Narrative:

I was flying a local VFR test flight in order to calibrate an autoplt and EFIS system. My flight departed sfb shortly after XA00 on jul/mon/06. My VFR clearance included contact to orl approach where I could expect clearance to enter the orl class B airspace. Departure was normal and uneventful. Upon contact with orl approach; I was cleared into the class B airspace at 5000 ft MSL; north of sfb in order to orbit and conduct the test flight. The calibration portion of the flight required 25 mins over the lake where I informed orl that I was ready for return to sfb. The approach controller cleared me to descend to 1500 ft MSL; to expect the mid field downwind for runway 27R; and to contact sanford tower. I began my descent into the airport and switched over to tower. The controller cleared me to enter the mid field downwind for runway 27R. I acknowledged his instruction and requested a non standard approach to the airport. My request was for a low approach to a 'pop up' then closed pattern for landing. This maneuver allows for high speed entry into the pattern followed by a rapid deceleration with a low power climb and medium G maneuver. The controller said; 'I have your request.' I continued inbound but with a ground speed above 200 KTS I began my turn to the downwind early (approximately 2-3 mi from the runway). The controller began to question my turn to the east by stating; 'nxxx where are you going? You're heading east.' this confused me as I fully intended to turn east in order to execute the instructed pattern entry. I remember very clearly looking out off my right wing and noting the numbers for runway 27R. I was certain my position was correct for the downwind for runway 27R. The controller said something else that made me question my location and heading. This confused me enough that I chose without instruction to depart the pattern back out to the north. My concern was twofold. I thought it was possible I was heading the wrong way and would cause a major conflict; or the controller thought I was someone else. Either way; I was unsure and chose to depart in order to self de-conflict with a possible traffic hazard. The controller soon came back and strongly noted that I was now heading north and promptly instructed me to turn 180 degrees. At this moment; I knew we agreed about where I was and which direction I was flying. I acknowledged his instruction with a hard turn back to the south; and back towards the airport. My assumption is the controller did not expect my execution to be as rapid as it was. I continued in towards the airport and clearly remember looking right at the numbers on the closed runway 18. I felt at this moment as though my situational awareness was where it needed to be. I was headed back to the airport as directed. Without further instruction from ATC; I soon flew over the top of the airport when the controller cleared me to land runway 27R #2 behind another light aircraft. I acknowledged his instruction but since I had already passed over runway 27R I was entering a left downwind for runway 27R. This put me in a dangerous situation where I was flying downwind directly over top of runway 27C where other training traffic was working. In essence; I was flying opposite of the final approach for runway 27C. With my head on a swivel I continued outbound towards the east in order to set up for the landing on runway 27R. The controller