Narrative:

Flight to bna taxied and took off in excess of maximum structural weights. Taxi was 581 pounds above maximum taxi weight. Takeoff was 411 pounds above mas takeoff weight. Both crew members did not realize company had 51000 pound aircraft. The flight was running late. Late arriving crew members; security checks; and late paperwork to the aircraft hastened the pace preparing the aircraft for flight. Passenger boarding began as briefing the flight attendant was barely completed. Sitting in the cockpit; I rechked the maintenance log and realized that passenger seatbelt and no smoking lights I had seen inoperative earlier had not been deferred as I had thought. I immediately used my cell phone to call dispatch and maintenance to defer them. That task completed; the load manifest was present for my review. I noticed the weight matched the FMS and the plots were in the envelope. We both noticed the 52000 pound v-spd card was missing. The v-spd cards had tape on them and the performance booklet had several torn pages. Given that; we both thought it was loose in the cockpit. The first officer quickly volunteered his fsm copy as it was approved in the go; no-go checklist. The fact that even this weight was over the maximum allowable takeoff weight on the manifest I must attribute to omission. Once the v-spd card was found to be missing; my focus shifted from the manifest sheet. The flight departed 25 mins late. At cruise altitude; I rechked my deferred stickers and write-up. I began to search for the missing v-spd card when I noticed the peeling sticker above the screens was a 51000 maximum takeoff gross weight over a 53000 pound sticker. The first officer's side displayed the same. It was our hope they had been left on by error. They had not. Arriving in bna; we contacted dispatch; maintenance control; chief pilot; and the clgs program manager to get the aircraft back to revenue status. The load manifest was redone to reflect 2 children on board. Approximately 20 mins later; maintenance control and engineering in montreal were able to determine no maintenance action would be required. The paperwork; however; took 3 hours to facsimile from XXX to bna. This was a case of complacency and rushing. Neither flight crew member believed company had any 51000 pound aircraft left and flying this route numerous times; I never questioned the weights versus the taxi; takeoff; fuel burn/landing limitations as they seemed about right for a 53000 pound aircraft. When running late; it is best to slowly and completely check your work especially when feeling rushed. While both the first officer and I will be more diligent and self-critical over this issue; I believe that enhancing the FMS for load manifest would prevent similar errors. Additionally; recording the maximum gross weight to the weight and index record in the maintenance log would be an excellent backup as the current stickers vary in size and location under the dash. Supplemental information from acn 707848: I was displaced from my original trip and was to operate flight XXXX to bna once I arrived in jfk from roc. We arrived in jfk approximately 30 mins before our scheduled to bna. Once I located the aircraft and greeted the captain; I realized I had forgotten my headset in the previous aircraft and went to retrieve it. I then returned to preflight the aircraft. The release had not arrived; nor had the flight attendant; so the captain and I were helping with her duties until she showed. Once the release arrived; I started filling out the performance numbers. I somehow failed to note the placard that the aircraft was a 51K ship and used 53K as the structural maximum gross takeoff weight. When I went to set the v-spd card to 52K; estimating the one we would need; it appeared missing and I assumed it had come off the ring. I pulled the 3a1; 52K card from my fsm. By the time we had the final passenger and bag count the flight was already delayed 15-20 mins. I plugged in the numbers and calculated our weight at 51617 pounds; which was over both the taxi and takeoff weight for the aircraft. The error wasn't discovered until we were at or near cruise. The captain looked up and noticed that the placards showed 51000 pounds; though 53000 pounds was slightly showing through from a previous sticker. I pulled out the manifest and noticed that not only were weover the 51K limit on takeoff; we were over my calculated maximum gross takeoff weight based on fuel burn (51378 pounds). After counting 2 kids; the actual takeoff weight was 51411 pounds; but was an error I should have easily caught and missed. The 51378 number was not; of course; our limitation; but it shows the rush I was in getting the paperwork out the door. I believe I made these mistakes for 2 main reasons: 1) I was feeling rushed to get the flight out and consequently did not look over the manifest with the usual discernment I usually do. 2) after bna; I was to deadhead home to cvg to end the trip and was concerned about missing that flight. In the 2 yrs I have been on the line here at company; I have never made such a careless error on a manifest without spotting it first before handing it over. The fact that I DOD so today makes me realize even more that no matter how 'routine' parts of our job seem; we are still prone to making errors on those routine things.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ200 FLT CREW TAXIED AND TOOK OFF OVER MAX GROSS STRUCTURAL WT.

