Narrative:

As we approached ZZZ1 from the southeast; ATC turned us to a northerly heading at 13000 ft; for left traffic to runway 16L. Shortly after crossing abeam the end of the runway on downwind; ATC cleared us to descend to 9000 ft. A few seconds later; they turned us to a heading of 260 degrees; for a left base. The captain said he had the runway in sight; so I told ATC and they cleared us for a visual approach to runway 16L. They pointed out an air carrier Y jet on approach to runway 16R and advised us to maintain visual separation. During this time; the captain requested flaps 1 degree; flags 2 degrees; and gear down at the appropriate speeds. I configured the aircraft as he asked on the base leg. At that point; runway 16L came into my view; which confirmed my instincts that we were going to be higher than normal for this point in the approach. The captain disconnected the autoplt during the base-to-final turn. He then asked for flaps 3 degrees; which I selected. As we passed; it became more obvious that we were too high to continue this approach in accordance with air carrier X's stabilized approach policy.' at no point in the approach did the captain use the speed brakes. The captain then asked for flaps full. This time; however; our airspeed was above our vfe-next minus 15 KTS guideline; so I told the captain that the airspeed was too high and left the flaps at 3 degrees. He asked again and again I refused. Finally; he shallowed his descent enough to bleed off the airspeed; and I selected flaps full. The captain then pushed the nose over in an attempt to establish the aircraft on the proper glide path. As a result; our airspeed increased toward red line and I advised him of this. He acknowledged this and continued the approach. Now we were inside 2 mi from the threshold; way too high and way too fast. Our sink rate prompted the aircraft to warn us with an audible 'sink rate' call. The captain continued the approach and executed a landing near the middle of the runway and turned off. The captain later stated that his concern about a fuel temperature advisory ECAM had caused him to question a go around as an option. (At our top of descent; the fuel page displayed a flashing green fuel temperature of -39 degrees in the left outboard tank; which had not yet xferred. After consulting the abnormals section of fom volume ii; the captain increased the speed and lowered our altitude to increase the temperature of the fuel. The advisory went away shortly after that.) on the previous leg; the captain had stated that he believed that the speed brakes should only be used 'when absolutely necessary.' he said that they increase fuel consumption. I feel that this perception prevented him from utilizing them early in the approach; especially on the downwind and base legs. He also seemed overly focused on being on-time for departure and arrival; which might have further lessened the appeal of a go around. As the PNF first officer; I should have been more assertive in suggesting a go around. I had only flown with this captain on one other occasion; going back well over a yr. This was our second leg together on this trip. I was unsure how far he would go with the approach before he initiated a go around. At a certain point; I remember thinking that it could be too large of a risk to take control of the aircraft from the captain and execute the go around. Especially in the airbus; wrestling for control of an aircraft in a high sink rate; low altitude situation could be the more dangerous option. I also think ego played a large part in this incident. As pilots; we have to be willing to accept that sometimes things do not go the way we want them to; and that it doesn't matter whether it's our fault or someone else's. We need to acknowledge a go around as a viable option and prepare for the possibility on every approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 CAPT CONTINUED AN UNSTABILIZED VISUAL APCH TO DEN AFTER A CLOSE-IN TURN FOLLOWED BY A LONG LNDG.

