Narrative:

Scheduling informed myself and the first officer we would be operating a ferry flight. Maintenance was to finish at XX45. We located the aircraft on the ramp and the first officer started his preflight. I couldn't locate the logbook on the aircraft. I exited the aircraft rounding the front going to the right side. I immediately noticed what I would consider substantial damage; originating below the static port extending to the power fuel/defuel panel; consisting of numerous horizontal creases/gouges in ft of length durations; dents; stressed rivets and skin puncturing. They were outlined with masking tape with measurements. The first officer met me at the damage and we discussed it. The first officer and I had immediate concerns of the safety of this aircraft and the operation of the flight. I asked mechanic that had pulled up (not working on this aircraft) if he would sign it off and he said 'no.' I located the mechanic working on this aircraft and asked him if he would fly on this aircraft 'as is' and he said 'no.' I did not feel the aircraft was safe and I placed a call to the chief pilot's office. I spoke with the assistant chief pilot and explained the extent of the damage and my concerns. He said he would make some calls and get back to me. He called back shortly after and left me a voice mail saying that maintenance and bombardier had been looking at 'hundreds of photos;' and that he was going off duty. He also said to contact chief on call with any other concerns. The mechanic then brought back the logbook with a facsimile copy of an engineering ferry permit. I reviewed it and immediately had another concern. The second sentence stated; 'the aircraft appears to be safe.' this was not acceptable to me. Either it is or isn't. I then placed a call to chief on call explaining my concerns and leaning towards not operating this aircraft; given the extent of the damage; remarks by the mechanics and the wording in the permit. Given the information; he agreed. He made some calls. He called back; having spoken with director of operations. The director informed the chief pilot to 'make me feel comfortable in operating the aircraft.' he asked me to call maintenance control to see if they could lessen my concerns. At this point I asked the chief pilot if he could have a union representative contact me; as I wanted to involve union safety. He said he would. I asked another pilot for his opinion and he said to check to see if it was considered an accident/incident. I received a call from a representative and explained the whole situation; he said he would make some calls and had me call union safety. I was put in contact with chief on call and again explained the situation. He told me not to move the aircraft. After several more calls with a variety of individuals; I was informed that this was now classified as an accident/incident; and the aircraft was not to be moved. I called scheduling; was assigned a different flight and was released to rest. A major contributing factor is a failure of communications and procedures; in that this wasn't classified as an accident/incident until hours afterwards and only because of numerous calls about the safety of the aircraft. It upsets me that the company gave us an assignment; tried to persuade us to operate it (despite our safety concerns) and could have led us to commit violations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 FLT CREW IS CONCERNED WITH DAMAGE TO THE ACFT AND THE FERRY PERMIT ISSUED TO FLY THE ACFT.

Narrative: SCHEDULING INFORMED MYSELF AND THE FO WE WOULD BE OPERATING A FERRY FLT. MAINT WAS TO FINISH AT XX45. WE LOCATED THE ACFT ON THE RAMP AND THE FO STARTED HIS PREFLT. I COULDN'T LOCATE THE LOGBOOK ON THE ACFT. I EXITED THE ACFT ROUNDING THE FRONT GOING TO THE R SIDE. I IMMEDIATELY NOTICED WHAT I WOULD CONSIDER SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE; ORIGINATING BELOW THE STATIC PORT EXTENDING TO THE PWR FUEL/DEFUEL PANEL; CONSISTING OF NUMEROUS HORIZ CREASES/GOUGES IN FT OF LENGTH DURATIONS; DENTS; STRESSED RIVETS AND SKIN PUNCTURING. THEY WERE OUTLINED WITH MASKING TAPE WITH MEASUREMENTS. THE FO MET ME AT THE DAMAGE AND WE DISCUSSED IT. THE FO AND I HAD IMMEDIATE CONCERNS OF THE SAFETY OF THIS ACFT AND THE OP OF THE FLT. I ASKED MECH THAT HAD PULLED UP (NOT WORKING ON THIS ACFT) IF HE WOULD SIGN IT OFF AND HE SAID 'NO.' I LOCATED THE MECH WORKING ON THIS ACFT AND ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD FLY ON THIS ACFT 'AS IS' AND HE SAID 'NO.' I DID NOT FEEL THE ACFT WAS SAFE AND I PLACED A CALL TO THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE. I SPOKE WITH THE ASSISTANT CHIEF PLT AND EXPLAINED THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE AND MY CONCERNS. HE SAID HE WOULD MAKE SOME CALLS AND GET BACK TO ME. HE CALLED BACK SHORTLY AFTER AND LEFT ME A VOICE MAIL SAYING THAT MAINT AND BOMBARDIER HAD BEEN LOOKING AT 'HUNDREDS OF PHOTOS;' AND THAT HE WAS GOING OFF DUTY. HE ALSO SAID TO CONTACT CHIEF ON CALL WITH ANY OTHER CONCERNS. THE MECH THEN BROUGHT BACK THE LOGBOOK WITH A FAX COPY OF AN ENGINEERING FERRY PERMIT. I REVIEWED IT AND IMMEDIATELY HAD ANOTHER CONCERN. THE SECOND SENTENCE STATED; 'THE ACFT APPEARS TO BE SAFE.' THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO ME. EITHER IT IS OR ISN'T. I THEN PLACED A CALL TO CHIEF ON CALL EXPLAINING MY CONCERNS AND LEANING TOWARDS NOT OPERATING THIS ACFT; GIVEN THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE; REMARKS BY THE MECHS AND THE WORDING IN THE PERMIT. GIVEN THE INFO; HE AGREED. HE MADE SOME CALLS. HE CALLED BACK; HAVING SPOKEN WITH DIRECTOR OF OPS. THE DIRECTOR INFORMED THE CHIEF PLT TO 'MAKE ME FEEL COMFORTABLE IN OPERATING THE ACFT.' HE ASKED ME TO CALL MAINT CTL TO SEE IF THEY COULD LESSEN MY CONCERNS. AT THIS POINT I ASKED THE CHIEF PLT IF HE COULD HAVE A UNION REPRESENTATIVE CONTACT ME; AS I WANTED TO INVOLVE UNION SAFETY. HE SAID HE WOULD. I ASKED ANOTHER PLT FOR HIS OPINION AND HE SAID TO CHK TO SEE IF IT WAS CONSIDERED AN ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. I RECEIVED A CALL FROM A REPRESENTATIVE AND EXPLAINED THE WHOLE SITUATION; HE SAID HE WOULD MAKE SOME CALLS AND HAD ME CALL UNION SAFETY. I WAS PUT IN CONTACT WITH CHIEF ON CALL AND AGAIN EXPLAINED THE SITUATION. HE TOLD ME NOT TO MOVE THE ACFT. AFTER SEVERAL MORE CALLS WITH A VARIETY OF INDIVIDUALS; I WAS INFORMED THAT THIS WAS NOW CLASSIFIED AS AN ACCIDENT/INCIDENT; AND THE ACFT WAS NOT TO BE MOVED. I CALLED SCHEDULING; WAS ASSIGNED A DIFFERENT FLT AND WAS RELEASED TO REST. A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS A FAILURE OF COMS AND PROCS; IN THAT THIS WASN'T CLASSIFIED AS AN ACCIDENT/INCIDENT UNTIL HRS AFTERWARDS AND ONLY BECAUSE OF NUMEROUS CALLS ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE ACFT. IT UPSETS ME THAT THE COMPANY GAVE US AN ASSIGNMENT; TRIED TO PERSUADE US TO OPERATE IT (DESPITE OUR SAFETY CONCERNS) AND COULD HAVE LED US TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.