Narrative: FLT TO BNA TAXIED AND TOOK OFF IN EXCESS OF MAX STRUCTURAL WTS. TAXI WAS 581 LBS ABOVE MAX TAXI WT. TKOF WAS 411 LBS ABOVE MAS TKOF WT. BOTH CREW MEMBERS DID NOT REALIZE COMPANY HAD 51000 LB ACFT. THE FLT WAS RUNNING LATE. LATE ARRIVING CREW MEMBERS; SECURITY CHKS; AND LATE PAPERWORK TO THE ACFT HASTENED THE PACE PREPARING THE ACFT FOR FLT. PAX BOARDING BEGAN AS BRIEFING THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS BARELY COMPLETED. SITTING IN THE COCKPIT; I RECHKED THE MAINT LOG AND REALIZED THAT PAX SEATBELT AND NO SMOKING LIGHTS I HAD SEEN INOP EARLIER HAD NOT BEEN DEFERRED AS I HAD THOUGHT. I IMMEDIATELY USED MY CELL PHONE TO CALL DISPATCH AND MAINT TO DEFER THEM. THAT TASK COMPLETED; THE LOAD MANIFEST WAS PRESENT FOR MY REVIEW. I NOTICED THE WT MATCHED THE FMS AND THE PLOTS WERE IN THE ENVELOPE. WE BOTH NOTICED THE 52000 LB V-SPD CARD WAS MISSING. THE V-SPD CARDS HAD TAPE ON THEM AND THE PERFORMANCE BOOKLET HAD SEVERAL TORN PAGES. GIVEN THAT; WE BOTH THOUGHT IT WAS LOOSE IN THE COCKPIT. THE FO QUICKLY VOLUNTEERED HIS FSM COPY AS IT WAS APPROVED IN THE GO; NO-GO CHKLIST. THE FACT THAT EVEN THIS WT WAS OVER THE MAX ALLOWABLE TKOF WT ON THE MANIFEST I MUST ATTRIBUTE TO OMISSION. ONCE THE V-SPD CARD WAS FOUND TO BE MISSING; MY FOCUS SHIFTED FROM THE MANIFEST SHEET. THE FLT DEPARTED 25 MINS LATE. AT CRUISE ALT; I RECHKED MY DEFERRED STICKERS AND WRITE-UP. I BEGAN TO SEARCH FOR THE MISSING V-SPD CARD WHEN I NOTICED THE PEELING STICKER ABOVE THE SCREENS WAS A 51000 MAX TKOF GROSS WT OVER A 53000 LB STICKER. THE FO'S SIDE DISPLAYED THE SAME. IT WAS OUR HOPE THEY HAD BEEN LEFT ON BY ERROR. THEY HAD NOT. ARRIVING IN BNA; WE CONTACTED DISPATCH; MAINT CTL; CHIEF PLT; AND THE CLGS PROGRAM MGR TO GET THE ACFT BACK TO REVENUE STATUS. THE LOAD MANIFEST WAS REDONE TO REFLECT 2 CHILDREN ON BOARD. APPROX 20 MINS LATER; MAINT CTL AND ENGINEERING IN MONTREAL WERE ABLE TO DETERMINE NO MAINT ACTION WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE PAPERWORK; HOWEVER; TOOK 3 HRS TO FAX FROM XXX TO BNA. THIS WAS A CASE OF COMPLACENCY AND RUSHING. NEITHER FLT CREW MEMBER BELIEVED COMPANY HAD ANY 51000 LB ACFT LEFT AND FLYING THIS RTE NUMEROUS TIMES; I NEVER QUESTIONED THE WTS VERSUS THE TAXI; TKOF; FUEL BURN/LNDG LIMITATIONS AS THEY SEEMED ABOUT RIGHT FOR A 53000 LB ACFT. WHEN RUNNING LATE; IT IS BEST TO SLOWLY AND COMPLETELY CHK YOUR WORK ESPECIALLY WHEN FEELING RUSHED. WHILE BOTH THE FO AND I WILL BE MORE DILIGENT AND SELF-CRITICAL OVER THIS ISSUE; I BELIEVE THAT ENHANCING THE FMS FOR LOAD MANIFEST WOULD PREVENT