Narrative:

Flight XXX lga-syr and flight YYY syr-pit. On takeoff out of lga as PF; just after liftoff I noted a left rolling tendency that required about half of the available right aileron authority to correct; which we attributed to a wind gust from the right crosswind reported by ATIS; very normal in lga. This assumption was bolstered when the left turning tendency disappeared at faster airspds and higher altitude. No problems were noted on landing in syr. On departure from syr off runway 28 with again a gusty right crosswind; the first officer as PF noted the left turn; but neither of us thought anything of it because it self-corrected at higher airspeed altitude on climb out. However; during landing flare in pit; first officer said it was taking an abnormally large amount of right aileron to keep the airplane straight in our zero wind landing. About half right aileron was used with our vref at around 130 KTS. This in addition to the 1/8 deflection right rudder trim and 1/8 deflection right aileron trim we had added in flight to correct for control pressures. On post flight walkaround after talking with maintenance control; the first officer and I noticed both ailerons were deflected down about 1/2 inch; but only mentioned it to accepting crew because maintenance was already on the way. Not long after arriving at the hotel; I received a call from maintenance control; with whom I had spoken about the write up; telling me the mechanics had found the right aileron control cable to be broken at the actuator. I feel this necessitates a report because it was technically a flight control system failure in-flight; although neither my first officer nor myself recognized the condition due to the circumstances of our operation (xwinds; gusts and lga turbulence; etc). I would have not have known about the failure if maintenance control had not followed up with me and let me know of the problem. I am grateful for his follow-up call; as we do not hear the results of write-ups without calling ourselves. It is of note that ours was not the first write-up regarding a problem with this aircraft; and the text description in the log from the previous day's crew included language stating that the flight controls felt like they were binding in-flight.supplemental information from 704453: however; on approach to pit and encountering turbulence I noted that it was taking a large amount of aileron input to correct for small roll deviations. Furthermore; I commented to the captain in the flare that it was taking approximately 1/4 to 1/2 right aileron deflection to keep the wings level during the flare; this was in addition to the trim inputs already in place. On post flight walkaround after talking with maintenance control; the captain and I noticed both ailerons deflected down about 1/2 an inch and mentioned it to the captain; who was already talking to maintenance.callback conversation with reporter 704452 revealed the following information: the reporter indicated that he (the captain) made the first takeoff from lga and the aircraft required aileron input that he associated with the crosswind coming across the terminal building adjacent to runway 31. He had flown out of lga numerous times and the crosswind was common. The control inputs disappeared as the aircraft accelerated. The next landing was normal; with very little input. The reporter noted that the winds during both takeoffs and the first landing were such that the flight crew attributed the control problems to be associated with them. The second landing by the first officer was not affected by wind and it was noted that the aircraft was difficult to control and required excessive aileron input. The flight crew performed a post flight inspection and noted that the aileron was drooping slightly and notified maintenance. The reporter indicated that this was the first such occurrence that he had knowledge of regarding any control problems with the emb-145. He was very pleased that maintenance control had followed up and notified him of the failure which precipitated his land the first officer's reports.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 FLT CREW HAS ACFT CTL PROBS DURING TKOF/LNDG AT PIT DUE TO A FAILED AILERON CTL CABLE.