asked again why I was going east where I became agitated. I simply didn't know what else to say or do. I didn't know how else to enter a downwind for a west runway except to fly east. The controller asked if I had a working compass on board; and I responded in an agitated manner; 'apparently not!' I asked the controller if he was working the correct airplane and then after an exchange; I stated to him; 'mark your tapes; we need to talk about this.' he agreed; asked me to slow down. I told him that I needed a turn to slow; he turned me east and shortly after that moment; the controller informed me that I was about to run east into someone else's airspace and then cleared me to land on runway 27R. I executed a hard left turn back to the airport; configured the airplane and promptly landed. I felt the controller being unaware of my aircraft performance was not prepared to work me into the pattern. In being unaware he chose to use his position as a controller to chastise me over the radio causing a cascading plethora of confusion. If the controller had simply stated his original instructions clearly; this entire event would have been avoided. A conversation with the duty supervisor revealed to me the controller initially asked where I was going because I turned my downwind too wide (3-4 mi from the field). He could have simply said; 'tighten up your downwind' and I would have known he wanted me closer. I feel the controller's actions and attitude could have easily caused an accident. He chose to berate the pilot instead of issuing clear instructions as to what he wanted the pilot to do. Obnoxious remarks caused me confusion in a tense situation.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A HIGH PERFORMANCE EXPERIMENTAL ACFT PLT ENTERING THE SFB PATTERN FOR LNDG DESCRIBES A SERIES OF MISCOMS WITH SFB TWR.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING A LCL VFR TEST FLT IN ORDER TO CALIBRATE AN AUTOPLT AND EFIS SYS. MY FLT DEPARTED SFB SHORTLY AFTER XA00 ON JUL/MON/06. MY VFR CLRNC INCLUDED CONTACT TO ORL APCH WHERE I COULD EXPECT CLRNC TO ENTER THE ORL CLASS B AIRSPACE. DEP WAS NORMAL AND UNEVENTFUL. UPON CONTACT WITH ORL APCH; I WAS CLRED INTO THE CLASS B AIRSPACE AT 5000 FT MSL; N OF SFB IN ORDER TO ORBIT AND CONDUCT THE TEST FLT. THE CALIBRATION PORTION OF THE FLT REQUIRED 25 MINS OVER THE LAKE WHERE I INFORMED ORL THAT I WAS READY FOR RETURN TO SFB. THE APCH CTLR CLRED ME TO DSND TO 1500 FT MSL; TO EXPECT THE MID FIELD DOWNWIND FOR RWY 27R; AND TO CONTACT SANFORD TWR. I BEGAN MY DSCNT INTO THE ARPT AND SWITCHED OVER TO TWR. THE CTLR CLRED ME TO ENTER THE MID FIELD DOWNWIND FOR RWY 27R. I ACKNOWLEDGED HIS INSTRUCTION AND REQUESTED A NON STANDARD APCH TO THE ARPT. MY REQUEST WAS FOR A LOW APCH TO A 'POP UP' THEN CLOSED PATTERN FOR LNDG. THIS MANEUVER ALLOWS FOR HIGH SPD ENTRY INTO THE PATTERN FOLLOWED BY A RAPID DECELERATION WITH A LOW PWR CLB AND MEDIUM G MANEUVER. THE CTLR SAID; 'I HAVE YOUR REQUEST.' I CONTINUED INBOUND BUT WITH A GND SPD ABOVE 200 KTS I BEGAN MY TURN TO THE DOWNWIND EARLY (APPROX 2-3 MI FROM THE RWY). THE CTLR BEGAN TO QUESTION MY TURN TO THE E BY STATING; 'NXXX WHERE ARE YOU GOING? YOU'RE HDG E.' THIS CONFUSED ME AS I FULLY INTENDED TO TURN E IN ORDER TO EXECUTE THE INSTRUCTED PATTERN ENTRY. I REMEMBER VERY CLRLY LOOKING OUT OFF MY R WING AND NOTING THE NUMBERS FOR RWY 27R. I WAS CERTAIN MY POS WAS CORRECT FOR THE DOWNWIND FOR RWY 