Narrative:

Upon arrival at the aircraft; we found the cockpit security door unlocked and disabled by the pulling of the circuit breaker for the door. We found the flight deck access panel keypad placarded inoperative in accordance with MEL. Although the MEL permits dispatch under this MEL item; I thought taking the aircraft with the cockpit completely inaccessible in the event neither the first officer or myself were able to open the door from the inside; for whatever reason; both unsafe and unwise. I was also concerned about not being able to ensure the security of the cockpit when no one was present since the door would have to be left unlocked to permit access when the crew returned. Our company policies and procedures require the door be locked anytime the cockpit is vacant. I refused the aircraft under the authority granted by the MEL general section which permits the captain to request equipment requirements above the minimums listed in the MEL if; in the captain's judgement; it is needed to ensure the safe and prudent operation of the aircraft. Our operating manual states the keypad is 'provided on the cabin side for gaining entry in case of an emergency such as crew incapacitation or inadvertent lockout.' unlike other fleets; the A300 door does not have a deadbolt nor can it be opened from the cabin with a key. The operating manual makes several references to the keypad being used in an emergency. In my judgement; this piece of emergency equipment is essential to ensure both the safe operation of the aircraft and its security. I think a modification to the door that adds a deadbolt and provides keyed access from the cabin would provide an appropriate level of safety as it does on our other fleets. A revision to the current MEL that removes the keypad as a placardable item until such a modification is made seems prudent. This item was not repaired during its overnight because it did not have to be. When I asked if it could be fixed before departure; I was told there were no parts available to effect the repair. As it turns out; no parts were needed. The keypad was repaired by simply reconnecting a loose connector within the keypad. In addition; a clarification was issued to our maintenance procedures manual in feb 2007 that affected this specific MEL item. The mpm is no longer carried in the cockpit as it used to be and the fact that a clarification was issued regarding this specific MEL item is only available in the online version of the MEL/mpm. No reference to mpm clarifications are issued to the crews in our release. As a result; it takes a bit of research and system knowledge on the part of the crew to determine the circuit breaker for the door has to be pulled or the aircraft completely powered down to prevent getting locked out of the cockpit. Although simple enough to deduce; that information should be in the MEL for the crews and for maintenance as well.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter indicated that maintenance was going to disable the keypad and MEL it inoperative as it was malfunctioning. The cockpit door would only be able to be opened from the inside once the flight crew entered the cockpit and reset the circuit breaker in the cockpit. His concern was that if one of the flight crew members had to leave the cockpit for physiological needs and the other crew member became disabled; the cockpit door could not be opened. He felt that with the keypad disabled (only way to open the cockpit door from the outside on the A300) that it was a safety of flight item.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 FLT CREW IS CONCERNED WITH MEL PROCS FOR INOP COCKPIT DOOR LOCK. FLT CREW REFUSES ACFT DUE TO SAFETY CONCERNS.

