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Attributes | |
ACN | 684384 |
Time | |
Date | 200601 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : dsm.airport |
State Reference | IA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dawn |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 87 flight time total : 10170 flight time type : 2524 |
ASRS Report | 684384 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 3000 flight time type : 1000 |
ASRS Report | 683946 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ground encounters : vehicle |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb other other : 4 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Company |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
I was the captain on air carrier flight. This was the second and final leg of a continuous duty overnight. The flight the night before was normal. The crew arrived at the airport; got the aircraft ready; and boarded on time. The WX was clear and cold; and the aircraft had sections of frost. The aircraft was fueled to a ramp of 8800 pounds. The bookings were heavy so we knew it would be close on the maximum number of people and bags we could carry. We had only 150 pounds of taxi fuel so we knew it also would be close to making it to the runway with minimum fuel for brake release. We closed the door about 5 mins before scheduled departure; and the aircraft was pushed back from the gate and disconnected. We configured the aircraft for the deicing with both engines running; and the APU shut down. The ground crew commenced the deicing to remove the frost. They started at the left wing; went around the airplane; and then to the back. The first officer made the comment about having enough fuel to taxi and make brake release. We saw no activity and flashed the lights to the ground crew man in front of the airplane. Both the first officer and I saw a thumbs up; cleared each of our sides; and I started to make a turn to taxi. I did not feel right about the fuel quantity; and decided that we needed more fuel. We felt a bump as the aircraft was stopped. We had not moved much. I shut the engines down and opened the passenger door. I told the ramper that we needed more fuel; and he stated his concern that we were taxiing before the signal. He told us that the deice bucket had touched the horizontal stabilizer. I questioned the bucket operator about the damage and she was not sure. I asked if I could go up with her and take a look. She positioned as best we could and I inspected the area that was just in front of the static wick on the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer. I did not notice any damage. The aircraft was fueled and we continued the trip with no problems. I inspected the same area on postflt; now that I had more light; and also did not notice any damage. I filed a late report with the chief pilot because of needing more fuel as the reason we did not depart on time. I then received a call from the chief pilot about damage to the aircraft; and the need to make a written report. The contact of the deice bucket to the aircraft was due to miscoms of hand signals. Our receiving the thumbs up meant that we were clear of deice activity. At no time did we see any type of signal from the ramper for the need to stop the aircraft. Stopping for fuel needs may have prevented this from being a bigger incident.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A CL65 CAPT DESCRIBES AN ENCOUNTER WITH A DE-ICE TRUCK SPRAY BUCKET AFTER RAMP PERSONNEL GAVE THE CREW A THUMBS UP SIGNAL.
Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT ON ACR FLT. THIS WAS THE SECOND AND FINAL LEG OF A CONTINUOUS DUTY OVERNIGHT. THE FLT THE NIGHT BEFORE WAS NORMAL. THE CREW ARRIVED AT THE ARPT; GOT THE ACFT READY; AND BOARDED ON TIME. THE WX WAS CLR AND COLD; AND THE ACFT HAD SECTIONS OF FROST. THE ACFT WAS FUELED TO A RAMP OF 8800 LBS. THE BOOKINGS WERE HVY SO WE KNEW IT WOULD BE CLOSE ON THE MAX NUMBER OF PEOPLE AND BAGS WE COULD CARRY. WE HAD ONLY 150 LBS OF TAXI FUEL SO WE KNEW IT ALSO WOULD BE CLOSE TO MAKING IT TO THE RWY WITH MINIMUM FUEL FOR BRAKE RELEASE. WE CLOSED THE DOOR ABOUT 5 MINS BEFORE SCHEDULED DEP; AND THE ACFT WAS PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE AND DISCONNECTED. WE CONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR THE DEICING WITH BOTH ENGS RUNNING; AND THE APU SHUT DOWN. THE GND CREW COMMENCED THE DEICING TO REMOVE THE FROST. THEY STARTED AT THE L WING; WENT AROUND THE AIRPLANE; AND THEN TO THE BACK. THE FO MADE THE COMMENT ABOUT HAVING ENOUGH FUEL TO TAXI AND MAKE BRAKE RELEASE. WE SAW NO ACTIVITY AND FLASHED THE LIGHTS TO THE GND CREW MAN IN FRONT OF THE AIRPLANE. BOTH THE FO AND I SAW A THUMBS UP; CLRED EACH OF OUR SIDES; AND I STARTED TO MAKE A TURN TO TAXI. I DID NOT FEEL RIGHT ABOUT THE FUEL QUANTITY; AND DECIDED THAT WE NEEDED MORE FUEL. WE FELT A BUMP AS THE ACFT WAS STOPPED. WE HAD NOT MOVED MUCH. I SHUT THE ENGS DOWN AND OPENED THE PAX DOOR. I TOLD THE RAMPER THAT WE NEEDED MORE FUEL; AND HE STATED HIS CONCERN THAT WE WERE TAXIING BEFORE THE SIGNAL. HE TOLD US THAT THE DEICE BUCKET HAD TOUCHED THE HORIZ STABILIZER. I QUESTIONED THE BUCKET OPERATOR ABOUT THE DAMAGE AND SHE WAS NOT SURE. I ASKED IF I COULD GO UP WITH HER AND TAKE A LOOK. SHE POSITIONED AS BEST WE COULD AND I INSPECTED THE AREA THAT WAS JUST IN FRONT OF THE STATIC WICK ON THE LEADING EDGE OF THE HORIZ STABILIZER. I DID NOT NOTICE ANY DAMAGE. THE ACFT WAS FUELED AND WE CONTINUED THE TRIP WITH NO PROBS. I INSPECTED THE SAME AREA ON POSTFLT; NOW THAT I HAD MORE LIGHT; AND ALSO DID NOT NOTICE ANY DAMAGE. I FILED A LATE RPT WITH THE CHIEF PLT BECAUSE OF NEEDING MORE FUEL AS THE REASON WE DID NOT DEPART ON TIME. I THEN RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE CHIEF PLT ABOUT DAMAGE TO THE ACFT; AND THE NEED TO MAKE A WRITTEN RPT. THE CONTACT OF THE DEICE BUCKET TO THE ACFT WAS DUE TO MISCOMS OF HAND SIGNALS. OUR RECEIVING THE THUMBS UP MEANT THAT WE WERE CLR OF DEICE ACTIVITY. AT NO TIME DID WE SEE ANY TYPE OF SIGNAL FROM THE RAMPER FOR THE NEED TO STOP THE ACFT. STOPPING FOR FUEL NEEDS MAY HAVE PREVENTED THIS FROM BEING A BIGGER INCIDENT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.