Narrative:

We had received our IFR clearance approximately 30 mins before engine start; and after calling for taxi instructions; we promptly received an amended clearance. The original clearance was a simple procedure that involved flying runway heading until 1.5 DME and then turning to a heading of 100 degrees and expect radar vectors after that. Upon calling for taxi; our amended clearance stated that we were now cleared to execute the kennedy 7 departure canarsie climb. As we taxied; we reviewed the departure procedure and found it to be a jumbled mess of confusing turns; crossing restrs and altitude assignments. All of the instructions were mixed into 1 long; confusing run-on sentence. There was no differentiation between the route (which was actually quite simple) that was to be flown and several poorly described and confusing crossing restrs which seemed completely out of place and order. As we taxied; we discussed the departure and thought we had it figured out. Shortly after contacting departure; we were told that we were off course; and were asked if we were able to visually identify a bridge that was located off our right side. We confirmed that we saw the bridge; which was approximately 1.5 mi off our right; and the controller stated that we were supposed to be over that bridge on the 176 degree radial from canarsie VOR. We were then given a heading to intercept the proper course and shortly thereafter (prior to the intercept) given a clearance to go direct to another fix further down the road. The controller politely explained where we were actually supposed to be and that the area we were over was noise sensitive. There were no traffic issues caused by our being off course. To prevent something like this; or an incident that could have been a lot worse; from happening again; there are a few things that I think should be looked at. First of all; the crews' performance was at fault. We clearly did not take enough time to look at the procedure and verify that we were both completely clear on exactly what was involved in this departure. We may have been somewhat overwhelmed by the last second change in routing or have felt pressure from the controllers to depart sooner than we were ready to; due to other departing traffic behind us. Needless to say; I; as the PIC should not have let either one of thos situations occur. In the future; I will be absolutely certain that myself and my copilot understand all aspects of our routing prior to accepting a takeoff clearance. The other problem that I see; was the very unclr and jumbled mess of a departure description. I believe that the routing description and the altitude and crossing restrs should be in 2 separate places. I think this would alleviate confusion and simplify the entire procedure. Another thing about the crossing restrs was the way they were stated using radials to define crossing restrs. I find this very confusing and a rather archaic way of giving these restrs. I have operated in some fairly complex and information-filled cockpits; and I have never seen one that could compute; prior to takeoff; how high I will be when crossing a particular radial. Wouldn't it be much clrer to simply state; 'climb as rapidly as possible' until a certain fix. I think that in a case such as this; where the restrs are only there for noise and not obstacle clearance; that this would be a much better way to describe the need for a good rate of climb. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter advised that because they felt pushed to get airborne they had not taken the time to line select and install the canarsie climb into their FMS. They intended to hand fly the departure using raw data. He was unable to recall why they had turned well inside the required lateral path.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CONFUSED BY THE SID CHART DESCRIPTION AND ILL PREPARED FOR TKOF FOLLOWING A LAST MIN DEP PROC CHANGE; FLT CREW OF TURBOJET LTT HAVE TRACK DEV ON CANARSIE CLB SEGMENT OF KENNEDY SID FROM JFK.

