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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 692927 |
Time | |
Date | 200602 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : msp.airport |
State Reference | MN |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : pushback ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 210 flight time total : 12000 flight time type : 3600 |
ASRS Report | 692927 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted other |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company Environmental Factor |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
5 mins prior to our scheduled departure time; the aircraft door was closed. At 4 mins prior; I heard the tug operator attempting to establish communication with me via the flight interphone but having difficulty because of what appeared to be a bad headset. I instructed her to get another headset to which she responded that the problem was not the headset but the cord. I told her; in that case; to get another cord to which she did not respond and continued attempting/struggling to establish communications with me via the faulty cord/headset. At our scheduled departure time and after several failed attempts to communicate with her; I was finally able to get the attention of the wing walker who; by this time had come to the tug on my side of the aircraft. I yelled down to him through my sliding window to get another cord and tell the tug operator to stop attempting to use the faulty one. He went to the gate right next to ours; approximately 50 ft away; and returned in less than 1 min with a working cord. It was very evident right away from her tone that she was now having an attitude problem with me. She asked me if I was trained to use hand signals; again with an attitude; as if to say that she felt we should have been using them. I calmly reminded her that I had asked her to get another headset/cord with plenty of time to still get our on-time departure and; since there was a working headset nearby; hand signals were not an option. In any case; that option was mine; not hers. She had also asked me to release the parking brake while attempting to communicate with the faulty headset cord and; now; again did so with the working one before I advised her that we were cleared to push; brakes set. I reminded her that I was awaiting clearance from ATC and that only at that time would the parking brake be released per SOP. Upon receiving ATC clearance and giving her clearance to push; the parking brake was released and push commenced 3 mins late. The initial movement of the aircraft by the tug began with a violent jerk/jolt which would occur by applying too much accelerator too quickly. Any harder and it would have required an inspection of the nose gear. I dismissed that incident as a possible error on her part but soon realized otherwise. As the pushback continued with the customary msp dogleg; I realized that our speed was excessive; approaching reckless; particularly while turning. I quickly commanded her to slow us down; to which I received no verbal response nor reduction in speed. I repeated the command but this time more authoritatively. She then slowed us to a more reasonable speed. I was in utter disbelief that due to her apparent frustration or anger over the headset cord; hand signals; and/or delay; she was willing to put us and the aircraft in harm's way. We disconnected and got airborne without further incident only to find that I had been charged with the delay. I sent a message to dispatch and told her that I was not taking that delay when in fact it was an equipment delay. She advised the flight manager with whom I spoke upon arrival in ord. They both agreed but operations did not make the change. I contacted operations supervisor and the station manager to advise them of the incident. Once I explained what happened; exactly; they then agreed to change the delay code. They were not aware of tug operator's attitude and resultant reckless handling of the tug and aircraft. They both indicated that she would at the very least be retrained/qualified and very possibly disciplined which I indicated was appropriate. I also commented to them that I would not allow her to operate a tug pushing/towing an aircraft under my command until I was assured of her retraining as well as counseling on her attitude.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PUSHBACK TUG OPERATOR OPERATES IN A RECKLESS FASHION AFTER A DISPUTE WITH THE B737 CAPT REGARDING COM EQUIP FAILURES.
