Narrative:

After reviewing the MEL crew action we complied with the crew actions pertaining the fuel deferral. Fuel quantity was verified on the fuel predict page; also fuel quantity was verified with the fueler present. Before taking the runway we selected the fuel page; verified fuel on board and noted that the left gauges appeared to be giving erroneous information as we thought they would based on the maintenance deferral. During climbout; around FL250; the fuel page displayed automatically because of an exceeded imbalance between left and right tanks. I reviewed the maintenance documents per captain's request to verify indeed the left tank quantities were deferred. Once again; we were under the impression that the left wing gauges were inaccurate and imbalance as indicated was what we would expect to see; given the maintenance status. We reviewed the fuel service form again to make sure we had the proper amount boarded. We checked the fuel score based on the flight plan and the fuel predict page and we were on schedule. An out of trim situation was noted with 0.8 units of trim indicated. Once the fuel transfer valves opened and transferred the outboard fuel; we felt something was not right. We attempted to contact dispatch so we could have a conversation with maintenance. Link was poor and took about 15 to 20 minutes to finally get a good connection. Also; no airbus personnel were available during initial contact. Due to poor communications with maintenance and the potential situation of not knowing how much fuel we had on board; we felt it was necessary to land and we declared an emergency. During decent; we got a low fuel indication per ECAM on the right wing tank. After that; we got a low pump pressure on the right side. I opened up the crossfeed and shut off right fuel pumps as per ECAM. We landed without further incident. During the approach we were advised of a potential 12 knot tailwind on straight in; but with a 10518 ft runway and a weight of approximately 124000 pounds we felt a straight in landing was safer than circling into the wind on the other runway because of an unknown fuel quantity on board. On short final; I noticed a 9 knot tailwind on the nd. Part of our troubleshooting of the problem was a thorough review of the flight manual fuel section. An emergency was declared with ATC and dispatch notified. Upon landing; the captain called dispatch and discussed what happened. He advised that he was going off duty but would brief the next dispatcher.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states A320 fuel gauges can be deferred in several ways; not just 'inoperative' like other aircraft. They were deferred with gauges 'degraded' but not inoperative; and MEL does not require that fuel tanks be dripped in that case. Reporter states the fueler made an error and under-fueled the aircraft. Reporter stated that the tank contained 80 pounds of fuel (approximately 12 gallons).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 WAS DISPATCHED WITH FUEL QUANTITY GAUGE DEFERRED AS 'DEGRADED.' THE FLT CREW BECAME UNSURE OF THEIR FUEL STATE; DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED TO THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT.

Narrative: AFTER REVIEWING THE MEL CREW ACTION WE COMPLIED WITH THE CREW ACTIONS PERTAINING THE FUEL DEFERRAL. FUEL QUANTITY WAS VERIFIED ON THE FUEL PREDICT PAGE; ALSO FUEL QUANTITY WAS VERIFIED WITH THE FUELER PRESENT. BEFORE TAKING THE RUNWAY WE SELECTED THE FUEL PAGE; VERIFIED FUEL ON BOARD AND NOTED THAT THE LEFT GAUGES APPEARED TO BE GIVING ERRONEOUS INFORMATION AS WE THOUGHT THEY WOULD BASED ON THE MAINTENANCE DEFERRAL. DURING CLIMBOUT; AROUND FL250; THE FUEL PAGE DISPLAYED AUTOMATICALLY BECAUSE OF AN EXCEEDED IMBALANCE BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT TANKS. I REVIEWED THE MAINTENANCE DOCUMENTS PER CAPTAIN'S REQUEST TO VERIFY INDEED THE LEFT TANK QUANTITIES WERE DEFERRED. ONCE AGAIN; WE WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE LEFT WING GAUGES WERE INACCURATE AND IMBALANCE AS INDICATED WAS WHAT WE WOULD EXPECT TO SEE; GIVEN THE MAINTENANCE STATUS. WE REVIEWED THE FUEL SERVICE FORM AGAIN TO MAKE SURE WE HAD THE PROPER AMOUNT BOARDED. WE CHECKED THE FUEL SCORE BASED ON THE FLIGHT PLAN AND THE FUEL PREDICT PAGE AND WE WERE ON SCHEDULE. AN OUT OF TRIM SITUATION WAS NOTED WITH 0.8 UNITS OF TRIM INDICATED. ONCE THE FUEL TRANSFER VALVES OPENED AND TRANSFERRED THE OUTBOARD FUEL; WE FELT SOMETHING WAS NOT RIGHT. WE ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT DISPATCH SO WE COULD HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH MAINT. LINK WAS POOR AND TOOK ABOUT 15 TO 20 MINUTES TO FINALLY GET A GOOD CONNECTION. ALSO; NO AIRBUS PERSONNEL WERE AVAILABLE DURING INITIAL CONTACT. DUE TO POOR COMMUNICATIONS WITH MAINT AND THE POTENTIAL SITUATION OF NOT KNOWING HOW MUCH FUEL WE HAD ON BOARD; WE FELT IT WAS NECESSARY TO LAND AND WE DECLARED AN EMERGENCY. DURING DECENT; WE GOT A LOW FUEL INDICATION PER ECAM ON THE RIGHT WING TANK. AFTER THAT; WE GOT A LOW PUMP PRESSURE ON THE RIGHT SIDE. I OPENED UP THE CROSSFEED AND SHUT OFF RIGHT FUEL PUMPS AS PER ECAM. WE LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. DURING THE APPROACH WE WERE ADVISED OF A POTENTIAL 12 KNOT TAILWIND ON STRAIGHT IN; BUT WITH A 10518 FT RUNWAY AND A WEIGHT OF APPROXIMATELY 124000 LBS WE FELT A STRAIGHT IN LANDING WAS SAFER THAN CIRCLING INTO THE WIND ON THE OTHER RWY BECAUSE OF AN UNKNOWN FUEL QUANTITY ON BOARD. ON SHORT FINAL; I NOTICED A 9 KNOT TAILWIND ON THE ND. PART OF OUR TROUBLESHOOTING OF THE PROBLEM WAS A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE FLT MANUAL FUEL SECTION. AN EMERGENCY WAS DECLARED WITH ATC AND DISPATCH NOTIFIED. UPON LANDING; THE CAPTAIN CALLED DISPATCH AND DISCUSSED WHAT HAPPENED. HE ADVISED THAT HE WAS GOING OFF DUTY BUT WOULD BRIEF THE NEXT DISPATCHER.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES A320 FUEL GAUGES CAN BE DEFERRED IN SEVERAL WAYS; NOT JUST 'INOP' LIKE OTHER ACFT. THEY WERE DEFERRED WITH GAUGES 'DEGRADED' BUT NOT INOP; AND MEL DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT FUEL TANKS BE DRIPPED IN THAT CASE. RPTR STATES THE FUELER MADE AN ERROR AND UNDER-FUELED THE ACFT. RPTR STATED THAT THE TANK CONTAINED 80 LBS OF FUEL (APPROXIMATELY 12 GALLONS).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.