Narrative:

ZLA stated that an airline crew reported they received a TCAS warning while flying at FL190 on initial approach to las. TCAS indicated a climb was appropriate to avoid the other aircraft; and they did so. ZLA idented my airplane; aircraft X; as the other aircraft. They also stated that my transponder indicated an altitude of FL187. Neither the pilot nor the passenger in aircraft X observed the airline. It is unknown if the airline crew visually observed my airplane. 1) ATIS received and altimeter was set to 29.95. 2) requested TA's from ground control and was given transponder code of XXXX. 3) departed on runway 12 at XA33 with right turn to heading of 280 degrees; direct bty. 4) tower handed to nellis approach on 135.1 was ok. 5) nellis requested a change in transponder code to YYYY. I acknowledged and made the change. 6) engine power control partially loosened; but seemed to hold climb setting. Then it suddenly fully loosened and engine dropped to idle. The adjustment was too tight to be hand tightened; so it was necessary to hold in position until a wrench could be located. 7) we were approaching a cumulous buildup directly on course; so the decision was made to deviate to the west and delay tightening the power control until passing the cumulous. 8) nellis-to-nellis handoff apparently was late because their transmission on 135.1 was intermittent and unreadable. Multiple communication attempts were made; and none were successfully completed. The new frequency could not be heard. 9) we searched the las vegas terminal area chart and found nellis approach frequency of 124.95 and tried to contact nellis; but did not get a response. 10) we were now over the spring mountains climbing over the cumulous. 11) we found third nellis approach frequency of 119.35 on the chart in small; difficult to find type. 12) contacted nellis approach on 119.35. They heard us and responded. We were told we were out of their area radar service terminated; squawk 1200. We acknowledged and did so. No handoff to ZLA was offered. 13) by this time we were past the cumulous and had turned direct bty. We were still climbing with a planned cruise altitude of 16500 ft MSL. 14) generator failure annunciator illuminated; then the low voltage annunciator. Low voltage was confirmed; and the generator switch was cycled. Generator power came back for a short time; then dropped out. This occurred several times before cycling the switch had no effect and the generator no longer produced any power. 15) the generator failure had taken priority over the engine control; and I still had not located the wrench and tightened. I asked the passenger to use a finger to keep it from moving when I needed to use my right hand and my left hand remained on the stick. 16) missed 16500 ft leveloff dealing with the generator; and did not notice until 17700 ft. Descent was immediately initiated. 17) I later learned from ZLA that my mode south transponder reported I was as high as FL187. I cannot confirm this; as the highest I saw was 17700 ft. 18) at the time of reaching maximum altitude; my transponder code was either YYYY assigned by nellis or 1200 entered when their radar service was terminated. 19) the decision was made to increase the friction on the engine control to eliminate this problem before further dealing with the generator. The erratic airspeed was interfering with altitude control. A wrench was found and the friction knob tightened. 20) I decided to abort the flight and to return to vgt. 21) made left turn and proceeded direct to vgt. 22) contacted tower and advised the generator had failed and we were running on only battery power. 23) tower controller directed me to fly directly to vgt and to squawk XXXX. I did both. 24) we were cleared for straight-in approach and landing to runway 7. 25) after landing; the ground controller asked me to telephone ZLA. I did and learned of the incident. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that when he left vgt the aircraft was working properly and that he was turned over to nellis controller for flight following. As he was climbing the throttle friction lock became loose and he had to hold the throttle to maintain engine power. Additionally he encountered cumulous buildups and elected to deviate tothe west around the WX. Simultaneously; the nellis frequency became unreadable and the generator fail light came on. He had difficulty finding another frequency for nellis and when he did; they advised he had deviated into ZLA's airspace and to squawk 1200; radar service terminated. At this time he realized he had climbed above FL180 and immediately descended back into VFR altitude. He elected to return to vgt at that time and was notified of his deviation and TCAS RA occurrence. He felt that the frequencys for the appropriate controling authority/authorized listed on the VFR area chart are difficult to find. This would have helped if he could have found the frequency sooner. Additionally; he felt that a published VFR procedure for arrival and departure should be listed somewhere on a chart.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LANCAIR PROP JET PLT HAS ALT EXCURSION DURING CLB AND ENTERS CTLED AIRSPACE AT FL180 CAUSING A TCAS RA FOR ANOTHER ACFT.

