Narrative:

I arrived at the jet in ogg to find the mechanics placarding the right hpsov valve; a repeat write-up from 2 prior flts; which had caused the aircraft to fly single pack ETOPS. As a result of deferring the hpsov valve; the heading was rendered inoperative. The flight crew believed that we needed the heading to be legal for an ETOPS flight. The captain began a satcom discussion with dispatch and maintenance; and in the process deemed that we could utilize MEL 24-13 option C; in which we would run the APU continually on the ETOPS portion to gain a third generator. In the midst of this discussion; the chief pilot on duty at operations inserted himself into the radio call. Please see the captain's report for the specifics of that conversation. I have concerns about the way the MEL is applied; ie; if you placard 1 item inoperative and it in turn renders another system inoperative; can you re-enter the MEL and layer the problem? It seems to me a frustration of the intent of the MEL; but it could be a provision of the MEL. I also feel that it was inappropriate for the chief to insert himself in the captain's conversation with dispatch and maintenance and attempt to coerce compliance from the captain as he attempted to work out the problem; and make a decision on whether or not to accept the airplane. I felt threatened by several of the chief's comments. Supplemental information from acn 707988: the set-up: I arrived at my jet finding no logbook; but my first officer had talked with the mechanic working a maintenance issue. The issue; right hpsov failed in-flight. Repeat write-up; third repeat? I started by checking the QRH just in case to see what I'd have had to do if it had happened to me on my ETOPS flight; which I was about to make. QRH requires; turn off the bleed and turn off associated pack. I pulled out the MEL (36-02) which stated that it could be deferred if the heading is not required for flight and then referenced MEL (24-13A;B;C) on the heading. MEL 24-13(a) and (B) both stated that heading needed for ETOPS. MEL 24-13(C) stated that heading if inoperative could be placarded and the APU run for ETOPS segment. The heading was fully functional but another problem degraded its use. (Disabling the heading so as to placard it.) I was then referred to a letter (not FAA approved) that the MEL can be manipulated and massaged to make this fix seemingly legal. My concerns: if I get the hpsov warning again; I'm obligated to turn off the bleed at the engine and then turn off the pack. Further degradation of good equipment; the heading by following MEL 24-13C by maintenance disabling the good heading as called for by MEL 24-13C and subsequent use of the APU appeared to be manipulation of the MEL rather than a guide to safe operation of the jet following the malfunction of required equipment. My concerns over this issue were both safety and legality. The heading picks up 7 busses with the loss of both left and right busses. If I lose both without an heading; will the APU be able to pick up those busses if it can't power either of the main busses? The only answer to that was found in a non-FAA approved study guide. It stated yes. It was clearly stated that the heading is not needed for ETOPS operation by chief pilot but another generator; ie; the APU must be running. According to MEL 24-13C that is true; if the heading has malfunctioned. The intentional disabling of required ETOPS equipment to get around another MEL issue appears to be contrary to the intent of the MEL. With the APU as my backup to provide the electrical power on the ETOPS segment; I determined that the heading issue was satisfied. The hpsov was wired closed. Maintenance was convinced the hpsov warning would not be an issue and I would not have to follow the QRH procedure and shut down a pack. I accepted the jet. The flight went well until approximately 100 mi from the california coast upon which time the right hpsov warning illuminated. I was obligated to close the bleed and turn off the pack following the QRH procedure. It became a single pack operation. I descended to FL350 for the remainder of the flight and landed uneventfully in chicago. One final issue: I was involved in a long discussion with dispatch and maintenance. Both were helpful; informative; and respectful. Then the dispatcher said that a chief pilot wants to talk to you. The chief pilot introduced himself into the satcom conversation. Initially it was informational and respectful. Then statements such as 'other pilots have flown this' and 'I had the same issue and flew the leg' began to appear. Then in a sharp tone the question was asked; 'what's your concern captain? Is it the safety or legality issue?' then came the grand finale; 'if you aren't going to fly this jet; let me know and I'll find someone who will.' his tone went from patronizing to intimidating. As PIC of my jet; I was in conversation with maintenance and dispatch. The chief inserted himself into my discussions. I respectfully accepted his insight and advice but strongly resented his insistence that his solution was my solution. Maintenance and dispatch were pushed aside as the chief dominated the conversation. Is it now the air carrier policy to involve chief pilots into the decision making process? Who makes the decisions? Capts or chiefs?! What does that do to the rookie capts? What does that do to the salty-dog capts? Ability to formulate their own decisions? Who's really responsible? It appears that captain's authority/authorized is not respected here at the air carrier. Is it now air carrier SOP to involve chief pilots in all the difficult decision making of our capts? In all the non-routine decisions of our capts? Is it now my responsibility to shut up and just go fly the jet? While I was concerned about the decisions I was faced with concerning my flight from maui; it pales in my concern over the respect for captain's authority/authorized.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 QUESTIONS LEGALITY OF DISPATCHING ETOPS FLT WITH R HPSOV WIRED SHUT.

