Narrative:

A C130; departed macdill AFB (mcf) at approximately XA30 local on an IFR flight plan to perform para-drop activity over mcf from 10000 ft. Mcf is due south of tpa. The para-drop activity was in direct conflict with departures off of tpa (tpa was on a south operation). This activity was not coordination with tpa controller personnel until after the fact (ie; after aircraft X departed mcf). This placed an increased workload on the local control position; as we in the tower were directed to take departing aircraft off of the tpa 3 SID and have them either fly a 120 degree or 220 degree heading to avoid the para-drops. The local controller position then had to redirect the electronic flight strips to the appropriate departure sector; in addition to modifying the stars track information to the correct scope. This increased 'heads down' time on a critical position where scanning the runway and airport environment is a must. This activity occurs on a regular basis and is a safety of flight hazard. It is only a matter of time until an incident/accident occurs. This could all be easily avoided if the USAF at mcf would simply perform para-drop activities at the restr area east of tpa; instead of the arrival/departure corridor of a busy airport. To do otherwise is ludicrous.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TPA TWR CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING MIL PARACHUTE ACTIVITY AT MCF WITHOUT TIMELY COORD; REQUIRING ADDITIONAL CTLR WORKLOAD.

Narrative: A C130; DEPARTED MACDILL AFB (MCF) AT APPROX XA30 LCL ON AN IFR FLT PLAN TO PERFORM PARA-DROP ACTIVITY OVER MCF FROM 10000 FT. MCF IS DUE S OF TPA. THE PARA-DROP ACTIVITY WAS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH DEPS OFF OF TPA (TPA WAS ON A S OP). THIS ACTIVITY WAS NOT COORD WITH TPA CTLR PERSONNEL UNTIL AFTER THE FACT (IE; AFTER ACFT X DEPARTED MCF). THIS PLACED AN INCREASED WORKLOAD ON THE LCL CTL POS; AS WE IN THE TWR WERE DIRECTED TO TAKE DEPARTING ACFT OFF OF THE TPA 3 SID AND HAVE THEM EITHER FLY A 120 DEG OR 220 DEG HDG TO AVOID THE PARA-DROPS. THE LCL CTLR POS THEN HAD TO REDIRECT THE ELECTRONIC FLT STRIPS TO THE APPROPRIATE DEP SECTOR; IN ADDITION TO MODIFYING THE STARS TRACK INFO TO THE CORRECT SCOPE. THIS INCREASED 'HEADS DOWN' TIME ON A CRITICAL POS WHERE SCANNING THE RWY AND ARPT ENVIRONMENT IS A MUST. THIS ACTIVITY OCCURS ON A REGULAR BASIS AND IS A SAFETY OF FLT HAZARD. IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME UNTIL AN INCIDENT/ACCIDENT OCCURS. THIS COULD ALL BE EASILY AVOIDED IF THE USAF AT MCF WOULD SIMPLY PERFORM PARA-DROP ACTIVITIES AT THE RESTR AREA E OF TPA; INSTEAD OF THE ARR/DEP CORRIDOR OF A BUSY ARPT. TO DO OTHERWISE IS LUDICROUS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.