Narrative: ZLA STATED THAT AN AIRLINE CREW RPTED THEY RECEIVED A TCAS WARNING WHILE FLYING AT FL190 ON INITIAL APCH TO LAS. TCAS INDICATED A CLB WAS APPROPRIATE TO AVOID THE OTHER ACFT; AND THEY DID SO. ZLA IDENTED MY AIRPLANE; ACFT X; AS THE OTHER ACFT. THEY ALSO STATED THAT MY XPONDER INDICATED AN ALT OF FL187. NEITHER THE PLT NOR THE PAX IN ACFT X OBSERVED THE AIRLINE. IT IS UNKNOWN IF THE AIRLINE CREW VISUALLY OBSERVED MY AIRPLANE. 1) ATIS RECEIVED AND ALTIMETER WAS SET TO 29.95. 2) REQUESTED TA'S FROM GND CTL AND WAS GIVEN XPONDER CODE OF XXXX. 3) DEPARTED ON RWY 12 AT XA33 WITH R TURN TO HDG OF 280 DEGS; DIRECT BTY. 4) TWR HANDED TO NELLIS APCH ON 135.1 WAS OK. 5) NELLIS REQUESTED A CHANGE IN XPONDER CODE TO YYYY. I ACKNOWLEDGED AND MADE THE CHANGE. 6) ENG PWR CTL PARTIALLY LOOSENED; BUT SEEMED TO HOLD CLB SETTING. THEN IT SUDDENLY FULLY LOOSENED AND ENG DROPPED TO IDLE. THE ADJUSTMENT WAS TOO TIGHT TO BE HAND TIGHTENED; SO IT WAS NECESSARY TO HOLD IN POS UNTIL A WRENCH COULD BE LOCATED. 7) WE WERE APCHING A CUMULOUS BUILDUP DIRECTLY ON COURSE; SO THE DECISION WAS MADE TO DEVIATE TO THE W AND DELAY TIGHTENING THE PWR CTL UNTIL PASSING THE CUMULOUS. 8) NELLIS-TO-NELLIS HDOF APPARENTLY WAS LATE BECAUSE THEIR XMISSION ON 135.1 WAS INTERMITTENT AND UNREADABLE. MULTIPLE COM ATTEMPTS WERE MADE; AND NONE WERE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED. THE NEW FREQ COULD NOT BE HEARD. 9) WE SEARCHED THE LAS VEGAS TERMINAL AREA CHART AND FOUND NELLIS APCH FREQ OF 124.95 AND TRIED TO CONTACT NELLIS; BUT DID NOT GET A RESPONSE. 10) WE WERE NOW OVER THE SPRING MOUNTAINS CLBING OVER THE CUMULOUS. 11) WE FOUND THIRD NELLIS APCH FREQ OF 119.35 ON THE CHART IN SMALL; DIFFICULT TO FIND TYPE. 12) CONTACTED NELLIS APCH ON 119.35. THEY HEARD US AND RESPONDED. WE WERE TOLD WE WERE OUT OF THEIR AREA RADAR SVC TERMINATED; SQUAWK 1200. WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND DID SO. NO HDOF TO ZLA WAS OFFERED. 13) BY THIS TIME WE WERE PAST THE CUMULOUS AND HAD TURNED DIRECT BTY. WE WERE STILL CLBING WITH A PLANNED CRUISE ALT OF 16500 FT MSL. 14) GENERATOR FAILURE ANNUNCIATOR ILLUMINATED; THEN THE LOW VOLTAGE ANNUNCIATOR. LOW VOLTAGE WAS CONFIRMED; AND THE GENERATOR SWITCH WAS CYCLED. GENERATOR PWR CAME BACK FOR A SHORT TIME; THEN DROPPED OUT. THIS OCCURRED SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE CYCLING THE SWITCH HAD NO EFFECT AND THE GENERATOR NO LONGER PRODUCED ANY PWR. 15) THE GENERATOR FAILURE HAD TAKEN PRIORITY OVER THE ENG CTL; AND I STILL HAD NOT LOCATED THE WRENCH AND TIGHTENED. I ASKED THE PAX TO USE A FINGER TO KEEP IT FROM MOVING WHEN I NEEDED TO USE MY R HAND AND MY L HAND REMAINED ON THE STICK. 