Narrative:

ZME sectors 4; 27; and 35 were busy working moderate traffic when both the main and standby frequencys failed. The controllers tried to switch to the back-up emergency communication (buec) frequencys. The buec's would not engage. The supervisor then combined the sectors onto other sectors that had working frequencys. The problem was that the working sectors did not have all of the needed landlines to communicate to the surrounding facilities (ZKC; ZID). To compound the problem; the supervisor(south) did not know how to assign the needed landlines. This; in my opinion; is due to a lack of training on the vscs equipment (voice switching communication equipment). Fortunately the controllers were able to relay clrncs through other airplanes to broadcast on the failed frequency for all aircraft to change to the working frequency. No loss of separation occurred. It was discovered after 2 1/2 hours that a fuse had blown at the remote communications air ground (rcag) site. There is supposed to be redundancy system to prevent this type of failure from happening. The buec frequencys are supposed to be located at a different location; and I was told the remote communication air ground sites are owned and maintained by mci and the buec site by a company. There used to be a few unused frequencys available for use; but these were taken out to save money. Another example of the FAA putting cost ahead of safety!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE CTLR DESCRIBED PRIMARY AND BACKUP FREQ OUTAGE CAUSED BY FUSE FAILURE AT A REMOTE SITE WITH LIMITED LANDLINE CAPABILITIES.

Narrative: ZME SECTORS 4; 27; AND 35 WERE BUSY WORKING MODERATE TFC WHEN BOTH THE MAIN AND STANDBY FREQS FAILED. THE CTLRS TRIED TO SWITCH TO THE BACK-UP EMER COM (BUEC) FREQS. THE BUEC'S WOULD NOT ENGAGE. THE SUPVR THEN COMBINED THE SECTORS ONTO OTHER SECTORS THAT HAD WORKING FREQS. THE PROB WAS THAT THE WORKING SECTORS DID NOT HAVE ALL OF THE NEEDED LANDLINES TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SURROUNDING FACILITIES (ZKC; ZID). TO COMPOUND THE PROB; THE SUPVR(S) DID NOT KNOW HOW TO ASSIGN THE NEEDED LANDLINES. THIS; IN MY OPINION; IS DUE TO A LACK OF TRAINING ON THE VSCS EQUIP (VOICE SWITCHING COM EQUIP). FORTUNATELY THE CTLRS WERE ABLE TO RELAY CLRNCS THROUGH OTHER AIRPLANES TO BROADCAST ON THE FAILED FREQ FOR ALL ACFT TO CHANGE TO THE WORKING FREQ. NO LOSS OF SEPARATION OCCURRED. IT WAS DISCOVERED AFTER 2 1/2 HRS THAT A FUSE HAD BLOWN AT THE REMOTE COMS AIR GND (RCAG) SITE. THERE IS SUPPOSED TO BE REDUNDANCY SYS TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF FAILURE FROM HAPPENING. THE BUEC FREQS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE LOCATED AT A DIFFERENT LOCATION; AND I WAS TOLD THE REMOTE COM AIR GND SITES ARE OWNED AND MAINTAINED BY MCI AND THE BUEC SITE BY A COMPANY. THERE USED TO BE A FEW UNUSED FREQS AVAILABLE FOR USE; BUT THESE WERE TAKEN OUT TO SAVE MONEY. ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE FAA PUTTING COST AHEAD OF SAFETY!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.