37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 702179 |
Time | |
Date | 200607 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001 To 0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : zmp.artcc |
State Reference | MN |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Weather Elements | Thunderstorm |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zmp.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff cruise : level descent : approach ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | other personnel |
Qualification | other pilot : instrument pilot : private |
Experience | flight time total : 400 |
ASRS Report | 702179 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | inflight encounter : weather non adherence : far non adherence : company policies |
Independent Detector | other other : 1 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Weather Flight Crew Human Performance Company |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
The situation unfolded when I noticed precipitation returns appearing on my aircraft situation display just to the west of the direct route from aberdeen; sd; to jamestown; nd. While the radar was indicating precipitation for the most part -- up to say; level 3; there was a threatening-looking area southeast of jamestown I really didn't like. A quick check of my plot indicated that the aircraft would be airborne momentarily. Thinking to at least consult with the crew about a possible up-fuel; I was able to reach them over the company frequency. The aircraft had been ramped to 1800 pounds; essentially enough fuel to make the trip; hold off jamestown for 20 mins; and land. The PNF informed me they were just getting off the ground and were unable to communicate at just that instant. I was able to reestablish contact with the crew shortly after my asd indicated they were aloft. I briefed them on what both my asd and the aberdeen nexrad were showing for WX: isolated areas of precipitation; parallel to and just west of their line of flight; moving east to ene. I also pointed out a cell measuring perhaps 5 mi in diameter; just southeast of jamestown also moving off to the east. This cell initially appeared as an area of intense precipitation that soon began returning level 4 to level 5 echoes. It also featured tops of at least 35000 ft. Once I had oriented and briefed the crew on what I saw; and I obtained confirmation from them that their airborne radar was painting this same situation; we agreed that the flight could proceed by picking its way through the cells. Both screens indicated clear WX just to the west of this activity. I advised the crew that should they paint anything they didn't like; a brief deviation to the west would put them behind the WX; and that an approach into jamestown from the southwest should be easily feasible. When the flight was approximately two-thirds the distance from aberdeen to jamestown; my asd updated. Now there were 3 cells in the jamestown vicinity. My flight was heading directly toward an area that was showing 35000 ft tops; the cell just south of jamestown had slid off to a position southeast of the destination; but was now indicating 40000 ft echo tops and projecting hail. I contacted the flight and describe the location and characteristics of these 2 convective phenomena; and they voiced their intention to continue picking their way through what they were painting. At about that point I overheard them call the station 'in-range;' and they reported they expected to touch down with 1400 pounds fob. The duty manager then interrogated me about the flight's fuel situation; and in effect demanded that I perform an analysis based on what would happen if the flight had to return to aberdeen. I responded that given the computer's burn figures; the airplane could actually land in aberdeen with its reserve supply intact based on the computer's numbers. If the crew's fuel report was accurate -- and I had no way to know whether it was or it wasn't -- they could actually end up on the ground in aberdeen; should it come to that; with perhaps as much as a hundred pounds over that. During the flight I had also had at least 2 phone conversations with station personnel in jamestown -- at one point I asked about the WX; as the radar showed a small thunderstorm either on or very close to the field; and the woman who answered told me they were getting just occasional drops of rain. However; that all became moot; as the flight landed uneventfully in jamestown. Having reviewed and re-reviewed this incident in my own mind; it's clear to me that better decision would have been to have exercised my statutory operation control and up-fueled prior to departing aberdeen. Failing that; an air return to aberdeen would have been simply a matter of convincing the crew of the advisability of carrying more fuel and an alternate. I had the authority/authorized to stop the flight and I didn't. So; the next logical question is 'why?' this was the very last flight of the night -- not just on my desk; but for the entire airline. It had been another long; frustrating day of WX events; ATC delays (some understandable; some due to mysteries only known to center); broken airplanes; no-show crews; and endless swaps. It's a very short flight -- typically; the WX you see out the window in aberdeen is the WX you're going to have getting up to jamestown. It was well after dark -- thus; any spectacular (and thus; for aircrews; particularly frightening) lightning displays would have been immediately apparent. Just before the aberdeen departure; I had coaxed two other flts through similarly threatening WX -- one up to devil's lake from brainerd; another to thief river falls from hibbing. I 'inherited' a number of flts from the shift going off duty at XA00 -- this included a trip; which also had been re-routed to circumnav significant convective activity in western PA. We are drilled to track down flight times relentlessly -- and I was also calling and recalling a hotel in an attempt to reach a flight crew member there who could provide me with the on and in times needed to close out their trip.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR IS DISPATCHED INTO KNOWN WX WITHOUT PROPER FUEL RESERVES.