27R. THE CTLR SAID SOMETHING ELSE THAT MADE ME QUESTION MY LOCATION AND HDG. THIS CONFUSED ME ENOUGH THAT I CHOSE WITHOUT INSTRUCTION TO DEPART THE PATTERN BACK OUT TO THE N. MY CONCERN WAS TWOFOLD. I THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE I WAS HDG THE WRONG WAY AND WOULD CAUSE A MAJOR CONFLICT; OR THE CTLR THOUGHT I WAS SOMEONE ELSE. EITHER WAY; I WAS UNSURE AND CHOSE TO DEPART IN ORDER TO SELF DE-CONFLICT WITH A POSSIBLE TFC HAZARD. THE CTLR SOON CAME BACK AND STRONGLY NOTED THAT I WAS NOW HDG N AND PROMPTLY INSTRUCTED ME TO TURN 180 DEGS. AT THIS MOMENT; I KNEW WE AGREED ABOUT WHERE I WAS AND WHICH DIRECTION I WAS FLYING. I ACKNOWLEDGED HIS INSTRUCTION WITH A HARD TURN BACK TO THE S; AND BACK TOWARDS THE ARPT. MY ASSUMPTION IS THE CTLR DID NOT EXPECT MY EXECUTION TO BE AS RAPID AS IT WAS. I CONTINUED IN TOWARDS THE ARPT AND CLRLY REMEMBER LOOKING RIGHT AT THE NUMBERS ON THE CLOSED RWY 18. I FELT AT THIS MOMENT AS THOUGH MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS WHERE IT NEEDED TO BE. I WAS HEADED BACK TO THE ARPT AS DIRECTED. WITHOUT FURTHER INSTRUCTION FROM ATC; I SOON FLEW OVER THE TOP OF THE ARPT WHEN THE CTLR CLRED ME TO LAND RWY 27R #2 BEHIND ANOTHER LIGHT ACFT. I ACKNOWLEDGED HIS INSTRUCTION BUT SINCE I HAD ALREADY PASSED OVER RWY 27R I WAS ENTERING A L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 27R. THIS PUT ME IN A DANGEROUS SITUATION WHERE I WAS FLYING DOWNWIND DIRECTLY OVER TOP OF RWY 27C WHERE OTHER TRAINING TFC WAS WORKING. IN ESSENCE; I WAS FLYING OPPOSITE OF THE FINAL APCH FOR RWY 27C. WITH MY HEAD ON A SWIVEL I CONTINUED OUTBOUND TOWARDS THE E IN ORDER TO SET UP FOR THE LNDG ON RWY 27R. THE CTLR ASKED AGAIN WHY I WAS GOING E WHERE I BECAME AGITATED. I SIMPLY DIDN'T KNOW WHAT ELSE TO SAY OR DO. I DIDN'T KNOW HOW ELSE TO ENTER A DOWNWIND FOR A W RWY EXCEPT TO FLY E. THE CTLR ASKED IF I HAD A WORKING COMPASS ON BOARD; AND I RESPONDED IN AN AGITATED MANNER; 'APPARENTLY NOT!' I ASKED THE CTLR IF HE WAS WORKING THE CORRECT AIRPLANE AND THEN AFTER AN EXCHANGE; I STATED TO HIM; 'MARK YOUR TAPES; WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT THIS.' HE AGREED; ASKED ME TO SLOW DOWN. I TOLD HIM THAT I NEEDED A TURN TO SLOW; HE TURNED ME E AND SHORTLY AFTER THAT MOMENT; THE CTLR INFORMED ME THAT I WAS ABOUT TO RUN E INTO SOMEONE ELSE'S AIRSPACE AND THEN CLRED ME TO LAND ON RWY 27R. I EXECUTED A HARD L TURN BACK TO THE ARPT; CONFIGURED THE AIRPLANE AND PROMPTLY LANDED. I FELT THE CTLR BEING UNAWARE OF MY ACFT PERFORMANCE WAS NOT PREPARED TO WORK ME INTO THE PATTERN. IN BEING UNAWARE HE CHOSE TO USE HIS POS AS A CTLR TO CHASTISE ME OVER THE RADIO CAUSING A CASCADING PLETHORA OF CONFUSION. IF THE CTLR HAD SIMPLY STATED HIS ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS CLRLY; THIS ENTIRE EVENT WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. A CONVERSATION WITH THE DUTY SUPVR REVEALED TO ME THE CTLR INITIALLY ASKED WHERE I WAS GOING BECAUSE I TURNED MY DOWNWIND TOO WIDE (3-4 MI FROM THE FIELD). HE COULD HAVE SIMPLY SAID; 'TIGHTEN UP YOUR DOWNWIND' AND I WOULD HAVE KNOWN HE WANTED ME CLOSER. I FEEL THE CTLR'S ACTIONS AND ATTITUDE COULD HAVE EASILY CAUSED AN ACCIDENT. HE CHOSE TO BERATE THE PLT INSTEAD OF ISSUING CLR INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHAT HE WANTED THE PLT TO DO. OBNOXIOUS REMARKS CAUSED ME CONFUSION IN A TENSE SITUATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.