Narrative:

On our flight to ewr; we encountered WX in the new york area and had to hold over the fix idented as kerri with an efc of 45 mins after entering holding. About 30 mins into the hold; ZBW started clearing aircraft to another holding fix called shaff (a fix on the arrival into ewr) and setting up for more holding closer to the field. All the while; we were in contact with dispatch discussing divert alternatives. When it came time to divert; we notified all the appropriate agencies and asked to divert to jfk. After being handed over to ZNY; they quickly gave us vectors and informed us that these were delaying vectors for sequence into jfk. By the time they got done vectoring us we were south of ewr and approach asked us if we still wanted jfk. We informed them that we could go to ewr without delay. So we were re-sequenced into ewr and vectored for the ILS to runway 22L. About 25 NM from the field we declared minimum fuel to assure no further delays with our fuel state. About 12 NM from the field we received an ECAM for the green hydraulic system overheated. The procedure called for the ptu to be turned off as well as the engine #1 hydraulic pump. We accomplished this within 30 seconds of the ECAM and read the rest of the procedure which stated if the overheat were to disappear; we could turn the 2 pumps back on. Since we were now about 6 mi from landing; we had to alternate extend the gear and land. About 2 mi from landing the overheat disappeared and the captain turned the pumps back on then reset the system. The gear doors remained extended but we landed without incident. We taxied to the gate and called maintenance inbound to let them know of the problem we had. We were met by maintenance at the gate and explained the whole scenario; the mechanic asked if we had sent any ACARS reports and we told him that we hadn't had the time before we got to the gate. He informed us that he would take care of that and it was my idea (the captain) not to send the report. Looking back on it; it was my bad decision that caused the confusion with the maintenance problem and I should have followed up with an ACARS code reporting what we had happen to the hydraulic system and the alternate extension of the gear. Given the little time we had between first indication and arriving at the gate along with a low fuel state; proper coordination and documentation was not accomplished.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 FLT CREW FAIL TO PROPERLY DOCUMENT A HYD GREEN SYS OVERHEAT ANOMALY DUE TO WORKLOAD CONSTRAINTS.

Narrative: ON OUR FLT TO EWR; WE ENCOUNTERED WX IN THE NEW YORK AREA AND HAD TO HOLD OVER THE FIX IDENTED AS KERRI WITH AN EFC OF 45 MINS AFTER ENTERING HOLDING. ABOUT 30 MINS INTO THE HOLD; ZBW STARTED CLRING ACFT TO ANOTHER HOLDING FIX CALLED SHAFF (A FIX ON THE ARR INTO EWR) AND SETTING UP FOR MORE HOLDING CLOSER TO THE FIELD. ALL THE WHILE; WE WERE IN CONTACT WITH DISPATCH DISCUSSING DIVERT ALTERNATIVES. WHEN IT CAME TIME TO DIVERT; WE NOTIFIED ALL THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND ASKED TO DIVERT TO JFK. AFTER BEING HANDED OVER TO ZNY; THEY QUICKLY GAVE US VECTORS AND INFORMED US THAT THESE WERE DELAYING VECTORS FOR SEQUENCE INTO JFK. BY THE TIME THEY GOT DONE VECTORING US WE WERE S OF EWR AND APCH ASKED US IF WE STILL WANTED JFK. WE INFORMED THEM THAT WE COULD GO TO EWR WITHOUT DELAY. SO WE WERE RE-SEQUENCED INTO EWR AND VECTORED FOR THE ILS TO RWY 22L. ABOUT 25 NM FROM THE FIELD WE DECLARED MINIMUM FUEL TO ASSURE NO FURTHER DELAYS WITH OUR FUEL STATE. ABOUT 12 NM FROM THE FIELD WE RECEIVED AN ECAM FOR THE GREEN HYD SYS OVERHEATED. THE PROC CALLED FOR THE PTU TO BE TURNED OFF AS WELL AS THE ENG #1 HYD PUMP. WE ACCOMPLISHED THIS WITHIN 30 SECONDS OF THE ECAM AND READ THE REST OF THE PROC WHICH STATED IF THE OVERHEAT WERE TO DISAPPEAR; WE COULD TURN THE 2 PUMPS BACK ON. SINCE WE WERE NOW ABOUT 6 MI FROM LNDG; WE HAD TO ALTERNATE EXTEND THE GEAR AND LAND. ABOUT 2 MI FROM LNDG THE OVERHEAT DISAPPEARED AND THE CAPT TURNED THE PUMPS BACK ON THEN RESET THE SYS. THE GEAR DOORS REMAINED EXTENDED BUT WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. WE TAXIED TO THE GATE AND CALLED MAINT INBOUND TO LET THEM KNOW OF THE PROB WE HAD. WE WERE MET BY MAINT AT THE GATE AND EXPLAINED THE WHOLE SCENARIO; THE MECH ASKED IF WE HAD SENT ANY ACARS RPTS AND WE TOLD HIM THAT WE HADN'T HAD THE TIME BEFORE WE GOT TO THE GATE. HE INFORMED US THAT HE WOULD TAKE CARE OF THAT AND IT WAS MY IDEA (THE CAPT) NOT TO SEND THE RPT. LOOKING BACK ON IT; IT WAS MY BAD DECISION THAT CAUSED THE CONFUSION WITH THE MAINT PROB AND I SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED UP WITH AN ACARS CODE RPTING WHAT WE HAD HAPPEN TO THE HYD SYS AND THE ALTERNATE EXTENSION OF THE GEAR. GIVEN THE LITTLE TIME WE HAD BTWN FIRST INDICATION AND ARRIVING AT THE GATE ALONG WITH A LOW FUEL STATE; PROPER COORD AND DOCUMENTATION WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.