Narrative:

Approaching sdf from darby intersection via radar vectors. Given: maintain 3500 ft until established; maintain 190 KTS until parcel; cleared ILS runway 35R approach. I was pilot monitoring; paired with an first officer for the first time (first leg ever flown together). I thought it might be tough to maintain 190 KTS to parcel and meet stabilized speed by 100 ft AGL; but the first officer was doing very well up to that point; so I didn't refuse the speed instruction part of the clearance. We were even above FL190; about 200-210 KTS at parcel with flaps 5 degrees. I received instructions to contact the tower; set what I thought was tower frequency (124.2); but had actually set (found on the ground) 124.125. I reported 1 mi out of parcel for runway 35R on the wrong frequency; then got distraction helping the first officer get the aircraft configured and slowed up for the landing. I remember thinking how embarrassing it would be for him if I had to tell him to go around; or take control of the aircraft as we had 4 jumpseaters; all current on our aircraft type. I let him continue and we were configured; on glide path in visual conditions passing through 1000 ft AGL; but we were about 20 KIAS fast. Speed was steadily decreasing; and I felt very certain we would shortly be 'on speed.' target speed was reached before 500 ft AGL. We landed and turned off the runway and I thought it strange we didn't receive instructions to contact ground. We stopped and the first officer dialed in the ground frequency and we received clearance to taxi to our ramp. The ground controller then asked if we had heard any of the tower controller's transmission clearing us to land. I responded; 'yes and believe I replied.' we then noticed the other frequency set in communication #1 was 124.125; not the correct 124.2. Evidently; we were cleared to land; but we never heard or acknowledged it. I was too distraction by the rush to get stabilized for the landing; and probably thought I heard cleared to land right after I thought I had transmitted to the tower. Supplemental information from acn 701285: I don't believe this would have happened if the captain and I had been rested. Another factor was that our attention was diverted at a critical phase of flight. We had been asked to keep our speed up; and then after using vertical speed to capture the GS the plane was difficult to slow prior to the 1000 ft AGL 'established approach' limit; we focused on our deceleration.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 FLT CREW LWOC AT SDF.

Narrative: APCHING SDF FROM DARBY INTXN VIA RADAR VECTORS. GIVEN: MAINTAIN 3500 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED; MAINTAIN 190 KTS UNTIL PARCEL; CLRED ILS RWY 35R APCH. I WAS PLT MONITORING; PAIRED WITH AN FO FOR THE FIRST TIME (FIRST LEG EVER FLOWN TOGETHER). I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE TOUGH TO MAINTAIN 190 KTS TO PARCEL AND MEET STABILIZED SPD BY 100 FT AGL; BUT THE FO WAS DOING VERY WELL UP TO THAT POINT; SO I DIDN'T REFUSE THE SPD INSTRUCTION PART OF THE CLRNC. WE WERE EVEN ABOVE FL190; ABOUT 200-210 KTS AT PARCEL WITH FLAPS 5 DEGS. I RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT THE TWR; SET WHAT I THOUGHT WAS TWR FREQ (124.2); BUT HAD ACTUALLY SET (FOUND ON THE GND) 124.125. I RPTED 1 MI OUT OF PARCEL FOR RWY 35R ON THE WRONG FREQ; THEN GOT DISTR HELPING THE FO GET THE ACFT CONFIGURED AND SLOWED UP FOR THE LNDG. I REMEMBER THINKING HOW EMBARRASSING IT WOULD BE FOR HIM IF I HAD TO TELL HIM TO GO AROUND; OR TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT AS WE HAD 4 JUMPSEATERS; ALL CURRENT ON OUR ACFT TYPE. I LET HIM CONTINUE AND WE WERE CONFIGURED; ON GLIDE PATH IN VISUAL CONDITIONS PASSING THROUGH 1000 FT AGL; BUT WE WERE ABOUT 20 KIAS FAST. SPD WAS STEADILY DECREASING; AND I FELT VERY CERTAIN WE WOULD SHORTLY BE 'ON SPD.' TARGET SPD WAS REACHED BEFORE 500 FT AGL. WE LANDED AND TURNED OFF THE RWY AND I THOUGHT IT STRANGE WE DIDN'T RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT GND. WE STOPPED AND THE FO DIALED IN THE GND FREQ AND WE RECEIVED CLRNC TO TAXI TO OUR RAMP. THE GND CTLR THEN ASKED IF WE HAD HEARD ANY OF THE TWR CTLR'S XMISSION CLRING US TO LAND. I RESPONDED; 'YES AND BELIEVE I REPLIED.' WE THEN NOTICED THE OTHER FREQ SET IN COM #1 WAS 124.125; NOT THE CORRECT 124.2. EVIDENTLY; WE WERE CLRED TO LAND; BUT WE NEVER HEARD OR ACKNOWLEDGED IT. I WAS TOO DISTR BY THE RUSH TO GET STABILIZED FOR THE LNDG; AND PROBABLY THOUGHT I HEARD CLRED TO LAND RIGHT AFTER I THOUGHT I HAD XMITTED TO THE TWR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 701285: I DON'T BELIEVE THIS WOULD HAVE HAPPENED IF THE CAPT AND I HAD BEEN RESTED. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THAT OUR ATTN WAS DIVERTED AT A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. WE HAD BEEN ASKED TO KEEP OUR SPD UP; AND THEN AFTER USING VERT SPD TO CAPTURE THE GS THE PLANE WAS DIFFICULT TO SLOW PRIOR TO THE 1000 FT AGL 'ESTABLISHED APCH' LIMIT; WE FOCUSED ON OUR DECELERATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.