SIMILAR ERRORS. ADDITIONALLY; RECORDING THE MAX GROSS WT TO THE WT AND INDEX RECORD IN THE MAINT LOG WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT BACKUP AS THE CURRENT STICKERS VARY IN SIZE AND LOCATION UNDER THE DASH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 707848: I WAS DISPLACED FROM MY ORIGINAL TRIP AND WAS TO OPERATE FLT XXXX TO BNA ONCE I ARRIVED IN JFK FROM ROC. WE ARRIVED IN JFK APPROX 30 MINS BEFORE OUR SCHEDULED TO BNA. ONCE I LOCATED THE ACFT AND GREETED THE CAPT; I REALIZED I HAD FORGOTTEN MY HEADSET IN THE PREVIOUS ACFT AND WENT TO RETRIEVE IT. I THEN RETURNED TO PREFLT THE ACFT. THE RELEASE HAD NOT ARRIVED; NOR HAD THE FLT ATTENDANT; SO THE CAPT AND I WERE HELPING WITH HER DUTIES UNTIL SHE SHOWED. ONCE THE RELEASE ARRIVED; I STARTED FILLING OUT THE PERFORMANCE NUMBERS. I SOMEHOW FAILED TO NOTE THE PLACARD THAT THE ACFT WAS A 51K SHIP AND USED 53K AS THE STRUCTURAL MAX GROSS TKOF WT. WHEN I WENT TO SET THE V-SPD CARD TO 52K; ESTIMATING THE ONE WE WOULD NEED; IT APPEARED MISSING AND I ASSUMED IT HAD COME OFF THE RING. I PULLED THE 3A1; 52K CARD FROM MY FSM. BY THE TIME WE HAD THE FINAL PAX AND BAG COUNT THE FLT WAS ALREADY DELAYED 15-20 MINS. I PLUGGED IN THE NUMBERS AND CALCULATED OUR WT AT 51617 LBS; WHICH WAS OVER BOTH THE TAXI AND TKOF WT FOR THE ACFT. THE ERROR WASN'T DISCOVERED UNTIL WE WERE AT OR NEAR CRUISE. THE CAPT LOOKED UP AND NOTICED THAT THE PLACARDS SHOWED 51000 LBS; THOUGH 53000 LBS WAS SLIGHTLY SHOWING THROUGH FROM A PREVIOUS STICKER. I PULLED OUT THE MANIFEST AND NOTICED THAT NOT ONLY WERE WEOVER THE 51K LIMIT ON TKOF; WE WERE OVER MY CALCULATED MAX GROSS TKOF WT BASED ON FUEL BURN (51378 LBS). AFTER COUNTING 2 KIDS; THE ACTUAL TKOF WT WAS 51411 LBS; BUT WAS AN ERROR I SHOULD HAVE EASILY CAUGHT AND MISSED. THE 51378 NUMBER WAS NOT; OF COURSE; OUR LIMITATION; BUT IT SHOWS THE RUSH I WAS IN GETTING THE PAPERWORK OUT THE DOOR. I BELIEVE I MADE THESE MISTAKES FOR 2 MAIN REASONS: 1) I WAS FEELING RUSHED TO GET THE FLT OUT AND CONSEQUENTLY DID NOT LOOK OVER THE MANIFEST WITH THE USUAL DISCERNMENT I USUALLY DO. 2) AFTER BNA; I WAS TO DEADHEAD HOME TO CVG TO END THE TRIP AND WAS CONCERNED ABOUT MISSING THAT FLT. IN THE 2 YRS I HAVE BEEN ON THE LINE HERE AT COMPANY; I HAVE NEVER MADE SUCH A CARELESS ERROR ON A MANIFEST WITHOUT SPOTTING IT FIRST BEFORE HANDING IT OVER. THE FACT THAT I DOD SO TODAY MAKES ME REALIZE EVEN MORE THAT NO MATTER HOW 'ROUTINE' PARTS OF OUR JOB SEEM; WE ARE STILL PRONE TO MAKING ERRORS ON THOSE ROUTINE THINGS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.