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A B777-200 flight crew on visual approach to hnl executed an unstabilized approach.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 696527 |
| Time | |
| Date | 200605 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : hnl.airport |
| State Reference | HI |
| Altitude | msl single value : 3000 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | tower : hnl.tower |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | B777-200 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Navigation In Use | other |
| Flight Phase | descent : approach |
| Route In Use | approach : traffic pattern |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| Experience | flight time last 90 days : 140 flight time total : 15000 flight time type : 900 |
| ASRS Report | 696527 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : first officer |
| Experience | flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 10000 flight time type : 1500 |
| ASRS Report | 696528 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | non adherence : company policies other anomaly other anomaly |
| Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
| Supplementary | |
| Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance |
| Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Cleared visual approach runway 8L hnl. WX clear; visibility greater than 10 mi. Commercial chart page for hnl says to intercept final for runway 8L at 3000 ft. First officer flying. Tower told us to turn base over john rogers airport (formerly barbers point) approximately a 7 mi final and maintain 3000 ft until on final (confirming the commercial chart page). Ewabe; the FAF; is just inside john rogers airport and has a crossing altitude of approximately 1900 ft. On downwind; I mentioned this altitude discrepancy to the crew. We turned base abeam john rogers. Over john rogers we turned to an intercept heading of 050 degrees (a bit early). Because of this; it took extra time and distance to intercept final for runway 8L and we had to maintain 3000 ft. Abeam ewabe; I called out 'ewabe; we are about 1000 ft high.' (F5; 180 KTS) to which the first officer responded gear down. At this point I felt the first officer understood the problem and was correcting. Because I had advocated twice -- once on downwind and once over ewabe -- I felt everyone understood the situation and it was a nuisance to advocate anymore. In hindsight; I checked out for the rest of the approach and landing. At no point did I feel unsafe; but I did feel uncomfortable. At 500 ft; we were 30K fast with flaps 20 degrees (flaps 30 degrees planned for landing). I was confused by the GPWS callout 'too low' when we were on GS. Flap handle was positioned to 30 degrees at 500 ft; but the flaps reached 30 degrees at about 250 ft. Only once did the GPWS call out 'too low flaps.' due to all of the distrs I did not do the final descent checklist. This approach ended with a smooth touchdown; 1000 ft from the arrival end of runway 8L; on speed. I believe the primary cause was the first officer's spatial disorientation; which I believe was caused by fatigue and a lack of recent lndgs. (Junior first officer on a widebody transport fleet). There were many secondary issues. A tight turn-in combined with a 3000 ft restr for runway 8L; the relief pilot was silent throughout the approach and landing. My lack of advocacy after my first 2 attempts. Causes for my lack of advocacy were: I have flown with the first officer before and know he is good. In my mind; after those 2 attempts; I felt like any more would be a nuisance; especially when I knew the first officer was good. (Maybe I did not want to hurt any feelings?) next time I'll advocate until I'm at the gate! Another secondary cause: in spite of all the training; I still felt a go around was for when I felt unsafe. Now I realize that even though I felt safe with the approach and landing while I was in the moment; looking back; our performance was not too safe -- we were 30K fast and not configured at 500 ft. I missed the 1000 ft and 500 ft calls. I did not do the final descent checklist. I did not call 'airspeed;' I did not call 'airspeed; go around.' in spite of all these errors; had I made the final call of 'airspeed; go around' at 500 ft; that would have erased all of our previous errors; let us start over; and would have avoided this incident completely!
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B777-200 FLT CREW ON VISUAL APCH TO HNL EXECUTED AN UNSTABILIZED APCH.