Narrative: UPON ARRIVAL AT THE ACFT; WE FOUND THE COCKPIT SECURITY DOOR UNLOCKED AND DISABLED BY THE PULLING OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR THE DOOR. WE FOUND THE FLT DECK ACCESS PANEL KEYPAD PLACARDED INOPERATIVE IN ACCORDANCE WITH MEL. ALTHOUGH THE MEL PERMITS DISPATCH UNDER THIS MEL ITEM; I THOUGHT TAKING THE ACFT WITH THE COCKPIT COMPLETELY INACCESSIBLE IN THE EVENT NEITHER THE FO OR MYSELF WERE ABLE TO OPEN THE DOOR FROM THE INSIDE; FOR WHATEVER REASON; BOTH UNSAFE AND UNWISE. I WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE COCKPIT WHEN NO ONE WAS PRESENT SINCE THE DOOR WOULD HAVE TO BE LEFT UNLOCKED TO PERMIT ACCESS WHEN THE CREW RETURNED. OUR COMPANY POLICIES AND PROCS REQUIRE THE DOOR BE LOCKED ANYTIME THE COCKPIT IS VACANT. I REFUSED THE ACFT UNDER THE AUTHORITY GRANTED BY THE MEL GENERAL SECTION WHICH PERMITS THE CAPT TO REQUEST EQUIP REQUIREMENTS ABOVE THE MINIMUMS LISTED IN THE MEL IF; IN THE CAPT'S JUDGEMENT; IT IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE SAFE AND PRUDENT OPERATION OF THE ACFT. OUR OPERATING MANUAL STATES THE KEYPAD IS 'PROVIDED ON THE CABIN SIDE FOR GAINING ENTRY IN CASE OF AN EMER SUCH AS CREW INCAPACITATION OR INADVERTENT LOCKOUT.' UNLIKE OTHER FLEETS; THE A300 DOOR DOES NOT HAVE A DEADBOLT NOR CAN IT BE OPENED FROM THE CABIN WITH A KEY. THE OPERATING MANUAL MAKES SEVERAL REFERENCES TO THE KEYPAD BEING USED IN AN EMER. IN MY JUDGEMENT; THIS PIECE OF EMER EQUIP IS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE BOTH THE SAFE OPERATION OF THE ACFT AND ITS SECURITY. I THINK A MODIFICATION TO THE DOOR THAT ADDS A DEADBOLT AND PROVIDES KEYED ACCESS FROM THE CABIN WOULD PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF SAFETY AS IT DOES ON OUR OTHER FLEETS. A REVISION TO THE CURRENT MEL THAT REMOVES THE KEYPAD AS A PLACARDABLE ITEM UNTIL SUCH A MODIFICATION IS MADE SEEMS PRUDENT. THIS ITEM WAS NOT REPAIRED DURING ITS OVERNIGHT BECAUSE IT DID NOT HAVE TO BE. WHEN I ASKED IF IT COULD BE FIXED BEFORE DEP; I WAS TOLD THERE WERE NO PARTS AVAILABLE TO EFFECT THE REPAIR. AS IT TURNS OUT; NO PARTS WERE NEEDED. THE KEYPAD WAS REPAIRED BY SIMPLY RECONNECTING A LOOSE CONNECTOR WITHIN THE KEYPAD. IN ADDITION; A CLARIFICATION WAS ISSUED TO OUR MAINT PROCS MANUAL IN FEB 2007 THAT AFFECTED THIS SPECIFIC MEL ITEM. THE MPM IS NO LONGER CARRIED IN THE COCKPIT AS IT USED TO BE AND THE FACT THAT A CLARIFICATION WAS ISSUED REGARDING THIS SPECIFIC MEL ITEM IS ONLY AVAILABLE IN THE ONLINE VERSION OF THE MEL/MPM. NO REFERENCE TO MPM CLARIFICATIONS ARE ISSUED TO THE CREWS IN OUR RELEASE. AS A RESULT; IT TAKES A BIT OF RESEARCH AND SYSTEM KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF THE CREW TO DETERMINE THE CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR THE DOOR HAS TO BE PULLED OR THE ACFT COMPLETELY POWERED DOWN TO PREVENT GETTING LOCKED OUT OF THE COCKPIT. ALTHOUGH SIMPLE ENOUGH TO DEDUCE; THAT INFO SHOULD BE IN THE MEL FOR THE CREWS AND FOR MAINT AS WELL.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR INDICATED THAT MAINT WAS GOING TO DISABLE THE KEYPAD AND MEL IT INOP AS IT WAS MALFUNCTIONING. THE COCKPIT DOOR WOULD ONLY BE ABLE TO BE OPENED FROM THE INSIDE ONCE THE FLT CREW ENTERED THE COCKPIT AND RESET THE CIRCUIT BREAKER IN THE COCKPIT. HIS CONCERN WAS THAT IF ONE OF THE FLT CREW MEMBERS HAD TO LEAVE THE COCKPIT FOR PHYSIOLOGICAL NEEDS AND THE OTHER CREW MEMBER BECAME DISABLED; THE COCKPIT DOOR COULD NOT BE OPENED. HE FELT THAT WITH THE KEYPAD DISABLED (ONLY WAY TO OPEN THE COCKPIT DOOR FROM THE OUTSIDE ON THE A300) THAT IT WAS A SAFETY OF FLT ITEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.