Narrative: THE SITUATION UNFOLDED WHEN I NOTICED PRECIPITATION RETURNS APPEARING ON MY ACFT SITUATION DISPLAY JUST TO THE W OF THE DIRECT RTE FROM ABERDEEN; SD; TO JAMESTOWN; ND. WHILE THE RADAR WAS INDICATING PRECIPITATION FOR THE MOST PART -- UP TO SAY; LEVEL 3; THERE WAS A THREATENING-LOOKING AREA SE OF JAMESTOWN I REALLY DIDN'T LIKE. A QUICK CHK OF MY PLOT INDICATED THAT THE ACFT WOULD BE AIRBORNE MOMENTARILY. THINKING TO AT LEAST CONSULT WITH THE CREW ABOUT A POSSIBLE UP-FUEL; I WAS ABLE TO REACH THEM OVER THE COMPANY FREQ. THE ACFT HAD BEEN RAMPED TO 1800 LBS; ESSENTIALLY ENOUGH FUEL TO MAKE THE TRIP; HOLD OFF JAMESTOWN FOR 20 MINS; AND LAND. THE PNF INFORMED ME THEY WERE JUST GETTING OFF THE GND AND WERE UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE AT JUST THAT INSTANT. I WAS ABLE TO REESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE CREW SHORTLY AFTER MY ASD INDICATED THEY WERE ALOFT. I BRIEFED THEM ON WHAT BOTH MY ASD AND THE ABERDEEN NEXRAD WERE SHOWING FOR WX: ISOLATED AREAS OF PRECIPITATION; PARALLEL TO AND JUST W OF THEIR LINE OF FLT; MOVING E TO ENE. I ALSO POINTED OUT A CELL MEASURING PERHAPS 5 MI IN DIAMETER; JUST SE OF JAMESTOWN ALSO MOVING OFF TO THE E. THIS CELL INITIALLY APPEARED AS AN AREA OF INTENSE PRECIPITATION THAT SOON BEGAN RETURNING LEVEL 4 TO LEVEL 5 ECHOES. IT ALSO FEATURED TOPS OF AT LEAST 35000 FT. ONCE I HAD ORIENTED AND BRIEFED THE CREW ON WHAT I SAW; AND I OBTAINED CONFIRMATION FROM THEM THAT THEIR AIRBORNE RADAR WAS PAINTING THIS SAME SITUATION; WE AGREED THAT THE FLT COULD PROCEED BY PICKING ITS WAY THROUGH THE CELLS. BOTH SCREENS INDICATED CLR WX JUST TO THE W OF THIS ACTIVITY. I ADVISED THE CREW THAT SHOULD THEY PAINT ANYTHING THEY DIDN'T LIKE; A BRIEF DEV TO THE W WOULD PUT THEM BEHIND THE WX; AND THAT AN APCH INTO JAMESTOWN FROM THE SW SHOULD BE EASILY FEASIBLE. WHEN THE FLT WAS APPROX TWO-THIRDS THE DISTANCE FROM ABERDEEN TO JAMESTOWN; MY ASD UPDATED. NOW THERE WERE 3 CELLS IN THE JAMESTOWN VICINITY. MY FLT WAS HEADING DIRECTLY TOWARD AN AREA THAT WAS SHOWING 35000 FT TOPS; THE CELL JUST S OF JAMESTOWN HAD SLID OFF TO A POS SE OF THE DEST; BUT WAS NOW INDICATING 40000 FT ECHO TOPS AND PROJECTING HAIL. I CONTACTED THE FLT AND DESCRIBE THE LOCATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THESE 2 CONVECTIVE PHENOMENA; AND THEY VOICED THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE PICKING THEIR WAY THROUGH WHAT THEY WERE PAINTING. AT ABOUT THAT POINT I OVERHEARD THEM CALL THE STATION 'IN-RANGE;' AND THEY RPTED THEY EXPECTED TO TOUCH DOWN WITH 1400 LBS FOB. THE DUTY MGR THEN INTERROGATED ME ABOUT THE FLT'S FUEL SITUATION; AND IN EFFECT