37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 692891 |
Time | |
Date | 200604 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001 To 0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | msl single value : 37000 |
Environment | |
Weather Elements | Thunderstorm |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zzz.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 210 flight time total : 10000 flight time type : 600 |
ASRS Report | 692891 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 24000 flight time type : 2000 |
ASRS Report | 692892 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : fuel qty gauges |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | other other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
We had a normal preflight except prior to push dispatch recommended a rerte for WX. After ACARS back and forth we accepted the change and called clearance delivery. After pushback we made the changes in the FMC; noted plenty of fuel and started taxiing. We originally had 10000 pounds in the left wing tank; 1980 pounds in the center tank and 10000 pounds in the right tank with 21900 total indicated. Everything seemed normal during takeoff and climb out with some right rudder being put in by the captain. At FL240 we noticed a fuel imbal. The aircraft was showing 1500 pounds lighter on the right side. The conversation started with the 3 previous write-ups on the right fuel gauge. After monitoring the gauge a little we pulled the engine fuel leak checklist wrote the fuel levels down and started the timer. While we monitored the fuel level changes the captain had the flight attendant look at the right engine and trailing edge for fuel spray and the right tank was at 8260. After noticing a continuous steady increase in the fuel imbal while the fuel flows showed heavier usage on the #1 engine the first officer went back for visual inspection after the flight attendants could not find any leak. The captain briefed the purser while I was in the back. I found nothing. After 10 mins the tank levels were 9160 in the left and 7400 in the right. We had increased the imbal 200 pounds in 10 mins. We also showed fuel used plus fuel burned was 2000 pounds lighter than pushback fuel. We felt this satisfied the 500 pound imbal increase in 30 mins and told maintenance and dispatch we were returning to land which was the closest suitable airport and it had good VFR WX. Maintenance said it sounded like a good idea. While continuing with engine fuel leak and then the in-flight engine shutdown checklist which directed us to the driftdown checklist and numerous performance computations; I started pulling checklists from the flight manual. In the rush; low lighting; and during numerous valid interruptions by ATC; maintenance; and the flight attendants I pulled only the first page of the in-flight engine shutdown checklist. It appeared like there was a complete box around the checklist in the lower light and the checklist ended with 'land at nearest suitable airport' which also made sense for the end of the checklist. We completed all the above checklist and I announced them complete. Then during our briefing we covered flaps 15 degree landing on runway 26 southeast landing and go around checklists; the t-proc for runway 26. We discussed bleeds off or on and opted for on. We did everything on our missed page of the checklist except for the GPWS flap inhibit switch which we got at 400 ft with the first warning. Captain had his best landing of the identify and we had the fire trucks inspect us before we taxied to the gate. The right tank was steady at 7000 pounds so we knew we no longer had the leak. We landed with the fuel perfectly in balance. I thought the crew worked great together. Everyone was professional.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-300 RETURNS TO DEP STATION AFTER ENCOUNTERING AN APPARENT FUEL LEAK.
Narrative: WE HAD A NORMAL PREFLT EXCEPT PRIOR TO PUSH DISPATCH RECOMMENDED A RERTE FOR WX. AFTER ACARS BACK AND FORTH WE ACCEPTED THE CHANGE AND CALLED CLRNC DELIVERY. AFTER PUSHBACK WE MADE THE CHANGES IN THE FMC; NOTED PLENTY OF FUEL AND STARTED TAXIING. WE ORIGINALLY HAD 10000 LBS IN THE L WING TANK; 1980 LBS IN THE CTR TANK AND 10000 LBS IN THE R TANK WITH 21900 TOTAL INDICATED. EVERYTHING SEEMED NORMAL DURING TKOF AND CLBOUT WITH SOME R RUDDER BEING PUT IN BY THE CAPT. AT FL240 WE NOTICED A FUEL IMBAL. THE ACFT WAS SHOWING 1500 LBS LIGHTER ON THE R SIDE. THE CONVERSATION STARTED WITH THE 3 PREVIOUS WRITE-UPS ON THE R FUEL GAUGE. AFTER MONITORING THE GAUGE A LITTLE WE PULLED THE ENG FUEL LEAK CHKLIST WROTE THE FUEL LEVELS DOWN AND STARTED THE TIMER. WHILE WE MONITORED THE FUEL LEVEL CHANGES THE CAPT HAD THE FLT ATTENDANT LOOK AT THE R ENG AND TRAILING EDGE FOR FUEL SPRAY AND THE R TANK WAS AT 8260. AFTER NOTICING A CONTINUOUS STEADY INCREASE IN THE FUEL IMBAL WHILE THE FUEL FLOWS SHOWED HEAVIER USAGE ON THE #1 ENG THE FO WENT BACK FOR VISUAL INSPECTION AFTER THE FLT ATTENDANTS COULD NOT FIND ANY LEAK. THE CAPT BRIEFED THE PURSER WHILE I WAS IN THE BACK. I FOUND NOTHING. AFTER 10 MINS THE TANK LEVELS WERE 9160 IN THE L AND 7400 IN THE R. WE HAD INCREASED THE IMBAL 200 LBS IN 10 MINS. WE ALSO SHOWED FUEL USED PLUS FUEL BURNED WAS 2000 LBS LIGHTER THAN PUSHBACK FUEL. WE FELT THIS SATISFIED THE 500 LB IMBAL INCREASE IN 30 MINS AND TOLD MAINT AND DISPATCH WE WERE RETURNING TO LAND WHICH WAS THE CLOSEST SUITABLE ARPT AND IT HAD GOOD VFR WX. MAINT SAID IT SOUNDED LIKE A GOOD IDEA. WHILE CONTINUING WITH ENG FUEL LEAK AND THEN THE INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN CHKLIST WHICH DIRECTED US TO THE DRIFTDOWN CHKLIST AND NUMEROUS PERFORMANCE COMPUTATIONS; I STARTED PULLING CHKLISTS FROM THE FLT MANUAL. IN THE RUSH; LOW LIGHTING; AND DURING NUMEROUS VALID INTERRUPTIONS BY ATC; MAINT; AND THE FLT ATTENDANTS I PULLED ONLY THE FIRST PAGE OF THE INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN CHKLIST. IT APPEARED LIKE THERE WAS A COMPLETE BOX AROUND THE CHKLIST IN THE LOWER LIGHT AND THE CHKLIST ENDED WITH 'LAND AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT' WHICH ALSO MADE SENSE FOR THE END OF THE CHKLIST. WE COMPLETED ALL THE ABOVE CHKLIST AND I ANNOUNCED THEM COMPLETE. THEN DURING OUR BRIEFING WE COVERED FLAPS 15 DEG LNDG ON RWY 26 SE LNDG AND GAR CHKLISTS; THE T-PROC FOR RWY 26. WE DISCUSSED BLEEDS OFF OR ON AND OPTED FOR ON. WE DID EVERYTHING ON OUR MISSED PAGE OF THE CHKLIST EXCEPT FOR THE GPWS FLAP INHIBIT SWITCH WHICH WE GOT AT 400 FT WITH THE FIRST WARNING. CAPT HAD HIS BEST LNDG OF THE IDENT AND WE HAD THE FIRE TRUCKS INSPECT US BEFORE WE TAXIED TO THE GATE. THE R TANK WAS STEADY AT 7000 LBS SO WE KNEW WE NO LONGER HAD THE LEAK. WE LANDED WITH THE FUEL PERFECTLY IN BAL. I THOUGHT THE CREW WORKED GREAT TOGETHER. EVERYONE WAS PROFESSIONAL.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.