Narrative:

The crew received the facsimile'ed flight plan on the morning of apr/thu/06 for a flight from bgr to opf. A copy of this flight plan was also facsimile'ed to the handler at bgr. Both copies of the flight plan were identical. The crew up-linked the flight plan through afis using the recall number on the flight plan. This up-linked flight plan was compared to the facsimile'ed flight plan and confirmed to be identical. The flight plan was also compared to the appropriate chart to verify the routing. Latitudes and longitudes for each waypoint along this fixed route were not compared as they were believed to be correct. While en route on this flight; the crew was queried by kingston center upon crossing gelog intersection if we were deviating from course. Our responses was negative and that we were on course. Kingston noted they had us in radar surveillance and estimated us to be 15 mi to the east of course. Latitudes and longitudes for gelog were compared and it was determined that both the flight plan waypoint and up-linked waypoint for gelog were not in agreement with the current chart -- lam hi 7/8. It was also determined that the previous waypoint dibok was also incorrect on the flight plan and up-linked flight plan. These waypoints loaded in the honeywell FMS with a '#' sign next to the name; ie; '#dibok.' this notated that the waypoint did not match the FMS database location for the waypoint and as such was considered a temporary waypoint. The crew was not aware of this until after the incident. Had this route been loaded manually in the FMS rather than up-linked; the correct location of these fixes would have been loaded; however; the FMS would not match the flight plan. By up-linking the flight plan the FMS did match the flight plan; however; this led to the crew flying an incorrect route over these 2 fixes resulting in a navigation error. The crew believes this to be a critical error on the part of the flight planning vendor. We would like to see some investigation by the flight planning vendor into how this error occurred so that it can be avoided in the future. Also; the crew believes that we could have caught this error ourselves had we investigated the reason for the '#' sign next to these incorrect waypoints on the FMS. Had we realized the significance of these signs we could have retyped in the waypoint and the FMS database would have loaded the correct latitude and longitude and this error would not have occurred. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that both the sic and himself were unaware of the FMC showing a 'temporary waypoint' by indicating it with a '#' sign. After reviewing the manual associated with the FMC; they realized the mistake. They had accepted the temporary waypoint into the flight plan without questioning the '#' sign. He said the '#' sign indicated that the 'temporary waypoint' was not recognized by the FMC database as a true waypoint. Reporter indicated that training in this area was limited and that it is the flight crew's responsibility to ensure they understand the FMC procedures completed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FALCON 900EX FLT CREW HAS A TRACK DEV WHILE ENRTE DUE TO INCORRECT WAYPOINTS LOADED INTO THE FMC. CTLR ADVISES THE FLT CREW OF DEV.

Narrative: THE CREW RECEIVED THE FAX'ED FLT PLAN ON THE MORNING OF APR/THU/06 FOR A FLT FROM BGR TO OPF. A COPY OF THIS FLT PLAN WAS ALSO FAX'ED TO THE HANDLER AT BGR. BOTH COPIES OF THE FLT PLAN WERE IDENTICAL. THE CREW UP-LINKED THE FLT PLAN THROUGH AFIS USING THE RECALL NUMBER ON THE FLT PLAN. THIS UP-LINKED FLT PLAN WAS COMPARED TO THE FAX'ED FLT PLAN AND CONFIRMED TO BE IDENTICAL. THE FLT PLAN WAS ALSO COMPARED TO THE APPROPRIATE CHART TO VERIFY THE ROUTING. LATITUDES AND LONGITUDES FOR EACH WAYPOINT ALONG THIS FIXED RTE WERE NOT COMPARED AS THEY WERE BELIEVED TO BE CORRECT. WHILE ENRTE ON THIS FLT; THE CREW WAS QUERIED BY KINGSTON CTR UPON XING GELOG INTXN IF WE WERE DEVIATING FROM COURSE. OUR RESPONSES WAS NEGATIVE AND THAT WE WERE ON COURSE. KINGSTON NOTED THEY HAD US IN RADAR SURVEILLANCE AND ESTIMATED US TO BE 15 MI TO THE E OF COURSE. LATITUDES AND LONGITUDES FOR GELOG WERE COMPARED AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT BOTH THE FLT PLAN WAYPOINT AND UP-LINKED WAYPOINT FOR GELOG WERE NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH THE CURRENT CHART -- LAM HI 7/8. IT WAS ALSO DETERMINED THAT THE PREVIOUS WAYPOINT DIBOK WAS ALSO INCORRECT ON THE FLT PLAN AND UP-LINKED FLT PLAN. THESE WAYPOINTS LOADED IN THE HONEYWELL FMS WITH A '#' SIGN NEXT TO THE NAME; IE; '#DIBOK.' THIS NOTATED THAT THE WAYPOINT DID NOT MATCH THE FMS DATABASE LOCATION FOR THE WAYPOINT AND AS SUCH WAS CONSIDERED A TEMPORARY WAYPOINT. THE CREW WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS UNTIL AFTER THE INCIDENT. HAD THIS RTE BEEN LOADED MANUALLY IN THE FMS RATHER THAN UP-LINKED; THE CORRECT LOCATION OF THESE FIXES WOULD HAVE BEEN LOADED; HOWEVER; THE FMS WOULD NOT MATCH THE FLT PLAN. BY UP-LINKING THE FLT PLAN THE FMS DID MATCH THE FLT PLAN; HOWEVER; THIS LED TO THE CREW FLYING AN INCORRECT RTE OVER THESE 2 FIXES RESULTING IN A NAV ERROR. THE CREW BELIEVES THIS TO BE A CRITICAL ERROR ON THE PART OF THE FLT PLANNING VENDOR. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SOME INVESTIGATION BY THE FLT PLANNING VENDOR INTO HOW THIS ERROR OCCURRED SO THAT IT CAN BE AVOIDED IN THE FUTURE. ALSO; THE CREW BELIEVES THAT WE COULD HAVE CAUGHT THIS ERROR OURSELVES HAD WE INVESTIGATED THE REASON FOR THE '#' SIGN NEXT TO THESE INCORRECT WAYPOINTS ON THE FMS. HAD WE REALIZED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE SIGNS WE COULD HAVE RETYPED IN THE WAYPOINT AND THE FMS DATABASE WOULD HAVE LOADED THE CORRECT LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE AND THIS ERROR WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT BOTH THE SIC AND HIMSELF WERE UNAWARE OF THE FMC SHOWING A 'TEMPORARY WAYPOINT' BY INDICATING IT WITH A '#' SIGN. AFTER REVIEWING THE MANUAL ASSOCIATED WITH THE FMC; THEY REALIZED THE MISTAKE. THEY HAD ACCEPTED THE TEMPORARY WAYPOINT INTO THE FLT PLAN WITHOUT QUESTIONING THE '#' SIGN. HE SAID THE '#' SIGN INDICATED THAT THE 'TEMPORARY WAYPOINT' WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE FMC DATABASE AS A TRUE WAYPOINT. RPTR INDICATED THAT TRAINING IN THIS AREA WAS LIMITED AND THAT IT IS THE FLT CREW'S RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE THEY UNDERSTAND THE FMC PROCS COMPLETED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.