Narrative:

One of my airborne flts was air carrier X ord-iad. They entered into about 3 airborne holds. I did airborne fuel analysis; based on their holds and forecasted release times and rertes. On the last hold he was held around cak; oh; west of pit. I told him the airborne hold was excessive and based on the fuel analysis he would be unable to accomplish the hold in the time allotted. His fuel requirements exceeded his fuel on board. I; therefore; suggested and informed the hub coordinator that he was going to have to divert to pit which was well within his fuel requirements. Somewhere in this time period of the hold to diversion; my computer went down; the pressure of the oso on my desk created an extreme back-up load of operational needs. I continued to concentrate only on airborne problems. Main problem for sending this report: air carrier X diverted to pit before I could do the fuel analysis; which really wasn't a problem because he still had plenty of fuel; but I was unable to forward to him the taf/NOTAMS/fdc's required prior to a diversion. I had to un-fly the flight in order to build the actual diversion which we had agreed to. Personally; the crashing of the system numerous times helped lead to operational loss of control; until I was able to set priorities of airborne flts only. Management was aware that I was swamped; mod asked that a ground weight balance be handled by someone in my area by his sending an all-points text message requesting assistance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLT CREW DIVERTS AN ACFT PRIOR TO DISPATCHER ISSUING THE REQUIRED INFO.

Narrative: ONE OF MY AIRBORNE FLTS WAS ACR X ORD-IAD. THEY ENTERED INTO ABOUT 3 AIRBORNE HOLDS. I DID AIRBORNE FUEL ANALYSIS; BASED ON THEIR HOLDS AND FORECASTED RELEASE TIMES AND RERTES. ON THE LAST HOLD HE WAS HELD AROUND CAK; OH; W OF PIT. I TOLD HIM THE AIRBORNE HOLD WAS EXCESSIVE AND BASED ON THE FUEL ANALYSIS HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO ACCOMPLISH THE HOLD IN THE TIME ALLOTTED. HIS FUEL REQUIREMENTS EXCEEDED HIS FUEL ON BOARD. I; THEREFORE; SUGGESTED AND INFORMED THE HUB COORDINATOR THAT HE WAS GOING TO HAVE TO DIVERT TO PIT WHICH WAS WELL WITHIN HIS FUEL REQUIREMENTS. SOMEWHERE IN THIS TIME PERIOD OF THE HOLD TO DIVERSION; MY COMPUTER WENT DOWN; THE PRESSURE OF THE OSO ON MY DESK CREATED AN EXTREME BACK-UP LOAD OF OPERATIONAL NEEDS. I CONTINUED TO CONCENTRATE ONLY ON AIRBORNE PROBS. MAIN PROB FOR SENDING THIS RPT: ACR X DIVERTED TO PIT BEFORE I COULD DO THE FUEL ANALYSIS; WHICH REALLY WASN'T A PROB BECAUSE HE STILL HAD PLENTY OF FUEL; BUT I WAS UNABLE TO FORWARD TO HIM THE TAF/NOTAMS/FDC'S REQUIRED PRIOR TO A DIVERSION. I HAD TO UN-FLY THE FLT IN ORDER TO BUILD THE ACTUAL DIVERSION WHICH WE HAD AGREED TO. PERSONALLY; THE CRASHING OF THE SYS NUMEROUS TIMES HELPED LEAD TO OPERATIONAL LOSS OF CTL; UNTIL I WAS ABLE TO SET PRIORITIES OF AIRBORNE FLTS ONLY. MGMNT WAS AWARE THAT I WAS SWAMPED; MOD ASKED THAT A GND WT BAL BE HANDLED BY SOMEONE IN MY AREA BY HIS SENDING AN ALL-POINTS TEXT MESSAGE REQUESTING ASSISTANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.