Narrative: AS WE APCHED ZZZ1 FROM THE SE; ATC TURNED US TO A NORTHERLY HDG AT 13000 FT; FOR L TFC TO RWY 16L. SHORTLY AFTER XING ABEAM THE END OF THE RWY ON DOWNWIND; ATC CLRED US TO DSND TO 9000 FT. A FEW SECONDS LATER; THEY TURNED US TO A HDG OF 260 DEGS; FOR A L BASE. THE CAPT SAID HE HAD THE RWY IN SIGHT; SO I TOLD ATC AND THEY CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 16L. THEY POINTED OUT AN ACR Y JET ON APCH TO RWY 16R AND ADVISED US TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION. DURING THIS TIME; THE CAPT REQUESTED FLAPS 1 DEG; FLAGS 2 DEGS; AND GEAR DOWN AT THE APPROPRIATE SPDS. I CONFIGURED THE ACFT AS HE ASKED ON THE BASE LEG. AT THAT POINT; RWY 16L CAME INTO MY VIEW; WHICH CONFIRMED MY INSTINCTS THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE HIGHER THAN NORMAL FOR THIS POINT IN THE APCH. THE CAPT DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT DURING THE BASE-TO-FINAL TURN. HE THEN ASKED FOR FLAPS 3 DEGS; WHICH I SELECTED. AS WE PASSED; IT BECAME MORE OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE TOO HIGH TO CONTINUE THIS APCH IN ACCORDANCE WITH ACR X'S STABILIZED APCH POLICY.' AT NO POINT IN THE APCH DID THE CAPT USE THE SPD BRAKES. THE CAPT THEN ASKED FOR FLAPS FULL. THIS TIME; HOWEVER; OUR AIRSPD WAS ABOVE OUR VFE-NEXT MINUS 15 KTS GUIDELINE; SO I TOLD THE CAPT THAT THE AIRSPD WAS TOO HIGH AND LEFT THE FLAPS AT 3 DEGS. HE ASKED AGAIN AND AGAIN I REFUSED. FINALLY; HE SHALLOWED HIS DSCNT ENOUGH TO BLEED OFF THE AIRSPD; AND I SELECTED FLAPS FULL. THE CAPT THEN PUSHED THE NOSE OVER IN AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE ACFT ON THE PROPER GLIDE PATH. AS A RESULT; OUR AIRSPD INCREASED TOWARD RED LINE AND I ADVISED HIM OF THIS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND CONTINUED THE APCH. NOW WE WERE INSIDE 2 MI FROM THE THRESHOLD; WAY TOO HIGH AND WAY TOO FAST. OUR SINK RATE PROMPTED THE ACFT TO WARN US WITH AN AUDIBLE 'SINK RATE' CALL. THE CAPT CONTINUED THE APCH AND EXECUTED A LNDG NEAR THE MIDDLE OF THE RWY AND TURNED OFF. THE CAPT LATER STATED THAT HIS CONCERN ABOUT A FUEL TEMP ADVISORY ECAM HAD CAUSED HIM TO QUESTION A GAR AS AN OPTION. (AT OUR TOP OF DSCNT; THE FUEL PAGE DISPLAYED A FLASHING GREEN FUEL TEMP OF -39 DEGS IN THE L OUTBOARD TANK; WHICH HAD NOT YET XFERRED. AFTER CONSULTING THE ABNORMALS SECTION OF FOM VOLUME II; THE CAPT INCREASED THE SPD AND LOWERED OUR ALT TO INCREASE THE TEMP OF THE FUEL. THE ADVISORY WENT AWAY SHORTLY AFTER THAT.) ON THE PREVIOUS LEG; THE CAPT HAD STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE SPD BRAKES SHOULD ONLY BE USED 'WHEN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.' HE SAID THAT THEY INCREASE FUEL CONSUMPTION. I FEEL THAT THIS PERCEPTION PREVENTED HIM FROM UTILIZING THEM EARLY IN THE APCH; ESPECIALLY ON THE DOWNWIND AND BASE LEGS. HE ALSO SEEMED OVERLY FOCUSED ON BEING ON-TIME FOR DEP AND ARR; WHICH MIGHT HAVE FURTHER LESSENED THE APPEAL OF A GAR. AS THE PNF FO; I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE IN SUGGESTING A GAR. I HAD ONLY FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT ON ONE OTHER OCCASION; GOING BACK WELL OVER A YR. THIS WAS OUR SECOND LEG TOGETHER ON THIS TRIP. I WAS UNSURE HOW FAR HE WOULD GO WITH THE APCH BEFORE HE INITIATED A GAR. AT A CERTAIN POINT; I REMEMBER THINKING THAT IT COULD BE TOO LARGE OF A RISK TO TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT FROM THE CAPT AND EXECUTE THE GAR. ESPECIALLY IN THE AIRBUS; WRESTLING FOR CTL OF AN ACFT IN A HIGH SINK RATE; LOW ALT SITUATION COULD BE THE MORE DANGEROUS OPTION. I ALSO THINK EGO PLAYED A LARGE PART IN THIS INCIDENT. AS PLTS; WE HAVE TO BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THAT SOMETIMES THINGS DO NOT GO THE WAY WE WANT THEM TO; AND THAT IT DOESN'T MATTER WHETHER IT'S OUR FAULT OR SOMEONE ELSE'S. WE NEED TO ACKNOWLEDGE A GAR AS A VIABLE OPTION AND PREPARE FOR THE POSSIBILITY ON EVERY APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.