Narrative: WE HAD RECEIVED OUR IFR CLRNC APPROX 30 MINS BEFORE ENG START; AND AFTER CALLING FOR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS; WE PROMPTLY RECEIVED AN AMENDED CLRNC. THE ORIGINAL CLRNC WAS A SIMPLE PROC THAT INVOLVED FLYING RWY HDG UNTIL 1.5 DME AND THEN TURNING TO A HDG OF 100 DEGS AND EXPECT RADAR VECTORS AFTER THAT. UPON CALLING FOR TAXI; OUR AMENDED CLRNC STATED THAT WE WERE NOW CLRED TO EXECUTE THE KENNEDY 7 DEP CANARSIE CLB. AS WE TAXIED; WE REVIEWED THE DEP PROC AND FOUND IT TO BE A JUMBLED MESS OF CONFUSING TURNS; XING RESTRS AND ALT ASSIGNMENTS. ALL OF THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE MIXED INTO 1 LONG; CONFUSING RUN-ON SENTENCE. THERE WAS NO DIFFERENTIATION BTWN THE RTE (WHICH WAS ACTUALLY QUITE SIMPLE) THAT WAS TO BE FLOWN AND SEVERAL POORLY DESCRIBED AND CONFUSING XING RESTRS WHICH SEEMED COMPLETELY OUT OF PLACE AND ORDER. AS WE TAXIED; WE DISCUSSED THE DEP AND THOUGHT WE HAD IT FIGURED OUT. SHORTLY AFTER CONTACTING DEP; WE WERE TOLD THAT WE WERE OFF COURSE; AND WERE ASKED IF WE WERE ABLE TO VISUALLY IDENT A BRIDGE THAT WAS LOCATED OFF OUR R SIDE. WE CONFIRMED THAT WE SAW THE BRIDGE; WHICH WAS APPROX 1.5 MI OFF OUR R; AND THE CTLR STATED THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE OVER THAT BRIDGE ON THE 176 DEG RADIAL FROM CANARSIE VOR. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A HDG TO INTERCEPT THE PROPER COURSE AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER (PRIOR TO THE INTERCEPT) GIVEN A CLRNC TO GO DIRECT TO ANOTHER FIX FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD. THE CTLR POLITELY EXPLAINED WHERE WE WERE ACTUALLY SUPPOSED TO BE AND THAT THE AREA WE WERE OVER WAS NOISE SENSITIVE. THERE WERE NO TFC ISSUES CAUSED BY OUR BEING OFF COURSE. TO PREVENT SOMETHING LIKE THIS; OR AN INCIDENT THAT COULD HAVE BEEN A LOT WORSE; FROM HAPPENING AGAIN; THERE ARE A FEW THINGS THAT I THINK SHOULD BE LOOKED AT. FIRST OF ALL; THE CREWS' PERFORMANCE WAS AT FAULT. WE CLRLY DID NOT TAKE ENOUGH TIME TO LOOK AT THE PROC AND VERIFY THAT WE WERE BOTH COMPLETELY CLR ON EXACTLY WHAT WAS INVOLVED IN THIS DEP. WE MAY HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT OVERWHELMED BY THE LAST SECOND CHANGE IN ROUTING OR HAVE FELT PRESSURE FROM THE CTLRS TO DEPART SOONER THAN WE WERE READY TO; DUE TO OTHER DEPARTING TFC BEHIND US. NEEDLESS TO SAY; I; AS THE PIC SHOULD NOT HAVE LET EITHER ONE OF THOS SITUATIONS OCCUR. IN THE FUTURE; I WILL BE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THAT MYSELF AND MY COPLT UNDERSTAND ALL ASPECTS OF OUR ROUTING PRIOR TO ACCEPTING A TKOF CLRNC. THE OTHER PROB THAT I SEE; WAS THE VERY UNCLR AND JUMBLED MESS OF A DEP DESCRIPTION. I BELIEVE THAT THE ROUTING DESCRIPTION AND THE ALT AND XING RESTRS SHOULD BE IN 2 SEPARATE PLACES. I THINK THIS WOULD ALLEVIATE CONFUSION AND SIMPLIFY THE ENTIRE PROC. ANOTHER THING ABOUT THE XING RESTRS WAS THE WAY THEY WERE STATED USING RADIALS TO DEFINE XING RESTRS. I FIND THIS VERY CONFUSING AND A RATHER ARCHAIC WAY OF GIVING THESE RESTRS. I HAVE OPERATED IN SOME FAIRLY COMPLEX AND INFO-FILLED COCKPITS; AND I HAVE NEVER SEEN ONE THAT COULD COMPUTE; PRIOR TO TKOF; HOW HIGH I WILL BE WHEN XING A PARTICULAR RADIAL. WOULDN'T IT BE MUCH CLRER TO SIMPLY STATE; 'CLB AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE' UNTIL A CERTAIN FIX. I THINK THAT IN A CASE SUCH AS THIS; WHERE THE RESTRS ARE ONLY THERE FOR NOISE AND NOT OBSTACLE CLRNC; THAT THIS WOULD BE A MUCH BETTER WAY TO DESCRIBE THE NEED FOR A GOOD RATE OF CLB. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR ADVISED THAT BECAUSE THEY FELT PUSHED TO GET AIRBORNE THEY HAD NOT TAKEN THE TIME TO LINE SELECT AND INSTALL THE CANARSIE CLB INTO THEIR FMS. THEY INTENDED TO HAND FLY THE DEP USING RAW DATA. HE WAS UNABLE TO RECALL WHY THEY HAD TURNED WELL INSIDE THE REQUIRED LATERAL PATH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.