Narrative: FLT XXX LGA-SYR AND FLT YYY SYR-PIT. ON TKOF OUT OF LGA AS PF; JUST AFTER LIFTOFF I NOTED A L ROLLING TENDENCY THAT REQUIRED ABOUT HALF OF THE AVAILABLE R AILERON AUTHORITY TO CORRECT; WHICH WE ATTRIBUTED TO A WIND GUST FROM THE R XWIND RPTED BY ATIS; VERY NORMAL IN LGA. THIS ASSUMPTION WAS BOLSTERED WHEN THE L TURNING TENDENCY DISAPPEARED AT FASTER AIRSPDS AND HIGHER ALT. NO PROBS WERE NOTED ON LNDG IN SYR. ON DEP FROM SYR OFF RWY 28 WITH AGAIN A GUSTY R XWIND; THE FO AS PF NOTED THE L TURN; BUT NEITHER OF US THOUGHT ANYTHING OF IT BECAUSE IT SELF-CORRECTED AT HIGHER AIRSPD ALT ON CLB OUT. HOWEVER; DURING LNDG FLARE IN PIT; FO SAID IT WAS TAKING AN ABNORMALLY LARGE AMOUNT OF R AILERON TO KEEP THE AIRPLANE STRAIGHT IN OUR ZERO WIND LNDG. ABOUT HALF R AILERON WAS USED WITH OUR VREF AT AROUND 130 KTS. THIS IN ADDITION TO THE 1/8 DEFLECTION R RUDDER TRIM AND 1/8 DEFLECTION R AILERON TRIM WE HAD ADDED IN FLT TO CORRECT FOR CTL PRESSURES. ON POST FLT WALKAROUND AFTER TALKING WITH MAINT CTL; THE FO AND I NOTICED BOTH AILERONS WERE DEFLECTED DOWN ABOUT 1/2 INCH; BUT ONLY MENTIONED IT TO ACCEPTING CREW BECAUSE MAINT WAS ALREADY ON THE WAY. NOT LONG AFTER ARRIVING AT THE HOTEL; I RECEIVED A CALL FROM MAINT CTL; WITH WHOM I HAD SPOKEN ABOUT THE WRITE UP; TELLING ME THE MECHANICS HAD FOUND THE R AILERON CTL CABLE TO BE BROKEN AT THE ACTUATOR. I FEEL THIS NECESSITATES A RPT BECAUSE IT WAS TECHNICALLY A FLT CTL SYSTEM FAILURE INFLT; ALTHOUGH NEITHER MY FO NOR MYSELF RECOGNIZED THE CONDITION DUE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF OUR OPERATION (XWINDS; GUSTS AND LGA TURB; ETC). I WOULD HAVE NOT HAVE KNOWN ABOUT THE FAILURE IF MAINT CTL HAD NOT FOLLOWED UP WITH ME AND LET ME KNOW OF THE PROB. I AM GRATEFUL FOR HIS FOLLOW-UP CALL; AS WE DO NOT HEAR THE RESULTS OF WRITE-UPS WITHOUT CALLING OURSELVES. IT IS OF NOTE THAT OURS WAS NOT THE FIRST WRITE-UP REGARDING A PROB WITH THIS ACFT; AND THE TEXT DESCRIPTION IN THE LOG FROM THE PREVIOUS DAY'S CREW INCLUDED LANGUAGE STATING THAT THE FLT CTLS FELT LIKE THEY WERE BINDING INFLT.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM 704453: HOWEVER; ON APCH TO PIT AND ENCOUNTERING TURB I NOTED THAT IT WAS TAKING A LARGE AMOUNT OF AILERON INPUT TO CORRECT FOR SMALL ROLL DEVS. FURTHERMORE; I COMMENTED TO THE CAPT IN THE FLARE THAT IT WAS TAKING APPROX 1/4 TO 1/2 R AILERON DEFLECTION TO KEEP THE WINGS LEVEL DURING THE FLARE; THIS WAS IN ADDITION TO THE TRIM INPUTS ALREADY IN PLACE. ON POST FLT WALKAROUND AFTER TALKING WITH MAINT CTL; THE CAPT AND I NOTICED BOTH AILERONS DEFLECTED DOWN ABOUT 1/2 AN INCH AND MENTIONED IT TO THE CAPT; WHO WAS ALREADY TALKING TO MAINT.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR 704452 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR INDICATED THAT HE (THE CAPT) MADE THE FIRST TKOF FROM LGA AND THE ACFT REQUIRED AILERON INPUT THAT HE ASSOCIATED WITH THE XWIND COMING ACROSS THE TERMINAL BUILDING ADJACENT TO RWY 31. HE HAD FLOWN OUT OF LGA NUMEROUS TIMES AND THE XWIND WAS COMMON. THE CTL INPUTS DISAPPEARED AS THE ACFT ACCELERATED. THE NEXT LNDG WAS NORMAL; WITH VERY LITTLE INPUT. THE RPTR NOTED THAT THE WINDS DURING BOTH TKOFS AND THE FIRST LNDG WERE SUCH THAT THE FLT CREW ATTRIBUTED THE CTL PROBS TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THEM. THE SECOND LNDG BY THE FO WAS NOT AFFECTED BY WIND AND IT WAS NOTED THAT THE ACFT WAS DIFFICULT TO CTL AND REQUIRED EXCESSIVE AILERON INPUT. THE FLT CREW PERFORMED A POST FLT INSPECTION AND NOTED THAT THE AILERON WAS DROOPING SLIGHTLY AND NOTIFIED MAINT. THE RPTR INDICATED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST SUCH OCCURRENCE THAT HE HAD KNOWLEDGE OF REGARDING ANY CTL PROBS WITH THE EMB-145. HE WAS VERY PLEASED THAT MAINT CTL HAD FOLLOWED UP AND NOTIFIED HIM OF THE FAILURE WHICH PRECIPITATED HIS LAND THE FO'S RPTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.