Narrative:

This event occurred during the 3RD leg of an 8 hour flight; 12 hour duty day when weather was a consideration for all 3 legs. The departure from teb on a wet runway 24 posed operational issues due to runway length. When runway 19 was requested; we were advised there would be an indefinite delay. This leg was flight planned for 5 hours and 23 mins. It was determined that runway 24 would be acceptable but with little margin for error. We were assigned the SID for runway 24 which both crew members agreed they were familiar with. During the takeoff briefing; the flying captain briefed the details of the procedure which were runway heading to 1500 ft MSL then right turn to 280 degrees to 4.5 DME from teb VOR. Then maintain 2000 ft. The procedure was in the FMC database. It was briefed we would use the LNAV and VNAV functions for the procedure which is rare in our operations. As the non flying captain; I set 2000 ft in the altitude selector and advised the flying captain on the setting with the comment that VNAV must be selected for takeoff. During our delay of approximately 10 mins waiting for takeoff clearance; our attention turned to runway performance and WX. Takeoff was as expected using almost all of available runway. Initial climb was as company procedures dictated. Through approximately 1200 to 1300 ft I noticed the altitude capture annunciation on the pfd. I focused my attention on the radar briefly and looking back at the altimeter we were passing through 1600 to 1700 ft. As I was alerting the flying pilot of the deviation; the controller advised us as well; stating our need to review the procedure. As I insisted the flying pilot needed to return to 1500 ft; the pilot slowly returned to the proper altitude at which time I noticed the VNAV was not armed. Contributing factors would be WX; aircraft performance; and non vigilance by both crew members of the initial climb profile. Other considerations might be insistence of full automation to include the use of autoplt (this event occurred during autothrottle; hand flown configuration). Training in the area of automation during SID and STAR procedures is not emphasized enough.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF CL60 FAIL TO MAINTAIN 1500 FT MSL PER TEB SID OFF RWY 24 AT TEB.

Narrative: THIS EVENT OCCURRED DURING THE 3RD LEG OF AN 8 HOUR FLT; 12 HOUR DUTY DAY WHEN WEATHER WAS A CONSIDERATION FOR ALL 3 LEGS. THE DEP FROM TEB ON A WET RWY 24 POSED OPERATIONAL ISSUES DUE TO RWY LENGTH. WHEN RWY 19 WAS REQUESTED; WE WERE ADVISED THERE WOULD BE AN INDEFINITE DELAY. THIS LEG WAS FLT PLANNED FOR 5 HOURS AND 23 MINS. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT RWY 24 WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE BUT WITH LITTLE MARGIN FOR ERROR. WE WERE ASSIGNED THE SID FOR RWY 24 WHICH BOTH CREW MEMBERS AGREED THEY WERE FAMILIAR WITH. DURING THE TKOF BRIEFING; THE FLYING CAPT BRIEFED THE DETAILS OF THE PROC WHICH WERE RWY HEADING TO 1500 FT MSL THEN R TURN TO 280 DEGS TO 4.5 DME FROM TEB VOR. THEN MAINTAIN 2000 FT. THE PROC WAS IN THE FMC DATABASE. IT WAS BRIEFED WE WOULD USE THE LNAV AND VNAV FUNCTIONS FOR THE PROC WHICH IS RARE IN OUR OPS. AS THE NON FLYING CAPT; I SET 2000 FT IN THE ALT SELECTOR AND ADVISED THE FLYING CAPT ON THE SETTING WITH THE COMMENT THAT VNAV MUST BE SELECTED FOR TKOF. DURING OUR DELAY OF APPROX 10 MINS WAITING FOR TKOF CLRNC; OUR ATTENTION TURNED TO RWY PERFORMANCE AND WX. TKOF WAS AS EXPECTED USING ALMOST ALL OF AVAILABLE RWY. INITIAL CLB WAS AS COMPANY PROCS DICTATED. THROUGH APPROX 1200 TO 1300 FT I NOTICED THE ALT CAPTURE ANNUNCIATION ON THE PFD. I FOCUSED MY ATTENTION ON THE RADAR BRIEFLY AND LOOKING BACK AT THE ALTIMETER WE WERE PASSING THROUGH 1600 TO 1700 FT. AS I WAS ALERTING THE FLYING PLT OF THE DEVIATION; THE CTLR ADVISED US AS WELL; STATING OUR NEED TO REVIEW THE PROC. AS I INSISTED THE FLYING PLT NEEDED TO RETURN TO 1500 FT; THE PLT SLOWLY RETURNED TO THE PROPER ALT AT WHICH TIME I NOTICED THE VNAV WAS NOT ARMED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WOULD BE WX; ACFT PERFORMANCE; AND NON VIGILANCE BY BOTH CREW MEMBERS OF THE INITIAL CLB PROFILE. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS MIGHT BE INSISTENCE OF FULL AUTOMATION TO INCLUDE THE USE OF AUTOPLT (THIS EVENT OCCURRED DURING AUTOTHROTTLE; HAND FLOWN CONFIGURATION). TRAINING IN THE AREA OF AUTOMATION DURING SID AND STAR PROCS IS NOT EMPHASIZED ENOUGH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.