DEMANDED THAT I PERFORM AN ANALYSIS BASED ON WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE FLT HAD TO RETURN TO ABERDEEN. I RESPONDED THAT GIVEN THE COMPUTER'S BURN FIGURES; THE AIRPLANE COULD ACTUALLY LAND IN ABERDEEN WITH ITS RESERVE SUPPLY INTACT BASED ON THE COMPUTER'S NUMBERS. IF THE CREW'S FUEL RPT WAS ACCURATE -- AND I HAD NO WAY TO KNOW WHETHER IT WAS OR IT WASN'T -- THEY COULD ACTUALLY END UP ON THE GND IN ABERDEEN; SHOULD IT COME TO THAT; WITH PERHAPS AS MUCH AS A HUNDRED LBS OVER THAT. DURING THE FLT I HAD ALSO HAD AT LEAST 2 PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH STATION PERSONNEL IN JAMESTOWN -- AT ONE POINT I ASKED ABOUT THE WX; AS THE RADAR SHOWED A SMALL TSTM EITHER ON OR VERY CLOSE TO THE FIELD; AND THE WOMAN WHO ANSWERED TOLD ME THEY WERE GETTING JUST OCCASIONAL DROPS OF RAIN. HOWEVER; THAT ALL BECAME MOOT; AS THE FLT LANDED UNEVENTFULLY IN JAMESTOWN. HAVING REVIEWED AND RE-REVIEWED THIS INCIDENT IN MY OWN MIND; IT'S CLR TO ME THAT BETTER DECISION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO HAVE EXERCISED MY STATUTORY OPERATION CTL AND UP-FUELED PRIOR TO DEPARTING ABERDEEN. FAILING THAT; AN AIR RETURN TO ABERDEEN WOULD HAVE BEEN SIMPLY A MATTER OF CONVINCING THE CREW OF THE ADVISABILITY OF CARRYING MORE FUEL AND AN ALTERNATE. I HAD THE AUTH TO STOP THE FLT AND I DIDN'T. SO; THE NEXT LOGICAL QUESTION IS 'WHY?' THIS WAS THE VERY LAST FLT OF THE NIGHT -- NOT JUST ON MY DESK; BUT FOR THE ENTIRE AIRLINE. IT HAD BEEN ANOTHER LONG; FRUSTRATING DAY OF WX EVENTS; ATC DELAYS (SOME UNDERSTANDABLE; SOME DUE TO MYSTERIES ONLY KNOWN TO CTR); BROKEN AIRPLANES; NO-SHOW CREWS; AND ENDLESS SWAPS. IT'S A VERY SHORT FLT -- TYPICALLY; THE WX YOU SEE OUT THE WINDOW IN ABERDEEN IS THE WX YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE GETTING UP TO JAMESTOWN. IT WAS WELL AFTER DARK -- THUS; ANY SPECTACULAR (AND THUS; FOR AIRCREWS; PARTICULARLY FRIGHTENING) LIGHTNING DISPLAYS WOULD HAVE BEEN IMMEDIATELY APPARENT. JUST BEFORE THE ABERDEEN DEP; I HAD COAXED TWO OTHER FLTS THROUGH SIMILARLY THREATENING WX -- ONE UP TO DEVIL'S LAKE FROM BRAINERD; ANOTHER TO THIEF RIVER FALLS FROM HIBBING. I 'INHERITED' A NUMBER OF FLTS FROM THE SHIFT GOING OFF DUTY AT XA00 -- THIS INCLUDED A TRIP; WHICH ALSO HAD BEEN RE-ROUTED TO CIRCUMNAV SIGNIFICANT CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY IN WESTERN PA. WE ARE DRILLED TO TRACK DOWN FLT TIMES RELENTLESSLY -- AND I WAS ALSO CALLING AND RECALLING A HOTEL IN AN ATTEMPT TO REACH A FLT CREW MEMBER THERE WHO COULD PROVIDE ME WITH THE ON AND IN TIMES NEEDED TO CLOSE OUT THEIR TRIP.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.