Narrative: 5 MINS PRIOR TO OUR SCHEDULED DEP TIME; THE ACFT DOOR WAS CLOSED. AT 4 MINS PRIOR; I HEARD THE TUG OPERATOR ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH COM WITH ME VIA THE FLT INTERPHONE BUT HAVING DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A BAD HEADSET. I INSTRUCTED HER TO GET ANOTHER HEADSET TO WHICH SHE RESPONDED THAT THE PROB WAS NOT THE HEADSET BUT THE CORD. I TOLD HER; IN THAT CASE; TO GET ANOTHER CORD TO WHICH SHE DID NOT RESPOND AND CONTINUED ATTEMPTING/STRUGGLING TO ESTABLISH COMS WITH ME VIA THE FAULTY CORD/HEADSET. AT OUR SCHEDULED DEP TIME AND AFTER SEVERAL FAILED ATTEMPTS TO COMMUNICATE WITH HER; I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO GET THE ATTN OF THE WING WALKER WHO; BY THIS TIME HAD COME TO THE TUG ON MY SIDE OF THE ACFT. I YELLED DOWN TO HIM THROUGH MY SLIDING WINDOW TO GET ANOTHER CORD AND TELL THE TUG OPERATOR TO STOP ATTEMPTING TO USE THE FAULTY ONE. HE WENT TO THE GATE RIGHT NEXT TO OURS; APPROX 50 FT AWAY; AND RETURNED IN LESS THAN 1 MIN WITH A WORKING CORD. IT WAS VERY EVIDENT RIGHT AWAY FROM HER TONE THAT SHE WAS NOW HAVING AN ATTITUDE PROB WITH ME. SHE ASKED ME IF I WAS TRAINED TO USE HAND SIGNALS; AGAIN WITH AN ATTITUDE; AS IF TO SAY THAT SHE FELT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN USING THEM. I CALMLY REMINDED HER THAT I HAD ASKED HER TO GET ANOTHER HEADSET/CORD WITH PLENTY OF TIME TO STILL GET OUR ON-TIME DEP AND; SINCE THERE WAS A WORKING HEADSET NEARBY; HAND SIGNALS WERE NOT AN OPTION. IN ANY CASE; THAT OPTION WAS MINE; NOT HERS. SHE HAD ALSO ASKED ME TO RELEASE THE PARKING BRAKE WHILE ATTEMPTING TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE FAULTY HEADSET CORD AND; NOW; AGAIN DID SO WITH THE WORKING ONE BEFORE I ADVISED HER THAT WE WERE CLRED TO PUSH; BRAKES SET. I REMINDED HER THAT I WAS AWAITING CLRNC FROM ATC AND THAT ONLY AT THAT TIME WOULD THE PARKING BRAKE BE RELEASED PER SOP. UPON RECEIVING ATC CLRNC AND GIVING HER CLRNC TO PUSH; THE PARKING BRAKE WAS RELEASED AND PUSH COMMENCED 3 MINS LATE. THE INITIAL MOVEMENT OF THE ACFT BY THE TUG BEGAN WITH A VIOLENT JERK/JOLT WHICH WOULD OCCUR BY APPLYING TOO MUCH ACCELERATOR TOO QUICKLY. ANY HARDER AND IT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED AN INSPECTION OF THE NOSE GEAR. I DISMISSED THAT INCIDENT AS A POSSIBLE ERROR ON HER PART BUT SOON REALIZED OTHERWISE. AS THE PUSHBACK CONTINUED WITH THE CUSTOMARY MSP DOGLEG; I REALIZED THAT OUR SPD WAS EXCESSIVE; APCHING RECKLESS; PARTICULARLY WHILE TURNING. I QUICKLY COMMANDED HER TO SLOW US DOWN; TO WHICH I RECEIVED NO VERBAL RESPONSE NOR REDUCTION IN SPD. I REPEATED THE COMMAND BUT THIS TIME MORE AUTHORITATIVELY. SHE THEN SLOWED US TO A MORE REASONABLE SPD. I WAS IN UTTER DISBELIEF THAT DUE TO HER APPARENT FRUSTRATION OR ANGER OVER THE HEADSET CORD; HAND SIGNALS; AND/OR DELAY; SHE WAS WILLING TO PUT US AND THE ACFT IN HARM'S WAY. WE DISCONNECTED AND GOT AIRBORNE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT ONLY TO FIND THAT I HAD BEEN CHARGED WITH THE DELAY. I SENT A MESSAGE TO DISPATCH AND TOLD HER THAT I WAS NOT TAKING THAT DELAY WHEN IN FACT IT WAS AN EQUIP DELAY. SHE ADVISED THE FLT MGR WITH WHOM I SPOKE UPON ARR IN ORD. THEY BOTH AGREED BUT OPS DID NOT MAKE THE CHANGE. I CONTACTED OPS SUPVR AND THE STATION MGR TO ADVISE THEM OF THE INCIDENT. ONCE I EXPLAINED WHAT HAPPENED; EXACTLY; THEY THEN AGREED TO CHANGE THE DELAY CODE. THEY WERE NOT AWARE OF TUG OPERATOR'S ATTITUDE AND RESULTANT RECKLESS HANDLING OF THE TUG AND ACFT. THEY BOTH INDICATED THAT SHE WOULD AT THE VERY LEAST BE RETRAINED/QUALIFIED AND VERY POSSIBLY DISCIPLINED WHICH I INDICATED WAS APPROPRIATE. I ALSO COMMENTED TO THEM THAT I WOULD NOT ALLOW HER TO OPERATE A TUG PUSHING/TOWING AN ACFT UNDER MY COMMAND UNTIL I WAS ASSURED OF HER RETRAINING AS WELL AS COUNSELING ON HER ATTITUDE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.