Narrative:

The aircraft is a new light sport aircraft with total time on airframe and engine of 55 hours. On may/xa/06 a brass 'T' on an oil line broke; resulting in loss of oil; and the subsequence seizing of the rotax 912 uls engine. The plane was successfully landed in a pasture and there was no damage to the airframe or injury. The pilot was the only person on board. The reason for this report is that under the light sport aircraft rules all alterations to the aircraft must be approved by the manufacturer of the aircraft (as distinct from the FAA). An alteration had been made to this aircraft without obtaining such approval. The alteration consisted of adding an oil pressure switch to activate a hobbs clock meter whenever the engine was running. The plate came equipped with a hobbs meter but was activated anytime the master electrical switch was on. If manufacturer approval had been obtained the manufacturer would had approved the installation but with this oil pressure switch located in a different position on the engine. However; the installation was made using a brass 'T' that also connected the oil pressure transmitter (to the cockpit instrument). With both units on this same brass 'T;' it was subject to additional weight and other forces that eventually caused the brass 'T' to fail where it screwed into the engine. As pilot and owner; I was responsible to ensure that my mechanic obtained appropriate approval; and as such violated requirements of the light sport aircraft airworthiness certificate. I was also the pilot whose life was on the line. At the time the FAA inspector examined the aircraft; the 1-PAGE operating limitations was not in the pilot flight manual which was left in the airplane after the incident. I received my pilot flight manual prior to the issuance of the special airworthiness certificate and the operating limitations. Normally the operating limitations would be bound into the flight manual at the time the aircraft was sold to me. At the time of the accident; I was carrying the operating limitations in a briefcase along with my computer and other miscellaneous papers. When I left the disabled aircraft I had intended to remove all of the aircraft documents for security reasons since the plane would be grounded until a new engine was installed. In the confusion (and trauma) following the incident I failed to remove all of these documents; although I did not remove my briefcase. The FAA examiner is questioning why the operating limitations was not in the aircraft when he examined the aircraft after I returned home (750 mi away).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TECNAM 2004 BRAVO PLT HAS AN ENG FAILURE WHILE ENRTE AND PERFORMS AN OFF FIELD LNDG.

Narrative: THE ACFT IS A NEW LIGHT SPORT ACFT WITH TOTAL TIME ON AIRFRAME AND ENG OF 55 HRS. ON MAY/XA/06 A BRASS 'T' ON AN OIL LINE BROKE; RESULTING IN LOSS OF OIL; AND THE SUBSEQUENCE SEIZING OF THE ROTAX 912 ULS ENG. THE PLANE WAS SUCCESSFULLY LANDED IN A PASTURE AND THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE AIRFRAME OR INJURY. THE PLT WAS THE ONLY PERSON ON BOARD. THE REASON FOR THIS RPT IS THAT UNDER THE LIGHT SPORT ACFT RULES ALL ALTERATIONS TO THE ACFT MUST BE APPROVED BY THE MANUFACTURER OF THE ACFT (AS DISTINCT FROM THE FAA). AN ALTERATION HAD BEEN MADE TO THIS ACFT WITHOUT OBTAINING SUCH APPROVAL. THE ALTERATION CONSISTED OF ADDING AN OIL PRESSURE SWITCH TO ACTIVATE A HOBBS CLOCK METER WHENEVER THE ENG WAS RUNNING. THE PLATE CAME EQUIPPED WITH A HOBBS METER BUT WAS ACTIVATED ANYTIME THE MASTER ELECTRICAL SWITCH WAS ON. IF MANUFACTURER APPROVAL HAD BEEN OBTAINED THE MANUFACTURER WOULD HAD APPROVED THE INSTALLATION BUT WITH THIS OIL PRESSURE SWITCH LOCATED IN A DIFFERENT POS ON THE ENG. HOWEVER; THE INSTALLATION WAS MADE USING A BRASS 'T' THAT ALSO CONNECTED THE OIL PRESSURE XMITTER (TO THE COCKPIT INST). WITH BOTH UNITS ON THIS SAME BRASS 'T;' IT WAS SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL WT AND OTHER FORCES THAT EVENTUALLY CAUSED THE BRASS 'T' TO FAIL WHERE IT SCREWED INTO THE ENG. AS PLT AND OWNER; I WAS RESPONSIBLE TO ENSURE THAT MY MECH OBTAINED APPROPRIATE APPROVAL; AND AS SUCH VIOLATED REQUIREMENTS OF THE LIGHT SPORT ACFT AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATE. I WAS ALSO THE PLT WHOSE LIFE WAS ON THE LINE. AT THE TIME THE FAA INSPECTOR EXAMINED THE ACFT; THE 1-PAGE OPERATING LIMITATIONS WAS NOT IN THE PLT FLT MANUAL WHICH WAS LEFT IN THE AIRPLANE AFTER THE INCIDENT. I RECEIVED MY PLT FLT MANUAL PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATE AND THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS. NORMALLY THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS WOULD BE BOUND INTO THE FLT MANUAL AT THE TIME THE ACFT WAS SOLD TO ME. AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT; I WAS CARRYING THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS IN A BRIEFCASE ALONG WITH MY COMPUTER AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS. WHEN I LEFT THE DISABLED ACFT I HAD INTENDED TO REMOVE ALL OF THE ACFT DOCUMENTS FOR SECURITY REASONS SINCE THE PLANE WOULD BE GNDED UNTIL A NEW ENG WAS INSTALLED. IN THE CONFUSION (AND TRAUMA) FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT I FAILED TO REMOVE ALL OF THESE DOCUMENTS; ALTHOUGH I DID NOT REMOVE MY BRIEFCASE. THE FAA EXAMINER IS QUESTIONING WHY THE OPERATING LIMITATIONS WAS NOT IN THE ACFT WHEN HE EXAMINED THE ACFT AFTER I RETURNED HOME (750 MI AWAY).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.