Narrative:

On climb out from srq we were on vectors for departure. We were also in the process of proceeding wbound and trying to pick our way around some rapidly growing thunderstorms. The controller was pressing us hard to take a turn to the north; the frequency was congested and stressful based on everyone's voice inflection. We were given a turn to 020 degrees as soon as feasible and every 10 seconds the controller was asking us when we could make the turn. We were gradually making a turn from the west to the north. I was looking outside and the first officer was flying; as we picked our way through the developing line I glanced inside the flight-deck to see the altitude alerter flashing. We were at 12700 ft. I disengaged the autoplt and 'hurried back to our assigned altitude.' this was the first officer's first trip off IOE. He was new to airline and jet operations. Mode awareness; lack of automation knowledge. I didn't see this; but as we debriefed this incident the first officer said he was climbing in IAS mode and about 11000 ft (right about the time the autoplt captured the altitude) he switched to the vertical speed mode. Apparently the autoplt continued climbing in the vertical speed mode and did not capture the altitude. Most of my attention was outside trying to look for a good hole in the line. I failed to properly monitor the flight path. Even legitimate things can (WX avoidance) become distrs. Things I would do different: 1) the heck with ATC; I would have continued wbound until past the line (about 5 more mins) and took the turn to the north when I was comfortable. 2) stay inside during the last 1000 ft till leveloff. I usually have this habit. Today's congested airspace and frequencys is limiting options for WX avoidance and adding communication and workload management complications. I think controllers issue multiple instructions with little regard for pilot workload. They need to situation in on joint CRM classes. We do joint CRM with the flight attendants; dispatchers and mechanics; but not the controllers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL600 CAPT RPTS AN ALT OVERSHOOT WHILE CLBING NEAR TSTMS WHEN HIS NEW FO SELECTED AUTOPLT VERT SPD; BECAME DISTR; AND MISSED THE LEVELOFF ALT.

Narrative: ON CLBOUT FROM SRQ WE WERE ON VECTORS FOR DEP. WE WERE ALSO IN THE PROCESS OF PROCEEDING WBOUND AND TRYING TO PICK OUR WAY AROUND SOME RAPIDLY GROWING TSTMS. THE CTLR WAS PRESSING US HARD TO TAKE A TURN TO THE N; THE FREQ WAS CONGESTED AND STRESSFUL BASED ON EVERYONE'S VOICE INFLECTION. WE WERE GIVEN A TURN TO 020 DEGS AS SOON AS FEASIBLE AND EVERY 10 SECONDS THE CTLR WAS ASKING US WHEN WE COULD MAKE THE TURN. WE WERE GRADUALLY MAKING A TURN FROM THE W TO THE N. I WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE AND THE FO WAS FLYING; AS WE PICKED OUR WAY THROUGH THE DEVELOPING LINE I GLANCED INSIDE THE FLIGHT-DECK TO SEE THE ALT ALERTER FLASHING. WE WERE AT 12700 FT. I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND 'HURRIED BACK TO OUR ASSIGNED ALT.' THIS WAS THE FO'S FIRST TRIP OFF IOE. HE WAS NEW TO AIRLINE AND JET OPS. MODE AWARENESS; LACK OF AUTOMATION KNOWLEDGE. I DIDN'T SEE THIS; BUT AS WE DEBRIEFED THIS INCIDENT THE FO SAID HE WAS CLBING IN IAS MODE AND ABOUT 11000 FT (RIGHT ABOUT THE TIME THE AUTOPLT CAPTURED THE ALT) HE SWITCHED TO THE VERT SPD MODE. APPARENTLY THE AUTOPLT CONTINUED CLBING IN THE VERT SPD MODE AND DID NOT CAPTURE THE ALT. MOST OF MY ATTN WAS OUTSIDE TRYING TO LOOK FOR A GOOD HOLE IN THE LINE. I FAILED TO PROPERLY MONITOR THE FLT PATH. EVEN LEGITIMATE THINGS CAN (WX AVOIDANCE) BECOME DISTRS. THINGS I WOULD DO DIFFERENT: 1) THE HECK WITH ATC; I WOULD HAVE CONTINUED WBOUND UNTIL PAST THE LINE (ABOUT 5 MORE MINS) AND TOOK THE TURN TO THE N WHEN I WAS COMFORTABLE. 2) STAY INSIDE DURING THE LAST 1000 FT TILL LEVELOFF. I USUALLY HAVE THIS HABIT. TODAY'S CONGESTED AIRSPACE AND FREQS IS LIMITING OPTIONS FOR WX AVOIDANCE AND ADDING COM AND WORKLOAD MGMNT COMPLICATIONS. I THINK CTLRS ISSUE MULTIPLE INSTRUCTIONS WITH LITTLE REGARD FOR PLT WORKLOAD. THEY NEED TO SIT IN ON JOINT CRM CLASSES. WE DO JOINT CRM WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS; DISPATCHERS AND MECHS; BUT NOT THE CTLRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.