Narrative: I ARRIVED AT THE JET IN OGG TO FIND THE MECHS PLACARDING THE R HPSOV VALVE; A REPEAT WRITE-UP FROM 2 PRIOR FLTS; WHICH HAD CAUSED THE ACFT TO FLY SINGLE PACK ETOPS. AS A RESULT OF DEFERRING THE HPSOV VALVE; THE HDG WAS RENDERED INOP. THE FLT CREW BELIEVED THAT WE NEEDED THE HDG TO BE LEGAL FOR AN ETOPS FLT. THE CAPT BEGAN A SATCOM DISCUSSION WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT; AND IN THE PROCESS DEEMED THAT WE COULD UTILIZE MEL 24-13 OPTION C; IN WHICH WE WOULD RUN THE APU CONTINUALLY ON THE ETOPS PORTION TO GAIN A THIRD GENERATOR. IN THE MIDST OF THIS DISCUSSION; THE CHIEF PLT ON DUTY AT OPS INSERTED HIMSELF INTO THE RADIO CALL. PLEASE SEE THE CAPT'S RPT FOR THE SPECIFICS OF THAT CONVERSATION. I HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT THE WAY THE MEL IS APPLIED; IE; IF YOU PLACARD 1 ITEM INOP AND IT IN TURN RENDERS ANOTHER SYS INOP; CAN YOU RE-ENTER THE MEL AND LAYER THE PROB? IT SEEMS TO ME A FRUSTRATION OF THE INTENT OF THE MEL; BUT IT COULD BE A PROVISION OF THE MEL. I ALSO FEEL THAT IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE CHIEF TO INSERT HIMSELF IN THE CAPT'S CONVERSATION WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT AND ATTEMPT TO COERCE COMPLIANCE FROM THE CAPT AS HE ATTEMPTED TO WORK OUT THE PROB; AND MAKE A DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO ACCEPT THE AIRPLANE. I FELT THREATENED BY SEVERAL OF THE CHIEF'S COMMENTS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 707988: THE SET-UP: I ARRIVED AT MY JET FINDING NO LOGBOOK; BUT MY FO HAD TALKED WITH THE MECH WORKING A MAINT ISSUE. THE ISSUE; R HPSOV FAILED INFLT. REPEAT WRITE-UP; THIRD REPEAT? I STARTED BY CHKING THE QRH JUST IN CASE TO SEE WHAT I'D HAVE HAD TO DO IF IT HAD HAPPENED TO ME ON MY ETOPS FLT; WHICH I WAS ABOUT TO MAKE. QRH REQUIRES; TURN OFF THE BLEED AND TURN OFF ASSOCIATED PACK. I PULLED OUT THE MEL (36-02) WHICH STATED THAT IT COULD BE DEFERRED IF THE HDG IS NOT REQUIRED FOR FLT AND THEN REFED MEL (24-13A;B;C) ON THE HDG. MEL 24-13(A) AND (B) BOTH STATED THAT HDG NEEDED FOR ETOPS. MEL 24-13(C) STATED THAT HDG IF INOP COULD BE PLACARDED AND THE APU RUN FOR ETOPS SEGMENT. THE HDG WAS FULLY FUNCTIONAL BUT ANOTHER PROB DEGRADED ITS USE. (DISABLING THE HDG SO AS TO PLACARD IT.) I WAS THEN REFERRED TO A LETTER (NOT FAA APPROVED) THAT THE MEL CAN BE MANIPULATED AND MASSAGED TO MAKE THIS FIX SEEMINGLY LEGAL. MY CONCERNS: IF I GET THE HPSOV WARNING AGAIN; I'M OBLIGATED TO TURN OFF THE BLEED AT THE ENG AND THEN TURN OFF THE PACK. FURTHER DEGRADATION OF GOOD EQUIP; THE HDG BY FOLLOWING MEL 24-13C BY MAINT DISABLING THE GOOD HDG AS CALLED FOR BY MEL 24-13C AND SUBSEQUENT USE OF THE APU APPEARED TO BE MANIPULATION OF THE MEL RATHER THAN A GUIDE TO SAFE OP OF THE JET FOLLOWING THE MALFUNCTION OF REQUIRED EQUIP. MY CONCERNS OVER THIS ISSUE WERE BOTH SAFETY AND LEGALITY. THE HDG PICKS UP 7 BUSSES WITH THE LOSS OF BOTH L AND R BUSSES. IF I