Narrative:

First officer's leg. Conducted visual approach to runway 1 into meridian; ms. Judging the landing roll; I eyed B2 as an exit point off of the runway; when tower asked us to continue landing roll to taxiway C and take taxiway C all the way. While on taxiway C; first officer was cleaning up aircraft as we are crossing runway 4/22 and clearing our left and then right. We see a single engine C172 performing a low go around extremely close to us. Tower urgently tells other aircraft to go around and tells us that we were told to contact ground and to hold short of runway 4/22. We say that we did not hear that; and I follow up confirming that we did not hear anything to that nature and I am terribly sorry. I was extremely shaken. I then was advised to call tower over the phone. When I call them; they ask me for my full name; lecture me that we were told to contact ground and to hold short of runway 4/22; and that they are in the process of pulling the tapes for review and that they would be contacting me shortly to advise me of appropriate action. I remain very apologetic and accept all responsibility as PIC. Ground eventually asks me to call them again. The supervisor basically tells me that both parties could have been more pro-active; that I need to be more vigilant and that the other plane never actually touched down and that the other plane does not wish to file charges. He then proceeds to ask me if I had initiated contact with company headquartersecond officerfficials to which I reply no; because I am awaiting official word from them -- the tower. He at that point states that no paperwork will be issued from their side. In hindsight; I believe that the tapes were pulled and that we were not asked to contact ground; nor to hold short of any runway. Contributing factors and lessons learned: 1) tower really needs to wait to issue instructions to flight crews until aircraft is off the runway; not decelerating through the high speed regime during landing. 2) as flight crews we should have waited with the after landing actions and checklists until clear of all runways. 3) I should have been much more situationally aware and not have assigned other aircraft using the same runway. 4) from now on; I will make sure to always contact ground and clarify cleared to cross all runways; regardless when tower clears us to the ramp. Ground and tower should have clued in when realizing we did not check in with ground and verify us holding short and on ground frequency; especially with another aircraft in the pattern and another runway in use with our taxiway intersecting it. In the end; regardless whose fault it was; this was a major wake-up call for me. I will take any and all responsibility; am still pretty shaken up; and realize I need to be much more vigilant.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ 200 LNDG MEI IS INSTRUCTED BY LCL TO TAXI TO THE RAMP AND MONITOR GND. CROSSED RWY 4-22 RESULTING IN GAR WITH C172 TFC.

Narrative: FO'S LEG. CONDUCTED VISUAL APCH TO RWY 1 INTO MERIDIAN; MS. JUDGING THE LNDG ROLL; I EYED B2 AS AN EXIT POINT OFF OF THE RWY; WHEN TWR ASKED US TO CONTINUE LNDG ROLL TO TXWY C AND TAKE TXWY C ALL THE WAY. WHILE ON TXWY C; FO WAS CLEANING UP ACFT AS WE ARE XING RWY 4/22 AND CLRING OUR L AND THEN R. WE SEE A SINGLE ENG C172 PERFORMING A LOW GAR EXTREMELY CLOSE TO US. TWR URGENTLY TELLS OTHER ACFT TO GO AROUND AND TELLS US THAT WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT GND AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4/22. WE SAY THAT WE DID NOT HEAR THAT; AND I FOLLOW UP CONFIRMING THAT WE DID NOT HEAR ANYTHING TO THAT NATURE AND I AM TERRIBLY SORRY. I WAS EXTREMELY SHAKEN. I THEN WAS ADVISED TO CALL TWR OVER THE PHONE. WHEN I CALL THEM; THEY ASK ME FOR MY FULL NAME; LECTURE ME THAT WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT GND AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4/22; AND THAT THEY ARE IN THE PROCESS OF PULLING THE TAPES FOR REVIEW AND THAT THEY WOULD BE CONTACTING ME SHORTLY TO ADVISE ME OF APPROPRIATE ACTION. I REMAIN VERY APOLOGETIC AND ACCEPT ALL RESPONSIBILITY AS PIC. GND EVENTUALLY ASKS ME TO CALL THEM AGAIN. THE SUPVR BASICALLY TELLS ME THAT BOTH PARTIES COULD HAVE BEEN MORE PRO-ACTIVE; THAT I NEED TO BE MORE VIGILANT AND THAT THE OTHER PLANE NEVER ACTUALLY TOUCHED DOWN AND THAT THE OTHER PLANE DOES NOT WISH TO FILE CHARGES. HE THEN PROCEEDS TO ASK ME IF I HAD INITIATED CONTACT WITH COMPANY HEADQUARTERS/OFFICIALS TO WHICH I REPLY NO; BECAUSE I AM AWAITING OFFICIAL WORD FROM THEM -- THE TWR. HE AT THAT POINT STATES THAT NO PAPERWORK WILL BE ISSUED FROM THEIR SIDE. IN HINDSIGHT; I BELIEVE THAT THE TAPES WERE PULLED AND THAT WE WERE NOT ASKED TO CONTACT GND; NOR TO HOLD SHORT OF ANY RWY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND LESSONS LEARNED: 1) TWR REALLY NEEDS TO WAIT TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO FLT CREWS UNTIL ACFT IS OFF THE RWY; NOT DECELERATING THROUGH THE HIGH SPD REGIME DURING LNDG. 2) AS FLT CREWS WE SHOULD HAVE WAITED WITH THE AFTER LNDG ACTIONS AND CHKLISTS UNTIL CLR OF ALL RWYS. 3) I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE SITUATIONALLY AWARE AND NOT HAVE ASSIGNED OTHER ACFT USING THE SAME RWY. 4) FROM NOW ON; I WILL MAKE SURE TO ALWAYS CONTACT GND AND CLARIFY CLRED TO CROSS ALL RWYS; REGARDLESS WHEN TWR CLRS US TO THE RAMP. GND AND TWR SHOULD HAVE CLUED IN WHEN REALIZING WE DID NOT CHK IN WITH GND AND VERIFY US HOLDING SHORT AND ON GND FREQ; ESPECIALLY WITH ANOTHER ACFT IN THE PATTERN AND ANOTHER RWY IN USE WITH OUR TXWY INTERSECTING IT. IN THE END; REGARDLESS WHOSE FAULT IT WAS; THIS WAS A MAJOR WAKE-UP CALL FOR ME. I WILL TAKE ANY AND ALL RESPONSIBILITY; AM STILL PRETTY SHAKEN UP; AND REALIZE I NEED TO BE MUCH MORE VIGILANT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.