localizer without the use of a turn in excess of 30 degrees. Therefore; we leveled off at 1000 ft and maintained our localizer intercept heading. Just as I was about to call for a missed approach (which I later discovered the captain was going to do as well); the airport came into view. At that point the captain stated that he would continue visually to the airport and he began a descent to avoid a scattered cloud layer. As we approached 500 ft on a modified left base entry to runway 8R; we performed the before landing checklist; however; we were unable to extend the landing gear before receiving a GPWS 'too low gear' alert. With the landing checklist completed and landing clearance received; it was clear that a safe landing could then be performed. Once our postflt duties were complete; the captain and I had a thorough debriefing. During this debriefing; we reached the following conclusions regarding our faults as a crew during the approach: 1) we should not have accepted the approach clearance once we discovered our position relative to the FAF. 2) we should have communicated our thoughts regarding the best course of action more clearly. 3) although neither of us felt the safety of flight was jeopardized; we should have executed a missed approach immediately after we realized a stabilized approach was not possible. Further; we believe the contributing human factors were: 1) having flown together all week we had become overly confident in each other's abilities; leading to our failure in communicating our comfort level. 2) we had become complacent and were in a hurry to get home. Supplemental information from acn 683846: I attempted to stay on GS and localizer but continued to the north with full deflection. At this point my plan was to intercept the localizer and go missed. I arrested the descent at about 1000 ft; made a turn to about a heading of 130 degrees -- we both saw the airport and approach lights. Due to some scattered clouds; we descended to 500 ft on a modified left base at which time the 'too low gear' and GPWS sounded. The landing checklist was completed with an uneventful landing after receiving clearance from the tower.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATR-42 FLT CREW REQUESTS AND RECEIVES A MODIFIED TURN TO INTERCEPT THE ILS APCH TO EXPEDITE THE ARR. THE ACFT WAS HIGH; FAST AND NOT CONFIGURED. THE GPWS SOUNDED 'TOO LOW GEAR.'

Narrative: THE SITUATION TOOK PLACE DURING THE APCH SEGMENT OF OUR FLT. THIS WAS THE FOURTH ROUNDTRIP BTWN OAKLAND AND VANCOUVER WE HAD PERFORMED THAT WK; THEREFORE; THE CAPT AND I WERE PREPARED FOR A STANDARD NON-EVENTFUL CONCLUSION OF OUR TRIP. AFTER REVIEWING THE ATIS; WE BRIEFED THE ILS RWY 8R FOR VANCOUVER. ONCE PASSING APPROX 5000 FT; THE CAPT ASKED ME TO CALL APCH AND REQUEST A CLOSE-IN BASE LEG TO HELP EXPEDITE OUR APCH. THE CTLR GRANTED OUR REQUEST AND GAVE US A R TURN TO THE N THAT WOULD SERVE AS OUR BASE LEG. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A SERIES OF STEP-DOWN ALTS TO BRING US TO OUR FINAL LOC INTERCEPT ALT OF 1500 FT. UPON REACHING 1500 FT; WE WERE GIVEN OUR APCH CLRNC. IT WAS CLEAR AT THIS POINT THAT THE LOC WOULD BE INTERCEPTED INSIDE OF THE FAF AND WE WOULD BE ABOVE THE GLIDE SLOPE. THEN; BEFORE WE HAD TIME TO DISCUSS OUR COURSE OF ACTION; THE LOC AND GS 'CAME ALIVE.' THE CAPT MADE A STANDARD-RATE TURN TO THE R TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AND BEGAN A DSCNT TO CAPTURE THE GS. ALTHOUGH WE WERE ABLE TO CAPTURE AND MAINTAIN THE GS; WE WERE UNABLE TO INTERCEPT THE LOC WITHOUT THE USE OF A TURN IN EXCESS OF 30 DEGS. THEREFORE; WE LEVELED OFF AT 1000 FT AND MAINTAINED OUR LOC INTERCEPT HDG. JUST AS I WAS ABOUT TO CALL FOR A MISSED APCH (WHICH I LATER DISCOVERED THE CAPT WAS GOING TO DO AS WELL); THE ARPT CAME INTO VIEW. AT THAT POINT THE CAPT STATED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE VISUALLY TO THE ARPT AND HE BEGAN A DSCNT TO AVOID A SCATTERED CLOUD LAYER. AS WE APCHED 500 FT ON A MODIFIED L BASE ENTRY TO RWY 8R; WE PERFORMED THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST; HOWEVER; WE WERE UNABLE TO EXTEND THE LNDG GEAR BEFORE RECEIVING A GPWS 'TOO LOW GEAR' ALERT. WITH THE LNDG CHKLIST COMPLETED AND LNDG CLRNC RECEIVED; IT WAS CLR THAT A SAFE LNDG COULD THEN BE PERFORMED. ONCE OUR POSTFLT DUTIES WERE COMPLETE; THE CAPT AND I HAD A THOROUGH DEBRIEFING. DURING THIS DEBRIEFING; WE REACHED THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS REGARDING OUR FAULTS AS A CREW DURING THE APCH: 1) WE SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THE APCH CLRNC ONCE WE DISCOVERED OUR POS RELATIVE TO THE FAF. 2) WE SHOULD HAVE COMMUNICATED OUR THOUGHTS REGARDING THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION MORE CLRLY. 3) ALTHOUGH NEITHER OF US FELT THE SAFETY OF FLT WAS JEOPARDIZED; WE SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH IMMEDIATELY AFTER WE REALIZED A STABILIZED APCH WAS NOT POSSIBLE. FURTHER; WE BELIEVE THE CONTRIBUTING HUMAN FACTORS WERE: 1) HAVING FLOWN TOGETHER ALL WK WE HAD BECOME OVERLY CONFIDENT IN EACH OTHER'S ABILITIES; LEADING TO OUR FAILURE IN COMMUNICATING OUR COMFORT LEVEL. 2) WE HAD BECOME COMPLACENT AND WERE IN A HURRY TO GET HOME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 683846: I ATTEMPTED TO STAY ON GS AND LOC BUT CONTINUED TO THE N WITH FULL DEFLECTION. AT THIS POINT MY PLAN WAS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AND GO MISSED. I ARRESTED THE DSCNT AT ABOUT 1000 FT; MADE A TURN TO ABOUT A HDG OF 130 DEGS -- WE BOTH SAW THE ARPT AND APCH LIGHTS. DUE TO SOME SCATTERED CLOUDS; WE DSNDED TO 500 FT ON A MODIFIED L BASE AT WHICH TIME THE 'TOO LOW GEAR' AND GPWS SOUNDED. THE LNDG CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED WITH AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC FROM THE TWR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.