16) MISSED 16500 FT LEVELOFF DEALING WITH THE GENERATOR; AND DID NOT NOTICE UNTIL 17700 FT. DSCNT WAS IMMEDIATELY INITIATED. 17) I LATER LEARNED FROM ZLA THAT MY MODE S XPONDER RPTED I WAS AS HIGH AS FL187. I CANNOT CONFIRM THIS; AS THE HIGHEST I SAW WAS 17700 FT. 18) AT THE TIME OF REACHING MAX ALT; MY XPONDER CODE WAS EITHER YYYY ASSIGNED BY NELLIS OR 1200 ENTERED WHEN THEIR RADAR SVC WAS TERMINATED. 19) THE DECISION WAS MADE TO INCREASE THE FRICTION ON THE ENG CTL TO ELIMINATE THIS PROB BEFORE FURTHER DEALING WITH THE GENERATOR. THE ERRATIC AIRSPD WAS INTERFERING WITH ALT CTL. A WRENCH WAS FOUND AND THE FRICTION KNOB TIGHTENED. 20) I DECIDED TO ABORT THE FLT AND TO RETURN TO VGT. 21) MADE L TURN AND PROCEEDED DIRECT TO VGT. 22) CONTACTED TWR AND ADVISED THE GENERATOR HAD FAILED AND WE WERE RUNNING ON ONLY BATTERY PWR. 23) TWR CTLR DIRECTED ME TO FLY DIRECTLY TO VGT AND TO SQUAWK XXXX. I DID BOTH. 24) WE WERE CLRED FOR STRAIGHT-IN APCH AND LNDG TO RWY 7. 25) AFTER LNDG; THE GND CTLR ASKED ME TO TELEPHONE ZLA. I DID AND LEARNED OF THE INCIDENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT WHEN HE LEFT VGT THE ACFT WAS WORKING PROPERLY AND THAT HE WAS TURNED OVER TO NELLIS CTLR FOR FLT FOLLOWING. AS HE WAS CLBING THE THROTTLE FRICTION LOCK BECAME LOOSE AND HE HAD TO HOLD THE THROTTLE TO MAINTAIN ENG PWR. ADDITIONALLY HE ENCOUNTERED CUMULOUS BUILDUPS AND ELECTED TO DEVIATE TOTHE W AROUND THE WX. SIMULTANEOUSLY; THE NELLIS FREQ BECAME UNREADABLE AND THE GENERATOR FAIL LIGHT CAME ON. HE HAD DIFFICULTY FINDING ANOTHER FREQ FOR NELLIS AND WHEN HE DID; THEY ADVISED HE HAD DEVIATED INTO ZLA'S AIRSPACE AND TO SQUAWK 1200; RADAR SVC TERMINATED. AT THIS TIME HE REALIZED HE HAD CLBED ABOVE FL180 AND IMMEDIATELY DSNDED BACK INTO VFR ALT. HE ELECTED TO RETURN TO VGT AT THAT TIME AND WAS NOTIFIED OF HIS DEV AND TCAS RA OCCURRENCE. HE FELT THAT THE FREQS FOR THE APPROPRIATE CTLING AUTH LISTED ON THE VFR AREA CHART ARE DIFFICULT TO FIND. THIS WOULD HAVE HELPED IF HE COULD HAVE FOUND THE FREQ SOONER. ADDITIONALLY; HE FELT THAT A PUBLISHED VFR PROC FOR ARR AND DEP SHOULD BE LISTED SOMEWHERE ON A CHART.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.