Narrative:

Once the traffic was not a factor; I made 2 360 degree turns and then reported in that I was ready for landing. Tower controller advised me I was #3 to land and to enter and remain on downwind until he called my base. I entered the downwind setting up for an anticipated extended downwind. This is what I would classify as the beginning of the chain of events leading up to the incident in question. A short distance past the approach end of the runway; tower called out landing traffic and cleared me to land; ie; there would be no long downwind. What then transpired was close to but not quite what I would call a 'short' approach. But it was closer in than what my definition of normal would be. It was not a situation I haven't been in before. For the approach I ultimately was high and fast. Flaps were extended at the normal 100 KIAS followed by lowering all the way when at or slightly slower than 80 KIAS. At this point I was still high and fast though on the approach. My normal practice of slipping was not as effective in this aircraft as in the C172 I normally fly. In short; it was not a stabilized approach. The nosewheel hit pretty hard. To the best of my recollection it was shortly before or after the nosewheel hit a second time that full power was applied to begin a go around. The nosewheel did strike a third time. I suspect it was after the third contact that I began to retract the flaps. I have to admit that from the second bump on details of events and their exact sequence are sketchy. At the time I had no thought nor was there any compelling reason to believe that the propeller struck the runway. I was concerned about possible damage to the nose gear. There was no extreme vibration and the engine was running fine. I did sense that something was not quite right though. I climbed to pattern altitude and executed what I would have to say was; under the conditions; a normal downwind; approach and landing followed by taxiing a short distance to the normal tie-down area. Upon getting out is when I noticed the damaged propeller. In retrospect; my decision to proceed with the landing; based on my experience in a C172; was bad. I have no doubt that given the same scenario the outcome would have been a non-eventful landing if I had been in a C172. My lack of experience in the DA20 should have been taken into consideration when making the decision to continue with the approach/landing. In hindsight; a go around would have obviously been the better decision.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DA20 PLT HAS HARD LNDG AT BOI WITH PROP STRIKE AND GAR.

Narrative: ONCE THE TFC WAS NOT A FACTOR; I MADE 2 360 DEG TURNS AND THEN RPTED IN THAT I WAS READY FOR LNDG. TWR CTLR ADVISED ME I WAS #3 TO LAND AND TO ENTER AND REMAIN ON DOWNWIND UNTIL HE CALLED MY BASE. I ENTERED THE DOWNWIND SETTING UP FOR AN ANTICIPATED EXTENDED DOWNWIND. THIS IS WHAT I WOULD CLASSIFY AS THE BEGINNING OF THE CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE INCIDENT IN QUESTION. A SHORT DISTANCE PAST THE APCH END OF THE RWY; TWR CALLED OUT LNDG TFC AND CLRED ME TO LAND; IE; THERE WOULD BE NO LONG DOWNWIND. WHAT THEN TRANSPIRED WAS CLOSE TO BUT NOT QUITE WHAT I WOULD CALL A 'SHORT' APCH. BUT IT WAS CLOSER IN THAN WHAT MY DEFINITION OF NORMAL WOULD BE. IT WAS NOT A SITUATION I HAVEN'T BEEN IN BEFORE. FOR THE APCH I ULTIMATELY WAS HIGH AND FAST. FLAPS WERE EXTENDED AT THE NORMAL 100 KIAS FOLLOWED BY LOWERING ALL THE WAY WHEN AT OR SLIGHTLY SLOWER THAN 80 KIAS. AT THIS POINT I WAS STILL HIGH AND FAST THOUGH ON THE APCH. MY NORMAL PRACTICE OF SLIPPING WAS NOT AS EFFECTIVE IN THIS ACFT AS IN THE C172 I NORMALLY FLY. IN SHORT; IT WAS NOT A STABILIZED APCH. THE NOSEWHEEL HIT PRETTY HARD. TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION IT WAS SHORTLY BEFORE OR AFTER THE NOSEWHEEL HIT A SECOND TIME THAT FULL PWR WAS APPLIED TO BEGIN A GAR. THE NOSEWHEEL DID STRIKE A THIRD TIME. I SUSPECT IT WAS AFTER THE THIRD CONTACT THAT I BEGAN TO RETRACT THE FLAPS. I HAVE TO ADMIT THAT FROM THE SECOND BUMP ON DETAILS OF EVENTS AND THEIR EXACT SEQUENCE ARE SKETCHY. AT THE TIME I HAD NO THOUGHT NOR WAS THERE ANY COMPELLING REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE PROP STRUCK THE RWY. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO THE NOSE GEAR. THERE WAS NO EXTREME VIBRATION AND THE ENG WAS RUNNING FINE. I DID SENSE THAT SOMETHING WAS NOT QUITE RIGHT THOUGH. I CLBED TO PATTERN ALT AND EXECUTED WHAT I WOULD HAVE TO SAY WAS; UNDER THE CONDITIONS; A NORMAL DOWNWIND; APCH AND LNDG FOLLOWED BY TAXIING A SHORT DISTANCE TO THE NORMAL TIE-DOWN AREA. UPON GETTING OUT IS WHEN I NOTICED THE DAMAGED PROP. IN RETROSPECT; MY DECISION TO PROCEED WITH THE LNDG; BASED ON MY EXPERIENCE IN A C172; WAS BAD. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT GIVEN THE SAME SCENARIO THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN A NON-EVENTFUL LNDG IF I HAD BEEN IN A C172. MY LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THE DA20 SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION WHEN MAKING THE DECISION TO CONTINUE WITH THE APCH/LNDG. IN HINDSIGHT; A GAR WOULD HAVE OBVIOUSLY BEEN THE BETTER DECISION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.