Narrative:

We ran through all checklist before we departed and all systems were okay; nothing abnormal. I was the PF on this leg with first officer as PNF. We departed the runway. With positive rate of climb call out from the first officer I called for gear up; at approximately 300-400 ft (while still hand flying the airplane) I asked the first officer if it looked smoky in the cockpit to him. As he started to reply we received the master warning message lav smoke. The next events happened at the same time; I instructed the first officer to tell tower that we were declaring an emergency; are making a left pattern for the runway and will be evacuating on the runway; and that I wanted the fire and rescue equipment to meet us on the runway. I had already started to make the 180 degree turn to fly a close-in left downwind as the first officer made the call to tower; during this time the flight attendant had called from the cabin to report that he had smoke in the cabin and the lav smoke detector was going off. I told him that I was aware of it and that we were returning to the field to land and for him to prepare the cabin for evacuation. I asked him how bad the smoke was at that time and he stated that it was not very bad and that it was only in part of the cabin. By the time that those events were done I was calling for gear down flaps 22 from the first officer. I called for flaps 45 and started a downwind to final turn that put us on approximately a .5 to .75 mile final. While on final I told the first officer to prepare to evacuate the plane as soon as we get stopped and that I wanted him to go help the flight attendants get the people away so the fire crew could come inspect it. The entire event from the lav smoke message to landing on the runway lasted only one and a half min; during which time we were talking to tower; the flight attendant; and getting configured to land while at a low altitude. We had an ecias message; a flight attendant calling; while trying to go from a takeoff configuration to getting ready for an emergency landing and evacuate/evacuation. I did what was necessary (as captain in command while exercising my emergency authority) to get this airplane back on the ground and everyone off safely. I did not think that it would be prudent to be distracted during this high workload and altitude to change controls to allow us to don our masks or to try and put on my mask and fly the plane at the same time; or to delay getting on the ground and risking our safety along with the passenger to climb to a higher altitude; and extending our pattern. We have all seen the videos that show how fast a fire can spread in an airplane. I did not want to become another accident report that stated 52 people died with the cause being the pilot delayed landing. All of the smoke dissipated by the time that we landed; if at any time during this situation the smoke had interfered with our ability to do our job I would have acted accordingly and extended our pattern so we could don our masks. Supplemental information from acn 705105: on this leg the captain was flying pilot and I was the non flying pilot. The takeoff roll went off without any problems at all. A few seconds after I brought up the gear of the airplane both I and the captain noticed a thin layer of smoke forming in the cockpit. At this point we were about 200 ft AGL and in the climb profile. At 400 ft AGL when the aircraft's inhibit logic came off line we received a 'lav smoke' EICAS warning message. Almost at the same time the flight attendant chimed up from the cabin to let us know that he also noticed smoke in the cabin. He said that the smoke was light and the farther back he went in the cabin the lighter the smoke was. At that point we were no more than about 800 ft AGL; at which point it was decided that the best course of action was to declare an emergency and immediately circle back around to get on the ground due to the warning message on the EICAS. I declared an emergency with the tower who we were still with because we had not been handed off yet. The captain then brought the aircraft through a tight left hand traffic pattern to land. As we were going through the pattern I was trying to get the aircraft ready to land; and also we were communicating with flight attendant toinform him of the current situation. We were under a high workload at that point; and thought that pausing to don the smoke mask and goggles would have delayed us getting on the ground safely by too much time. Also the smoke in the cockpit at the worst point was very light and seemed to pose no immediate breathing risk. We did not have the autoplt on so donning the mask would have required us to transfer controls and take up time that we needed to safely get the aircraft configured and on the ground so we could get everyone safely off the aircraft. The weather was VFR with clear skies with a hazy visibility of about 6-7 miles. I was helping to make sure the captain had the field in sight at all times so we could safely land. Tower cleared us to land immediately and we let them know of the situation so they could get the necessary equipment in place. By the time the airplane was on the downwind to base leg of the pattern the smoke in the cockpit was all gone; and we had no trouble at all seeing outside or breathing. The captain brought the airplane to a safe landing and a complete stop on the runway while I ran the required checklist to properly configure for landing. Once we stopped on the runway we gave the command to the flight attendant to let all the people exit through the main entrance of the aircraft at a normal pace. As the passenger were exiting we ran though the emergency evacuation memory items and configured the aircraft so we could deplane after the passenger. Once everyone was off the firefighters searched the airplane thoroughly and found no danger. Callback conversation with reporter acn 705106 revealed the following information: reporter states he is unaware of the exact source of the smoke.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW EXPERIENCED SMOKE AND FUMES IN THE COCKPIT AND LAV SMOKE EICAS MSG SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF. THEY DECLARED AN EMER AND RETURNED TO LAND AT DEP ARPT.

