Narrative:

As the captain I had a great deal of paperwork duties regarding a number of maintenance issues: therefore; the first officer had entered the flight plan into the mcdu. Once finished with the paperwork; I hurriedly checked the first officer's entries and briefed the departure as I was the PF and we were already boarded with passenger and late to push back from the gate. In doing so; I checked the P-56 airspace avoidance procedure and verified that the first officer had correctly entered a place/bearing/distance for the dca 328 degree radial with the dca VOR being the anchor point. The first officer had a 300 degree heading pre-selected which I explained to him 'wasn't necessary as this is a fully managed departure.' on takeoff at 30 ft the navigation mode engaged; however; I quickly realized that the flight director command bars were not commanding a turn to the left which was required to avoid P-56. I; therefore; rolled the aircraft into a left turn and briefly caught a view of the pentagon from the left window and made a mental note that the positioning appeared to still be good. I began decreasing the bank angle in an attempt to resynchronize with the command bars as I had been convinced that the command bars should be providing valid guidance. At this point I noted that I was almost wings level on a heading of approximately 335-340 degrees; and then looked to the first officer's raw data and verified that we were still considerably right of course; which was north of the dca 328 degree radial. At that same moment the 'cross track error' illuminated on my navigation display and indicated we were .4 to .5 mi off course. I immediately turned the aircraft to the left and quickly intercepted the dca 328 degree radial. After leveling at the cruise altitude I began discussing the departure with the first officer to determine why the aircraft did not command the required left turn after liftoff. The first officer remarked that he 'never has luck with that procedure.' after some discussion; I finally realized that the cause of the error was our failure to delete 'the default acceleration altitude pseudo waypoint' which is automatically placed in the flight plan in-line with the departure runway centerline; which in turn commands the aircraft to that point. The first officer explained that he was not aware that he should have deleted this from the flight plan. Even though he did recall the same procedure being utilized at a previous airline he had flown for. I do not feel that we actually penetrated the P-56 airspace. However; I do believe we came extremely close (approximately .125 mi) to the boundary when we should not have. Although I do feel that the workload and time constraints at the gate contributed to this oversight; I take responsibility for this error as I failed to realize that the pseudo waypoint was left within the flight plan.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 FLT CREW HAS A TRACK HDG DEV ON DEP FROM DCA.

Narrative: AS THE CAPT I HAD A GREAT DEAL OF PAPERWORK DUTIES REGARDING A NUMBER OF MAINT ISSUES: THEREFORE; THE FO HAD ENTERED THE FLT PLAN INTO THE MCDU. ONCE FINISHED WITH THE PAPERWORK; I HURRIEDLY CHKED THE FO'S ENTRIES AND BRIEFED THE DEP AS I WAS THE PF AND WE WERE ALREADY BOARDED WITH PAX AND LATE TO PUSH BACK FROM THE GATE. IN DOING SO; I CHKED THE P-56 AIRSPACE AVOIDANCE PROC AND VERIFIED THAT THE FO HAD CORRECTLY ENTERED A PLACE/BEARING/DISTANCE FOR THE DCA 328 DEG RADIAL WITH THE DCA VOR BEING THE ANCHOR POINT. THE FO HAD A 300 DEG HDG PRE-SELECTED WHICH I EXPLAINED TO HIM 'WASN'T NECESSARY AS THIS IS A FULLY MANAGED DEP.' ON TKOF AT 30 FT THE NAV MODE ENGAGED; HOWEVER; I QUICKLY REALIZED THAT THE FLT DIRECTOR COMMAND BARS WERE NOT COMMANDING A TURN TO THE L WHICH WAS REQUIRED TO AVOID P-56. I; THEREFORE; ROLLED THE ACFT INTO A L TURN AND BRIEFLY CAUGHT A VIEW OF THE PENTAGON FROM THE L WINDOW AND MADE A MENTAL NOTE THAT THE POSITIONING APPEARED TO STILL BE GOOD. I BEGAN DECREASING THE BANK ANGLE IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESYNCHRONIZE WITH THE COMMAND BARS AS I HAD BEEN CONVINCED THAT THE COMMAND BARS SHOULD BE PROVIDING VALID GUIDANCE. AT THIS POINT I NOTED THAT I WAS ALMOST WINGS LEVEL ON A HDG OF APPROX 335-340 DEGS; AND THEN LOOKED TO THE FO'S RAW DATA AND VERIFIED THAT WE WERE STILL CONSIDERABLY R OF COURSE; WHICH WAS N OF THE DCA 328 DEG RADIAL. AT THAT SAME MOMENT THE 'CROSS TRACK ERROR' ILLUMINATED ON MY NAV DISPLAY AND INDICATED WE WERE .4 TO .5 MI OFF COURSE. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED THE ACFT TO THE L AND QUICKLY INTERCEPTED THE DCA 328 DEG RADIAL. AFTER LEVELING AT THE CRUISE ALT I BEGAN DISCUSSING THE DEP WITH THE FO TO DETERMINE WHY THE ACFT DID NOT COMMAND THE REQUIRED L TURN AFTER LIFTOFF. THE FO REMARKED THAT HE 'NEVER HAS LUCK WITH THAT PROC.' AFTER SOME DISCUSSION; I FINALLY REALIZED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE ERROR WAS OUR FAILURE TO DELETE 'THE DEFAULT ACCELERATION ALT PSEUDO WAYPOINT' WHICH IS AUTOMATICALLY PLACED IN THE FLT PLAN IN-LINE WITH THE DEP RWY CTRLINE; WHICH IN TURN COMMANDS THE ACFT TO THAT POINT. THE FO EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE THAT HE SHOULD HAVE DELETED THIS FROM THE FLT PLAN. EVEN THOUGH HE DID RECALL THE SAME PROC BEING UTILIZED AT A PREVIOUS AIRLINE HE HAD FLOWN FOR. I DO NOT FEEL THAT WE ACTUALLY PENETRATED THE P-56 AIRSPACE. HOWEVER; I DO BELIEVE WE CAME EXTREMELY CLOSE (APPROX .125 MI) TO THE BOUNDARY WHEN WE SHOULD NOT HAVE. ALTHOUGH I DO FEEL THAT THE WORKLOAD AND TIME CONSTRAINTS AT THE GATE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS OVERSIGHT; I TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS ERROR AS I FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE PSEUDO WAYPOINT WAS LEFT WITHIN THE FLT PLAN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.