Narrative:

Performing ZZZ1 airport qualification. Received aircraft for flight with right inboard fuel quantity indicator deferred inoperative. Fueler performed pre-fuel dipstick and determined both fuel indicators did not match fuel dipstick readings. Fuel indicators showed 2700 pounds left inboard and 3200 pounds right inboard. Fuel dipsticks showed 47 units at L1 (4700 pounds according to fueler's table) and 45 units at R1 (4500 pounds). Dispatch and maintenance notified of the discrepancy. We performed troubleshooting per maintenance with no results and reviewed fuel sheet from previous crew. We found a discrepancy on their fuel sheet leaving us with impression that proper procedures were not followed and the problem could have been idented by fueler prior to departure from ZZZ2. The ZZZ2 fueler's pre-dipstick reading was 4.3 (4300 pounds); however; the 'fuel in tank' amount was recorded as 2730 pounds. We concluded he read off the fuel indicator from the wing which was in agreement with the indicator in the cockpit when we compared the two in ZZZ1. The local fueler tables were not set up to read fuel readings less than 34 units (3400 pounds). We are routinely landing with less fuel than 3400 pounds per tank and he indicated we could not verify the quantity with the dipstick because we did not have the data. Maintenance concurred. Local maintenance performed troubleshooting per maintenance with no results initially. Consulting with maintenance on MEL it was determined we could not dispatch with both fuel quantity indicators inoperative. Flight canceled. Plan was to conduct type 2 maintenance ferry; however; we consulted fom and determined that we did not meet requirements with no MEL procedure for fuel quantity indicators. Dispatch and manager notified. My partner (captain) continued to help local maintenance troubleshoot fuel problem. He suggested we defuel and refuel with a known quantity of fuel. Upon completion of refuel it was determined by fueler and mechanic that the indicators and dipstick readings were in agreement with each other. However; when we arrived back at aircraft; fuel was not distributed properly creating further confusion. Fuel in left outboard showed 600 pounds with 4100 pounds in left inboard. Dipstick reading was zero at L5 and 55 at L1 initially. Fuel in right outboard indicated 1560 pounds and 3160 pounds in right inboard. We xferred fuel from left inboard to left outboard and fuel discrepancy resolved. Conducted ferry flight to ZZZ2. Concerns include: 1) dispatching aircraft with this problem and little air carrier support on site if other indicator is unknowingly inoperative or goes inoperative. 2) pilot's lack of knowledge about this process when it came time to help support procedure in ZZZ1 and determine proper fuel quantity was on board out of ZZZ2 and ZZZ1. 3) unable to determine fuel reading below 34 units because fuel table does not read below that. 4) defueling and refueling with known quantity of fuel (which seemed to fix problem) was not performed until after cancellation. 5) multiple system discrepancies which complicated and confused the overall issue. 6) lack of communication to passenger about the nature of the problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 INCURRED A TRIP CANCELLATION DUE TO FUELER UNABLE TO ACCOMPLISH FUEL INDICATOR INOP MEL SPECIAL PROCS. FUEL LEVELS BELOW 3400 LBS DO NOT APPEAR ON FUEL TABLE.

