Narrative:

On preflight inspection; I noticed a 14 inch puddle of fresh fluid under the left engine and a trail of drops 4 inches apart leading from the taxiway (33 spots per 18 ft). Upon further investigation the lower engine drain mast was leaking fluid out of the hole marked 'idg (integrated drive generator).' I notified the captain and station operations. Captain started to call support personnel. A mechanic was sent out and had us run the engine and reported the drip rate at 3 drops per minute within limits. When we went out to look at the drip I counted 12 drips per minute and a larger puddle approximately 21 inches and fluid still dripping. The mechanic did not visually inspect the idg nor know how much fluid was left in the idg. If we were only leaking 3 drops per minute while the engine was running; how do you explain the 33 drops per 18 ft on taxi in? That means it took us 11 minutes to taxi 18 ft. Our total taxi time was under 5 minutes.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the leak was from the idg drive and not the engine and yet the technician added two qts of oil to the engine. The technician was a recent transfer in to the station from a major maintenance facility sheet metal shop and was unfamiliar with the idg. The oil level sight gauge of the idg was never checked. The oil leak would decrease when the engine was run at a higher power level than idle; but on shutdown just poured out of the idg cavity drain. The airplane was taken out of service and two technicians were sent to the station to replace the idg seals. The technician was a long time company employee and was 'bumped' into the station with seniority to hold the only job open in the system.supplemental information from acn 688137: I called maintenance and operations and had a mechanic come out to look at it. He put 2 qts of oil in the engine; we ran it up; he counted three drips/minute; said it was within limits and told the customer service rep to start boarding. We witnessed 12 drops/minute after shutdown and refused the aircraft. At no time did anyone open the cowl or check the idg oil levels before the aircraft was released. We had no idea if there was any oil left in the idg or if there was a substantial qty of oil inside the cowl that could pose a fire hazard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 WAS REFUSED DUE TO THE L ENG IDG OIL LEAK BEYOND DISPATCH LIMITS.

Narrative: ON PREFLT INSPECTION; I NOTICED A 14 INCH PUDDLE OF FRESH FLUID UNDER THE L ENG AND A TRAIL OF DROPS 4 INCHES APART LEADING FROM THE TXWY (33 SPOTS PER 18 FT). UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION THE LOWER ENG DRAIN MAST WAS LEAKING FLUID OUT OF THE HOLE MARKED 'IDG (INTEGRATED DRIVE GENERATOR).' I NOTIFIED THE CAPT AND STATION OPS. CAPT STARTED TO CALL SUPPORT PERSONNEL. A MECHANIC WAS SENT OUT AND HAD US RUN THE ENG AND RPTED THE DRIP RATE AT 3 DROPS PER MINUTE WITHIN LIMITS. WHEN WE WENT OUT TO LOOK AT THE DRIP I COUNTED 12 DRIPS PER MINUTE AND A LARGER PUDDLE APPROX 21 INCHES AND FLUID STILL DRIPPING. THE MECHANIC DID NOT VISUALLY INSPECT THE IDG NOR KNOW HOW MUCH FLUID WAS LEFT IN THE IDG. IF WE WERE ONLY LEAKING 3 DROPS PER MINUTE WHILE THE ENG WAS RUNNING; HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE 33 DROPS PER 18 FT ON TAXI IN? THAT MEANS IT TOOK US 11 MINUTES TO TAXI 18 FT. OUR TOTAL TAXI TIME WAS UNDER 5 MINUTES.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE LEAK WAS FROM THE IDG DRIVE AND NOT THE ENG AND YET THE TECHNICIAN ADDED TWO QTS OF OIL TO THE ENG. THE TECHNICIAN WAS A RECENT TRANSFER IN TO THE STATION FROM A MAJOR MAINT FACILITY SHEET METAL SHOP AND WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE IDG. THE OIL LEVEL SIGHT GAUGE OF THE IDG WAS NEVER CHECKED. THE OIL LEAK WOULD DECREASE WHEN THE ENG WAS RUN AT A HIGHER POWER LEVEL THAN IDLE; BUT ON SHUTDOWN JUST POURED OUT OF THE IDG CAVITY DRAIN. THE AIRPLANE WAS TAKEN OUT OF SVC AND TWO TECHNICIANS WERE SENT TO THE STATION TO REPLACE THE IDG SEALS. THE TECHNICIAN WAS A LONG TIME COMPANY EMPLOYEE AND WAS 'BUMPED' INTO THE STATION WITH SENIORITY TO HOLD THE ONLY JOB OPEN IN THE SYSTEM.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 688137: I CALLED MAINT AND OPS AND HAD A MECHANIC COME OUT TO LOOK AT IT. HE PUT 2 QTS OF OIL IN THE ENG; WE RAN IT UP; HE COUNTED THREE DRIPS/MINUTE; SAID IT WAS WITHIN LIMITS AND TOLD THE CUSTOMER SVC REP TO START BOARDING. WE WITNESSED 12 DROPS/MINUTE AFTER SHUTDOWN AND REFUSED THE ACFT. AT NO TIME DID ANYONE OPEN THE COWL OR CHECK THE IDG OIL LEVELS BEFORE THE ACFT WAS RELEASED. WE HAD NO IDEA IF THERE WAS ANY OIL LEFT IN THE IDG OR IF THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL QTY OF OIL INSIDE THE COWL THAT COULD POSE A FIRE HAZARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.