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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 690363 |
Time | |
Date | 200603 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : pdx.airport |
State Reference | OR |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-400 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : takeoff roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
ASRS Report | 690363 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Company |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
Upon departure roll at pdx; the first officer remarked that he had to use excessive pressures and trim to fly the aircraft compared to what he normally experienced. During climb out; I contacted operations to ask them to review the weight and balance computations as the aircraft did not feel right on takeoff. They checked the data and confirmed the computations were done correctly and that nothing was amiss. They also mentioned that 20 transfer bags that potentially could have been on the aircraft were not boarded as the inbound flight with those bags had not yet arrived. A few minutes later the operations agent initiated contact with us to notify us that some 20 additional bags were actually boarded in the aft pit. At that point I was confused as to what bags they were if the inbound transfer aircraft had not yet arrived. I subsequently contacted dispatch to request a phone patch with the duty office to assess the circumstances and review an appropriate course of action. After several attempts the dispatcher said that he was unable to patch the duty office on to the frequency but that he would relay my circumstances to him. I then requested that a baggage/cargo audit be performed upon arrival. I also requested that the new weights and cg be provided to us as we obviously departed with incorrect weight and balance information. The revised information revealed a 400 pound increase in the aircraft ZFW; a 500 pound increase in aircraft tow and a 2.7 percent aft cg shift. Approximately 30 minutes after arrival; the individual that performed the inbound baggage audit disclosed to me that they found an additional 630 pounds of bags loaded in pit 6 that had not been computed in the original weight and balance computations. He indicated that they were going to file a report on the matter.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter indicated that the problem with the incorrect loading of the baggage cargo is an ongoing problem and appears to stem from the company outsourcing the ramp operation to another company. The company operations agent sends the load plan to the ramp personnel and the communications appear to break down. He indicated that the training and procedures seem to be lacking. Additionally; it appears that bags arrive from other carriers and the reporter is worried that the material has not been checked properly for security. The crew receives the load manifest via ACARS and this is the only source they have to load the information into the FMC for cg and ATOG with regard to aircraft performance. The flight crew is at the mercy of the ramp personnel and the operations agent to ensure that the aircraft is loaded properly and within cg/weight limits. The reporter indicated that the first officer was the PF and that at liftoff; the aircraft was excessively nose heavy and this prompted the flight crew to query the company to investigate the aircraft loading. This is when it was found that the aircraft was loaded improperly and that it was in excess of 600 pounds over the manifest reported weight.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-400 FLT CREW HAS WT AND BALANCE ISSUES AFTER TKOF. ACFT IS HARD TO TRIM AND FLT CREW DISCOVERS EXCESSIVE BAGGAGE WAS LOADED AND NOT RPTED.
Narrative: UPON DEP ROLL AT PDX; THE FO REMARKED THAT HE HAD TO USE EXCESSIVE PRESSURES AND TRIM TO FLY THE ACFT COMPARED TO WHAT HE NORMALLY EXPERIENCED. DURING CLBOUT; I CONTACTED OPERATIONS TO ASK THEM TO REVIEW THE WT AND BALANCE COMPUTATIONS AS THE ACFT DID NOT FEEL RIGHT ON TKOF. THEY CHKED THE DATA AND CONFIRMED THE COMPUTATIONS WERE DONE CORRECTLY AND THAT NOTHING WAS AMISS. THEY ALSO MENTIONED THAT 20 TRANSFER BAGS THAT POTENTIALLY COULD HAVE BEEN ON THE ACFT WERE NOT BOARDED AS THE INBOUND FLT WITH THOSE BAGS HAD NOT YET ARRIVED. A FEW MINUTES LATER THE OPS AGENT INITIATED CONTACT WITH US TO NOTIFY US THAT SOME 20 ADDITIONAL BAGS WERE ACTUALLY BOARDED IN THE AFT PIT. AT THAT POINT I WAS CONFUSED AS TO WHAT BAGS THEY WERE IF THE INBOUND TRANSFER ACFT HAD NOT YET ARRIVED. I SUBSEQUENTLY CONTACTED DISPATCH TO REQUEST A PHONE PATCH WITH THE DUTY OFFICE TO ASSESS THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND REVIEW AN APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION. AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS THE DISPATCHER SAID THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO PATCH THE DUTY OFFICE ON TO THE FREQ BUT THAT HE WOULD RELAY MY CIRCUMSTANCES TO HIM. I THEN REQUESTED THAT A BAGGAGE/CARGO AUDIT BE PERFORMED UPON ARR. I ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE NEW WTS AND CG BE PROVIDED TO US AS WE OBVIOUSLY DEPARTED WITH INCORRECT WT AND BALANCE INFO. THE REVISED INFO REVEALED A 400 LB INCREASE IN THE ACFT ZFW; A 500 LB INCREASE IN ACFT TOW AND A 2.7 PERCENT AFT CG SHIFT. APPROX 30 MINUTES AFTER ARR; THE INDIVIDUAL THAT PERFORMED THE INBOUND BAGGAGE AUDIT DISCLOSED TO ME THAT THEY FOUND AN ADDITIONAL 630 LBS OF BAGS LOADED IN PIT 6 THAT HAD NOT BEEN COMPUTED IN THE ORIGINAL WT AND BAL COMPUTATIONS. HE INDICATED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO FILE A RPT ON THE MATTER.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR INDICATED THAT THE PROBLEM WITH THE INCORRECT LOADING OF THE BAGGAGE CARGO IS AN ONGOING PROBLEM AND APPEARS TO STEM FROM THE COMPANY OUTSOURCING THE RAMP OPERATION TO ANOTHER COMPANY. THE COMPANY OPERATIONS AGENT SENDS THE LOAD PLAN TO THE RAMP PERSONNEL AND THE COMMUNICATIONS APPEAR TO BREAK DOWN. HE INDICATED THAT THE TRAINING AND PROCS SEEM TO BE LACKING. ADDITIONALLY; IT APPEARS THAT BAGS ARRIVE FROM OTHER CARRIERS AND THE RPTR IS WORRIED THAT THE MATERIAL HAS NOT BEEN CHKED PROPERLY FOR SECURITY. THE CREW RECEIVES THE LOAD MANIFEST VIA ACARS AND THIS IS THE ONLY SOURCE THEY HAVE TO LOAD THE INFO INTO THE FMC FOR CG AND ATOG WITH REGARD TO ACFT PERFORMANCE. THE FLT CREW IS AT THE MERCY OF THE RAMP PERSONNEL AND THE OPERATIONS AGENT TO ENSURE THAT THE ACFT IS LOADED PROPERLY AND WITHIN CG/WT LIMITS. THE RPTR INDICATED THAT THE FO WAS THE PF AND THAT AT LIFTOFF; THE ACFT WAS EXCESSIVELY NOSE HVY AND THIS PROMPTED THE FLT CREW TO QUERY THE COMPANY TO INVESTIGATE THE ACFT LOADING. THIS IS WHEN IT WAS FOUND THAT THE ACFT WAS LOADED IMPROPERLY AND THAT IT WAS IN EXCESS OF 600 LBS OVER THE MANIFEST RPTED WT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.