Narrative: WE RAN THROUGH ALL CHKLIST BEFORE WE DEPARTED AND ALL SYSTEMS WERE OKAY; NOTHING ABNORMAL. I WAS THE PF ON THIS LEG WITH FO AS PNF. WE DEPARTED THE RWY. WITH POSITIVE RATE OF CLB CALL OUT FROM THE FO I CALLED FOR GEAR UP; AT APPROX 300-400 FT (WHILE STILL HAND FLYING THE AIRPLANE) I ASKED THE FO IF IT LOOKED SMOKY IN THE COCKPIT TO HIM. AS HE STARTED TO REPLY WE RECEIVED THE MASTER WARNING MSG LAV SMOKE. THE NEXT EVENTS HAPPENED AT THE SAME TIME; I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO TELL TWR THAT WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER; ARE MAKING A LEFT PATTERN FOR THE RWY AND WILL BE EVACUATING ON THE RWY; AND THAT I WANTED THE FIRE AND RESCUE EQUIPMENT TO MEET US ON THE RWY. I HAD ALREADY STARTED TO MAKE THE 180 DEG TURN TO FLY A CLOSE-IN L DOWNWIND AS THE FO MADE THE CALL TO TWR; DURING THIS TIME THE FLT ATTENDANT HAD CALLED FROM THE CABIN TO RPT THAT HE HAD SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND THE LAV SMOKE DETECTOR WAS GOING OFF. I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS AWARE OF IT AND THAT WE WERE RETURNING TO THE FIELD TO LAND AND FOR HIM TO PREPARE THE CABIN FOR EVACUATION. I ASKED HIM HOW BAD THE SMOKE WAS AT THAT TIME AND HE STATED THAT IT WAS NOT VERY BAD AND THAT IT WAS ONLY IN PART OF THE CABIN. BY THE TIME THAT THOSE EVENTS WERE DONE I WAS CALLING FOR GEAR DOWN FLAPS 22 FROM THE FO. I CALLED FOR FLAPS 45 AND STARTED A DOWNWIND TO FINAL TURN THAT PUT US ON APPROX A .5 TO .75 MILE FINAL. WHILE ON FINAL I TOLD THE FO TO PREPARE TO EVACUATE THE PLANE AS SOON AS WE GET STOPPED AND THAT I WANTED HIM TO GO HELP THE FLT ATTENDANTS GET THE PEOPLE AWAY SO THE FIRE CREW COULD COME INSPECT IT. THE ENTIRE EVENT FROM THE LAV SMOKE MSG TO LNDG ON THE RWY LASTED ONLY ONE AND A HALF MIN; DURING WHICH TIME WE WERE TALKING TO TWR; THE FLT ATTENDANT; AND GETTING CONFIGURED TO LAND WHILE AT A LOW ALT. WE HAD AN ECIAS MSG; A FLT ATTENDANT CALLING; WHILE TRYING TO GO FROM A TAKEOFF CONFIG TO GETTING READY FOR AN EMER LNDG AND EVAC. I DID WHAT WAS NECESSARY (AS CAPT IN COMMAND WHILE EXERCISING MY EMER AUTHORITY) TO GET THIS AIRPLANE BACK ON THE GND AND EVERYONE OFF SAFELY. I DID NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO BE DISTRACTED DURING THIS HIGH WORKLOAD AND ALT TO CHANGE CTLS TO ALLOW US TO DON OUR MASKS OR TO TRY AND PUT ON MY MASK AND FLY THE PLANE AT THE SAME TIME; OR TO DELAY GETTING ON THE GND AND RISKING OUR SAFETY ALONG WITH THE PAX TO CLB TO A HIGHER ALT; AND EXTENDING OUR PATTERN. WE HAVE ALL SEEN THE VIDEOS THAT SHOW HOW FAST A FIRE CAN SPREAD IN AN AIRPLANE. I DID NOT WANT TO BECOME ANOTHER ACCIDENT RPT THAT STATED 52 PEOPLE DIED WITH THE CAUSE BEING THE PLT DELAYED LNDG. ALL OF THE SMOKE DISSIPATED BY THE TIME THAT WE LANDED; IF AT ANY TIME DURING THIS SITUATION THE SMOKE HAD INTERFERED WITH OUR ABILITY TO DO OUR JOB I WOULD HAVE ACTED ACCORDINGLY AND EXTENDED OUR PATTERN SO WE COULD DON OUR MASKS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 705105: ON THIS LEG THE CAPT WAS FLYING PLT AND I WAS