Narrative:

Landed runway 8L. After clearing runway; first officer received gate X as our gate; which is not shown on the airport page. He then asked operations where the gate was located and they informed us it was by gate Y. I transitioned into a single engine taxi and taxied for approximately 16 mins. I entered the ramp area and idented the gate. There were 2 lead-in lines (xa or xb). I elected to line up on xa and stopped approximately 150 ft from gate. After completing the stop; I saw the guide person run out and started marshalling me in on the xa line. We followed the guide person's instructions and the taxi speed was around 3 KTS. The first officer and I talked about the placement of a power cart located to the right of the taxi line and around the stop marks. I asked the first officer to keep a close eye on the power cart. I kept following the guide person and the first officer watched for the clearance on the external power cart. When the signal for stop was given; I immediately stopped. As I stopped I felt a thud in brake pedals. The first officer felt it too and looked to his right and verified we did not hit the power cart or any other obstruction. I looked to my left and saw the top of the #1 engine nacelle was against the bottom of the jetbridge. I directed the first officer to shut down the #1 engine. I contacted operations and told them what happened. They said they had already been told. I contacted dispatch via cell phone and asked for the flight duty manager and maintenance control to join us on the call. I told them what happened and discussed whether the aircraft should be moved. We came to the conclusion not to move the aircraft and take pictures of the engine and parking placement of the aircraft. The next priority was to deplane the passenger. We coordination with operations to get airstairs and was told it would take 10 mins. After several calls; the airstairs arrived about 1 hour after the incident. After the airstairs were delivered; the contract mechanic asked the airstairs not to be used because it might cause further damage to the nacelle when the passenger deplane because of the weight change. He was worried about the nacelle rubbing against the jetway and said he had been talking with maintenance control. After coordination with the maintenance control engine controller and flight duty manager; we all agreed to push the aircraft back 2-3 ft and deplane the passenger. This took an additional 20 mins. We deplaned the passenger after almost 1 1/2 hours after the incident and there were no passenger injuries. Here are some of my observations: this whole incident was not a lack of effort; but a lack of communication and coordination. After talking with the guide person; her plan was to park us and then run upstairs and operate the jetway because of manpwr constraints. Gate X was a brand new gate for us; about 1 week old; and was only used for rj's and never had a mainline aircraft park there. One of the rj's was parked at a gate mainline aircraft use all the time. In my opinion; the jetway was never reconfigured to accept a mainline aircraft before our arrival. I feel attention to detail and manpwr issues were a key factor to this incident. Good employees working hard but making mistakes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319'S L ENG COWL STRUCK A JETWAY AFTER THE MARSHALLER GAVE THE CAPT A LATE STOP SIGNAL AT AN IMPROPERLY POSITIONED JETWAY.

Narrative: LANDED RWY 8L. AFTER CLRING RWY; FO RECEIVED GATE X AS OUR GATE; WHICH IS NOT SHOWN ON THE ARPT PAGE. HE THEN ASKED OPS WHERE THE GATE WAS LOCATED AND THEY INFORMED US IT WAS BY GATE Y. I TRANSITIONED INTO A SINGLE ENG TAXI AND TAXIED FOR APPROX 16 MINS. I ENTERED THE RAMP AREA AND IDENTED THE GATE. THERE WERE 2 LEAD-IN LINES (XA OR XB). I ELECTED TO LINE UP ON XA AND STOPPED APPROX 150 FT FROM GATE. AFTER COMPLETING THE STOP; I SAW THE GUIDE PERSON RUN OUT AND STARTED MARSHALLING ME IN ON THE XA LINE. WE FOLLOWED THE GUIDE PERSON'S INSTRUCTIONS AND THE TAXI SPD WAS AROUND 3 KTS. THE FO AND I TALKED ABOUT THE PLACEMENT OF A PWR CART LOCATED TO THE R OF THE TAXI LINE AND AROUND THE STOP MARKS. I ASKED THE FO TO KEEP A CLOSE EYE ON THE PWR CART. I KEPT FOLLOWING THE GUIDE PERSON AND THE FO WATCHED FOR THE CLRNC ON THE EXTERNAL PWR CART. WHEN THE SIGNAL FOR STOP WAS GIVEN; I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED. AS I STOPPED I FELT A THUD IN BRAKE PEDALS. THE FO FELT IT TOO AND LOOKED TO HIS R AND VERIFIED WE DID NOT HIT THE PWR CART OR ANY OTHER OBSTRUCTION. I LOOKED TO MY L AND SAW THE TOP OF THE #1 ENG NACELLE WAS AGAINST THE BOTTOM OF THE JETBRIDGE. I DIRECTED THE FO TO SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. I CONTACTED OPS AND TOLD THEM WHAT HAPPENED. THEY SAID THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN TOLD. I CONTACTED DISPATCH VIA CELL PHONE AND ASKED FOR THE FLT DUTY MGR AND MAINT CTL TO JOIN US ON THE CALL. I TOLD THEM WHAT HAPPENED AND DISCUSSED WHETHER THE ACFT SHOULD BE MOVED. WE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION NOT TO MOVE THE ACFT AND TAKE PICTURES OF THE ENG AND PARKING PLACEMENT OF THE ACFT. THE NEXT PRIORITY WAS TO DEPLANE THE PAX. WE COORD WITH OPS TO GET AIRSTAIRS AND WAS TOLD IT WOULD TAKE 10 MINS. AFTER SEVERAL CALLS; THE AIRSTAIRS ARRIVED ABOUT 1 HR AFTER THE INCIDENT. AFTER THE AIRSTAIRS WERE DELIVERED; THE CONTRACT MECH ASKED THE AIRSTAIRS NOT TO BE USED BECAUSE IT MIGHT CAUSE FURTHER DAMAGE TO THE NACELLE WHEN THE PAX DEPLANE BECAUSE OF THE WT CHANGE. HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE NACELLE RUBBING AGAINST THE JETWAY AND SAID HE HAD BEEN TALKING WITH MAINT CTL. AFTER COORD WITH THE MAINT CTL ENG CTLR AND FLT DUTY MGR; WE ALL AGREED TO PUSH THE ACFT BACK 2-3 FT AND DEPLANE THE PAX. THIS TOOK AN ADDITIONAL 20 MINS. WE DEPLANED THE PAX AFTER ALMOST 1 1/2 HRS AFTER THE INCIDENT AND THERE WERE NO PAX INJURIES. HERE ARE SOME OF MY OBSERVATIONS: THIS WHOLE INCIDENT WAS NOT A LACK OF EFFORT; BUT A LACK OF COM AND COORD. AFTER TALKING WITH THE GUIDE PERSON; HER PLAN WAS TO PARK US AND THEN RUN UPSTAIRS AND OPERATE THE JETWAY BECAUSE OF MANPWR CONSTRAINTS. GATE X WAS A BRAND NEW GATE FOR US; ABOUT 1 WK OLD; AND WAS ONLY USED FOR RJ'S AND NEVER HAD A MAINLINE ACFT PARK THERE. ONE OF THE RJ'S WAS PARKED AT A GATE MAINLINE ACFT USE ALL THE TIME. IN MY OPINION; THE JETWAY WAS NEVER RECONFIGURED TO ACCEPT A MAINLINE ACFT BEFORE OUR ARR. I FEEL ATTN TO DETAIL AND MANPWR ISSUES WERE A KEY FACTOR TO THIS INCIDENT. GOOD EMPLOYEES WORKING HARD BUT MAKING MISTAKES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.