Narrative:

When we began our descent about 15 mins out; the conversation and duties switched to something other than the approach. Then about 50 mi out; because of an EFIS that both of us were unfamiliar with and prior experience with the VOR/DME-1 jac; I suggested this approach. PF agreed -- we were on a GPS direct to jac. Due to prior experience; which I misinterped; I figured we were almost on a direct course to ordee and would preclude the DME arc. Did not doublechk this. I briefed the approach based on this; we set up our radios and were content. This was not a very thorough brief as we knew we would probably break out even before we reached ordee. Controller then asked which approach we wanted; and I asked for this approach. We were then instructed to intercept the 16 DME arc and cleared for that approach. Here are the problems: 1) I was surprised by the necessity of the arc and we were getting very close -- within 23 mi of the VOR. Then I checked and found that we were actually closer to direct ecuna which is the beginning of the west side of the arc. 2) then PF then asked how to do a DME arc and to refresh him on it. 3) this was the killer: I told him to turn so that the inbound course in his 90 degree index on the HSI to start -- this would have brought him within 10 degrees of a good heading and I would help him from there. But he wanted an exact heading. This meant a direction to turn (left/right). I thought that was obvious to him. It may not have been obvious to me though but I made it obvious by checking. I told him to turn right and put the final approach course in his 90 degree index. He still wanted a heading so I added 90 degrees to 008 degrees and gave him 098 degrees. Because of the still strong tailwind and a high airspeed and my last second duties we had blown through and were at 14.8 mi when I called ATC; confessed and asked for a heading for vectors back to the approach. This would also keep us away from the tetons. He gave us a 110 degree heading (that was going to bring us close to ordee) and told us he would vector us through final and bring us around again for the approach. I believe that we were beginning the right turn for the arc at the time of the vector. At least 4 mi a min; that extra min of fooling around made the difference between a good arc and approach and our predicament -- I could have easily talked the PF through the arc as I know them pretty well. Not long afterwards the PF asked about the airport location. I looked at the VOR needle and said it should be just behind the wingtip. He spotted the airport at the same time I spoke (clouds were broken). I forget if I canceled right away or we got the visual after declaring the airport in sight. If I canceled right away it was about 20 seconds too soon because of cloud clrncs. In any case there was no other aircraft even remotely close to us; and the approach and landing went very well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE550 FLT CREW BECOME DISORIENTED DURING APCH TO JAC; LOSE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND CONTINUE VFR TO A LNDG.

Narrative: WHEN WE BEGAN OUR DSCNT ABOUT 15 MINS OUT; THE CONVERSATION AND DUTIES SWITCHED TO SOMETHING OTHER THAN THE APCH. THEN ABOUT 50 MI OUT; BECAUSE OF AN EFIS THAT BOTH OF US WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH AND PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH THE VOR/DME-1 JAC; I SUGGESTED THIS APCH. PF AGREED -- WE WERE ON A GPS DIRECT TO JAC. DUE TO PRIOR EXPERIENCE; WHICH I MISINTERPED; I FIGURED WE WERE ALMOST ON A DIRECT COURSE TO ORDEE AND WOULD PRECLUDE THE DME ARC. DID NOT DOUBLECHK THIS. I BRIEFED THE APCH BASED ON THIS; WE SET UP OUR RADIOS AND WERE CONTENT. THIS WAS NOT A VERY THOROUGH BRIEF AS WE KNEW WE WOULD PROBABLY BREAK OUT EVEN BEFORE WE REACHED ORDEE. CTLR THEN ASKED WHICH APCH WE WANTED; AND I ASKED FOR THIS APCH. WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO INTERCEPT THE 16 DME ARC AND CLRED FOR THAT APCH. HERE ARE THE PROBS: 1) I WAS SURPRISED BY THE NECESSITY OF THE ARC AND WE WERE GETTING VERY CLOSE -- WITHIN 23 MI OF THE VOR. THEN I CHKED AND FOUND THAT WE WERE ACTUALLY CLOSER TO DIRECT ECUNA WHICH IS THE BEGINNING OF THE W SIDE OF THE ARC. 2) THEN PF THEN ASKED HOW TO DO A DME ARC AND TO REFRESH HIM ON IT. 3) THIS WAS THE KILLER: I TOLD HIM TO TURN SO THAT THE INBOUND COURSE IN HIS 90 DEG INDEX ON THE HSI TO START -- THIS WOULD HAVE BROUGHT HIM WITHIN 10 DEGS OF A GOOD HDG AND I WOULD HELP HIM FROM THERE. BUT HE WANTED AN EXACT HDG. THIS MEANT A DIRECTION TO TURN (L/R). I THOUGHT THAT WAS OBVIOUS TO HIM. IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN OBVIOUS TO ME THOUGH BUT I MADE IT OBVIOUS BY CHKING. I TOLD HIM TO TURN R AND PUT THE FINAL APCH COURSE IN HIS 90 DEG INDEX. HE STILL WANTED A HDG SO I ADDED 90 DEGS TO 008 DEGS AND GAVE HIM 098 DEGS. BECAUSE OF THE STILL STRONG TAILWIND AND A HIGH AIRSPD AND MY LAST SECOND DUTIES WE HAD BLOWN THROUGH AND WERE AT 14.8 MI WHEN I CALLED ATC; CONFESSED AND ASKED FOR A HDG FOR VECTORS BACK TO THE APCH. THIS WOULD ALSO KEEP US AWAY FROM THE TETONS. HE GAVE US A 110 DEG HDG (THAT WAS GOING TO BRING US CLOSE TO ORDEE) AND TOLD US HE WOULD VECTOR US THROUGH FINAL AND BRING US AROUND AGAIN FOR THE APCH. I BELIEVE THAT WE WERE BEGINNING THE R TURN FOR THE ARC AT THE TIME OF THE VECTOR. AT LEAST 4 MI A MIN; THAT EXTRA MIN OF FOOLING AROUND MADE THE DIFFERENCE BTWN A GOOD ARC AND APCH AND OUR PREDICAMENT -- I COULD HAVE EASILY TALKED THE PF THROUGH THE ARC AS I KNOW THEM PRETTY WELL. NOT LONG AFTERWARDS THE PF ASKED ABOUT THE ARPT LOCATION. I LOOKED AT THE VOR NEEDLE AND SAID IT SHOULD BE JUST BEHIND THE WINGTIP. HE SPOTTED THE ARPT AT THE SAME TIME I SPOKE (CLOUDS WERE BROKEN). I FORGET IF I CANCELED RIGHT AWAY OR WE GOT THE VISUAL AFTER DECLARING THE ARPT IN SIGHT. IF I CANCELED RIGHT AWAY IT WAS ABOUT 20 SECONDS TOO SOON BECAUSE OF CLOUD CLRNCS. IN ANY CASE THERE WAS NO OTHER ACFT EVEN REMOTELY CLOSE TO US; AND THE APCH AND LNDG WENT VERY WELL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.