Narrative: PERFORMING ZZZ1 ARPT QUALIFICATION. RECEIVED ACFT FOR FLT WITH R INBOARD FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR DEFERRED INOP. FUELER PERFORMED PRE-FUEL DIPSTICK AND DETERMINED BOTH FUEL INDICATORS DID NOT MATCH FUEL DIPSTICK READINGS. FUEL INDICATORS SHOWED 2700 LBS L INBOARD AND 3200 LBS R INBOARD. FUEL DIPSTICKS SHOWED 47 UNITS AT L1 (4700 LBS ACCORDING TO FUELER'S TABLE) AND 45 UNITS AT R1 (4500 LBS). DISPATCH AND MAINT NOTIFIED OF THE DISCREPANCY. WE PERFORMED TROUBLESHOOTING PER MAINT WITH NO RESULTS AND REVIEWED FUEL SHEET FROM PREVIOUS CREW. WE FOUND A DISCREPANCY ON THEIR FUEL SHEET LEAVING US WITH IMPRESSION THAT PROPER PROCS WERE NOT FOLLOWED AND THE PROB COULD HAVE BEEN IDENTED BY FUELER PRIOR TO DEP FROM ZZZ2. THE ZZZ2 FUELER'S PRE-DIPSTICK READING WAS 4.3 (4300 LBS); HOWEVER; THE 'FUEL IN TANK' AMOUNT WAS RECORDED AS 2730 LBS. WE CONCLUDED HE READ OFF THE FUEL INDICATOR FROM THE WING WHICH WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE INDICATOR IN THE COCKPIT WHEN WE COMPARED THE TWO IN ZZZ1. THE LCL FUELER TABLES WERE NOT SET UP TO READ FUEL READINGS LESS THAN 34 UNITS (3400 LBS). WE ARE ROUTINELY LNDG WITH LESS FUEL THAN 3400 LBS PER TANK AND HE INDICATED WE COULD NOT VERIFY THE QUANTITY WITH THE DIPSTICK BECAUSE WE DID NOT HAVE THE DATA. MAINT CONCURRED. LCL MAINT PERFORMED TROUBLESHOOTING PER MAINT WITH NO RESULTS INITIALLY. CONSULTING WITH MAINT ON MEL IT WAS DETERMINED WE COULD NOT DISPATCH WITH BOTH FUEL QUANTITY INDICATORS INOP. FLT CANCELED. PLAN WAS TO CONDUCT TYPE 2 MAINT FERRY; HOWEVER; WE CONSULTED FOM AND DETERMINED THAT WE DID NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS WITH NO MEL PROC FOR FUEL QUANTITY INDICATORS. DISPATCH AND MGR NOTIFIED. MY PARTNER (CAPT) CONTINUED TO HELP LCL MAINT TROUBLESHOOT FUEL PROB. HE SUGGESTED WE DEFUEL AND REFUEL WITH A KNOWN QUANTITY OF FUEL. UPON COMPLETION OF REFUEL IT WAS DETERMINED BY FUELER AND MECH THAT THE INDICATORS AND DIPSTICK READINGS WERE IN AGREEMENT WITH EACH OTHER. HOWEVER; WHEN WE ARRIVED BACK AT ACFT; FUEL WAS NOT DISTRIBUTED PROPERLY CREATING FURTHER CONFUSION. FUEL IN L OUTBOARD SHOWED 600 LBS WITH 4100 LBS IN L INBOARD. DIPSTICK READING WAS ZERO AT L5 AND 55 AT L1 INITIALLY. FUEL IN R OUTBOARD INDICATED 1560 LBS AND 3160 LBS IN R INBOARD. WE XFERRED FUEL FROM L INBOARD TO L OUTBOARD AND FUEL DISCREPANCY RESOLVED. CONDUCTED FERRY FLT TO ZZZ2. CONCERNS INCLUDE: 1) DISPATCHING ACFT WITH THIS PROB AND LITTLE ACR SUPPORT ON SITE IF OTHER INDICATOR IS UNKNOWINGLY INOP OR GOES INOP. 2) PLT'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THIS PROCESS WHEN IT CAME TIME TO HELP SUPPORT PROC IN ZZZ1 AND DETERMINE PROPER FUEL QUANTITY WAS ON BOARD OUT OF ZZZ2 AND ZZZ1. 3) UNABLE TO DETERMINE FUEL READING BELOW 34 UNITS BECAUSE FUEL TABLE DOES NOT READ BELOW THAT. 4) DEFUELING AND REFUELING WITH KNOWN QUANTITY OF FUEL (WHICH SEEMED TO FIX PROB) WAS NOT PERFORMED UNTIL AFTER CANCELLATION. 5) MULTIPLE SYS DISCREPANCIES WHICH COMPLICATED AND CONFUSED THE OVERALL ISSUE. 6) LACK OF COM TO PAX ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.