LOSE BOTH WITHOUT AN HDG; WILL THE APU BE ABLE TO PICK UP THOSE BUSSES IF IT CAN'T PWR EITHER OF THE MAIN BUSSES? THE ONLY ANSWER TO THAT WAS FOUND IN A NON-FAA APPROVED STUDY GUIDE. IT STATED YES. IT WAS CLRLY STATED THAT THE HDG IS NOT NEEDED FOR ETOPS OP BY CHIEF PLT BUT ANOTHER GENERATOR; IE; THE APU MUST BE RUNNING. ACCORDING TO MEL 24-13C THAT IS TRUE; IF THE HDG HAS MALFUNCTIONED. THE INTENTIONAL DISABLING OF REQUIRED ETOPS EQUIP TO GET AROUND ANOTHER MEL ISSUE APPEARS TO BE CONTRARY TO THE INTENT OF THE MEL. WITH THE APU AS MY BACKUP TO PROVIDE THE ELECTRICAL PWR ON THE ETOPS SEGMENT; I DETERMINED THAT THE HDG ISSUE WAS SATISFIED. THE HPSOV WAS WIRED CLOSED. MAINT WAS CONVINCED THE HPSOV WARNING WOULD NOT BE AN ISSUE AND I WOULD NOT HAVE TO FOLLOW THE QRH PROC AND SHUT DOWN A PACK. I ACCEPTED THE JET. THE FLT WENT WELL UNTIL APPROX 100 MI FROM THE CALIFORNIA COAST UPON WHICH TIME THE R HPSOV WARNING ILLUMINATED. I WAS OBLIGATED TO CLOSE THE BLEED AND TURN OFF THE PACK FOLLOWING THE QRH PROC. IT BECAME A SINGLE PACK OP. I DSNDED TO FL350 FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY IN CHICAGO. ONE FINAL ISSUE: I WAS INVOLVED IN A LONG DISCUSSION WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT. BOTH WERE HELPFUL; INFORMATIVE; AND RESPECTFUL. THEN THE DISPATCHER SAID THAT A CHIEF PLT WANTS TO TALK TO YOU. THE CHIEF PLT INTRODUCED HIMSELF INTO THE SATCOM CONVERSATION. INITIALLY IT WAS INFORMATIONAL AND RESPECTFUL. THEN STATEMENTS SUCH AS 'OTHER PLTS HAVE FLOWN THIS' AND 'I HAD THE SAME ISSUE AND FLEW THE LEG' BEGAN TO APPEAR. THEN IN A SHARP TONE THE QUESTION WAS ASKED; 'WHAT'S YOUR CONCERN CAPT? IS IT THE SAFETY OR LEGALITY ISSUE?' THEN CAME THE GRAND FINALE; 'IF YOU AREN'T GOING TO FLY THIS JET; LET ME KNOW AND I'LL FIND SOMEONE WHO WILL.' HIS TONE WENT FROM PATRONIZING TO INTIMIDATING. AS PIC OF MY JET; I WAS IN CONVERSATION WITH MAINT AND DISPATCH. THE CHIEF INSERTED HIMSELF INTO MY DISCUSSIONS. I RESPECTFULLY ACCEPTED HIS INSIGHT AND ADVICE BUT STRONGLY RESENTED HIS INSISTENCE THAT HIS SOLUTION WAS MY SOLUTION. MAINT AND DISPATCH WERE PUSHED ASIDE AS THE CHIEF DOMINATED THE CONVERSATION. IS IT NOW THE ACR POLICY TO INVOLVE CHIEF PLTS INTO THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS? WHO MAKES THE DECISIONS? CAPTS OR CHIEFS?! WHAT DOES THAT DO TO THE ROOKIE CAPTS? WHAT DOES THAT DO TO THE SALTY-DOG CAPTS? ABILITY TO FORMULATE THEIR OWN DECISIONS? WHO'S REALLY RESPONSIBLE? IT APPEARS THAT CAPT'S AUTH IS NOT RESPECTED HERE AT THE ACR. IS IT NOW ACR SOP TO INVOLVE CHIEF PLTS IN ALL THE DIFFICULT DECISION MAKING OF OUR CAPTS? IN ALL THE NON-ROUTINE DECISIONS OF OUR CAPTS? IS IT NOW MY RESPONSIBILITY TO SHUT UP AND JUST GO FLY THE JET? WHILE I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE DECISIONS I WAS FACED WITH CONCERNING MY FLT FROM MAUI; IT PALES IN MY CONCERN OVER THE RESPECT FOR CAPT'S AUTH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.