Narrative: CLRED VISUAL APCH RWY 8L HNL. WX CLR; VISIBILITY GREATER THAN 10 MI. COMMERCIAL CHART PAGE FOR HNL SAYS TO INTERCEPT FINAL FOR RWY 8L AT 3000 FT. FO FLYING. TWR TOLD US TO TURN BASE OVER JOHN ROGERS ARPT (FORMERLY BARBERS POINT) APPROX A 7 MI FINAL AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT UNTIL ON FINAL (CONFIRMING THE COMMERCIAL CHART PAGE). EWABE; THE FAF; IS JUST INSIDE JOHN ROGERS ARPT AND HAS A XING ALT OF APPROX 1900 FT. ON DOWNWIND; I MENTIONED THIS ALT DISCREPANCY TO THE CREW. WE TURNED BASE ABEAM JOHN ROGERS. OVER JOHN ROGERS WE TURNED TO AN INTERCEPT HDG OF 050 DEGS (A BIT EARLY). BECAUSE OF THIS; IT TOOK EXTRA TIME AND DISTANCE TO INTERCEPT FINAL FOR RWY 8L AND WE HAD TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT. ABEAM EWABE; I CALLED OUT 'EWABE; WE ARE ABOUT 1000 FT HIGH.' (F5; 180 KTS) TO WHICH THE FO RESPONDED GEAR DOWN. AT THIS POINT I FELT THE FO UNDERSTOOD THE PROB AND WAS CORRECTING. BECAUSE I HAD ADVOCATED TWICE -- ONCE ON DOWNWIND AND ONCE OVER EWABE -- I FELT EVERYONE UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION AND IT WAS A NUISANCE TO ADVOCATE ANYMORE. IN HINDSIGHT; I CHKED OUT FOR THE REST OF THE APCH AND LNDG. AT NO POINT DID I FEEL UNSAFE; BUT I DID FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE. AT 500 FT; WE WERE 30K FAST WITH FLAPS 20 DEGS (FLAPS 30 DEGS PLANNED FOR LNDG). I WAS CONFUSED BY THE GPWS CALLOUT 'TOO LOW' WHEN WE WERE ON GS. FLAP HANDLE WAS POSITIONED TO 30 DEGS AT 500 FT; BUT THE FLAPS REACHED 30 DEGS AT ABOUT 250 FT. ONLY ONCE DID THE GPWS CALL OUT 'TOO LOW FLAPS.' DUE TO ALL OF THE DISTRS I DID NOT DO THE FINAL DSCNT CHKLIST. THIS APCH ENDED WITH A SMOOTH TOUCHDOWN; 1000 FT FROM THE ARR END OF RWY 8L; ON SPD. I BELIEVE THE PRIMARY CAUSE WAS THE FO'S SPATIAL DISORIENTATION; WHICH I BELIEVE WAS CAUSED BY FATIGUE AND A LACK OF RECENT LNDGS. (JUNIOR FO ON A WDB FLEET). THERE WERE MANY SECONDARY ISSUES. A TIGHT TURN-IN COMBINED WITH A 3000 FT RESTR FOR RWY 8L; THE RELIEF PLT WAS SILENT THROUGHOUT THE APCH AND LNDG. MY LACK OF ADVOCACY AFTER MY FIRST 2 ATTEMPTS. CAUSES FOR MY LACK OF ADVOCACY WERE: I HAVE FLOWN WITH THE FO BEFORE AND KNOW HE IS GOOD. IN MY MIND; AFTER THOSE 2 ATTEMPTS; I FELT LIKE ANY MORE WOULD BE A NUISANCE; ESPECIALLY WHEN I KNEW THE FO WAS GOOD. (MAYBE I DID NOT WANT TO HURT ANY FEELINGS?) NEXT TIME I'LL ADVOCATE UNTIL I'M AT THE GATE! ANOTHER SECONDARY CAUSE: IN SPITE OF ALL THE TRAINING; I STILL FELT A GAR WAS FOR WHEN I FELT UNSAFE. NOW I REALIZE THAT EVEN THOUGH I FELT SAFE WITH THE APCH AND LNDG WHILE I WAS IN THE MOMENT; LOOKING BACK; OUR PERFORMANCE WAS NOT TOO SAFE -- WE WERE 30K FAST AND NOT CONFIGURED AT 500 FT. I MISSED THE 1000 FT AND 500 FT CALLS. I DID NOT DO THE FINAL DSCNT CHKLIST. I DID NOT CALL 'AIRSPD;' I DID NOT CALL 'AIRSPD; GO AROUND.' IN SPITE OF ALL THESE ERRORS; HAD I MADE THE FINAL CALL OF 'AIRSPD; GO AROUND' AT 500 FT; THAT WOULD HAVE ERASED ALL OF OUR PREVIOUS ERRORS; LET US START OVER; AND WOULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS INCIDENT COMPLETELY!
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.