THE NON FLYING PLT. THE TAKEOFF ROLL WENT OFF WITHOUT ANY PROBS AT ALL. A FEW SECONDS AFTER I BROUGHT UP THE GEAR OF THE AIRPLANE BOTH I AND THE CAPT NOTICED A THIN LAYER OF SMOKE FORMING IN THE COCKPIT. AT THIS POINT WE WERE ABOUT 200 FT AGL AND IN THE CLB PROFILE. AT 400 FT AGL WHEN THE ACFT'S INHIBIT LOGIC CAME OFF LINE WE RECEIVED A 'LAV SMOKE' EICAS WARNING MSG. ALMOST AT THE SAME TIME THE FLT ATTENDANT CHIMED UP FROM THE CABIN TO LET US KNOW THAT HE ALSO NOTICED SMOKE IN THE CABIN. HE SAID THAT THE SMOKE WAS LIGHT AND THE FARTHER BACK HE WENT IN THE CABIN THE LIGHTER THE SMOKE WAS. AT THAT POINT WE WERE NO MORE THAN ABOUT 800 FT AGL; AT WHICH POINT IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO DECLARE AN EMER AND IMMEDIATELY CIRCLE BACK AROUND TO GET ON THE GND DUE TO THE WARNING MSG ON THE EICAS. I DECLARED AN EMER WITH THE TWR WHO WE WERE STILL WITH BECAUSE WE HAD NOT BEEN HANDED OFF YET. THE CAPT THEN BROUGHT THE ACFT THROUGH A TIGHT L HAND TFC PATTERN TO LAND. AS WE WERE GOING THROUGH THE PATTERN I WAS TRYING TO GET THE ACFT READY TO LAND; AND ALSO WE WERE COMMUNICATING WITH FLT ATTENDANT TOINFORM HIM OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. WE WERE UNDER A HIGH WORKLOAD AT THAT POINT; AND THOUGHT THAT PAUSING TO DON THE SMOKE MASK AND GOGGLES WOULD HAVE DELAYED US GETTING ON THE GND SAFELY BY TOO MUCH TIME. ALSO THE SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT AT THE WORST POINT WAS VERY LIGHT AND SEEMED TO POSE NO IMMEDIATE BREATHING RISK. WE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTOPLT ON SO DONNING THE MASK WOULD HAVE REQUIRED US TO TRANSFER CTLS AND TAKE UP TIME THAT WE NEEDED TO SAFELY GET THE ACFT CONFIGURED AND ON THE GND SO WE COULD GET EVERYONE SAFELY OFF THE ACFT. THE WEATHER WAS VFR WITH CLR SKIES WITH A HAZY VISIBILITY OF ABOUT 6-7 MILES. I WAS HELPING TO MAKE SURE THE CAPT HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT AT ALL TIMES SO WE COULD SAFELY LAND. TWR CLRED US TO LAND IMMEDIATELY AND WE LET THEM KNOW OF THE SITUATION SO THEY COULD GET THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT IN PLACE. BY THE TIME THE AIRPLANE WAS ON THE DOWNWIND TO BASE LEG OF THE PATTERN THE SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT WAS ALL GONE; AND WE HAD NO TROUBLE AT ALL SEEING OUTSIDE OR BREATHING. THE CAPT BROUGHT THE AIRPLANE TO A SAFE LNDG AND A COMPLETE STOP ON THE RWY WHILE I RAN THE REQUIRED CHKLIST TO PROPERLY CONFIGURE FOR LNDG. ONCE WE STOPPED ON THE RWY WE GAVE THE COMMAND TO THE FLT ATTENDANT TO LET ALL THE PEOPLE EXIT THROUGH THE MAIN ENTRANCE OF THE ACFT AT A NORMAL PACE. AS THE PAX WERE EXITING WE RAN THOUGH THE EMER EVACUATION MEMORY ITEMS AND CONFIGURED THE ACFT SO WE COULD DEPLANE AFTER THE PAX. ONCE EVERYONE WAS OFF THE FIREFIGHTERS SEARCHED THE AIRPLANE THOROUGHLY AND FOUND NO DANGER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 705106 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES HE IS UNAWARE OF THE EXACT SOURCE OF THE SMOKE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.