Narrative:

Preflight and preparation were normal until flight attendant had a cabin discrepancy at about XA15L. Called maintenance; which came out promptly and addressed the issue and was complete about XA30L. The mechanic stopped by the cockpit and said fix was complete and would send new mrd immediately. Door was closed and before pushback checklist completed. Pushed at XA33 and set brake. I broke my habit pattern and reverted to old procedure and had push crew stay connected after tow bar was disconnected until we received our new mrd (critical mistake #1). I had never done this before and had always had the push crew disconnect and received my salute/release from guidance while I waited for a new mrd. We had a much longer than expected delay in awaiting mrd (7 mins; mrd arrived at XA41) and I had not talked to the push crew in over 5 mins. When mrd arrived I told first officer I had a salute/release from guidance; taxi clearance (2ND critical mistake) when in fact I had not. As per SOP; I selected VHF #2 and left the interphone volume still up. We received taxi clearance; I turned on the taxi light; released the parking brake and started to add power on the #1 engine. Just as the aircraft started to move; I heard 'whoa; whoa' on the interphone. I immediately realized what was going on and aggressively applied wheel brakes and retarded the power to idle. We had moved about 2-3 ft straight ahead. I asked the ground crew if we had hit anything and he replied negative. I had him disconnect; received the salute/release from guidance and continued taxi. Had the interphone not been left on this could have had a much worse outcome. Human factors: mistake #1 -- reverting to an old procedure. Fatigue played an underlying role as I had been up for over 15 hours and on duty almost 9 hours on day 3 of 4 days of reserve. I had not pushed back without an mrd very recently; however; I have many times. Bottom-line; I don't know why I reverted to the old procedure. Mistake #2 -- the long delay in awaiting the mrd combined with the late time of night contributed to me believing I had my salute/release from guidance; but this was my responsibility. We get into the habit of reading a script (ie; '1000 ft cleared to land;' 'I've got a salute/release from guidance taxi clearance'); but when something knocks us out of our normal sequence (awaiting an mrd) extra vigilance is required. SOP save the day -- when I first upgraded to captain; it was hard to remember to leave the interphone up. Although; this situation is not the reasoning behind leaving the interphone up; it gave us one more chance to break this chain of events and saved a much worse situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 CAPT HAS GND CREW STAY CONNECTED AFTER THE TOW BAR WAS DISCONNECTED WHILE AWAITING A REVISED DISPATCH RELEASE. CAPT SUBSEQUENTLY BEGINS TAXI WITHOUT A SALUTE WHILE GND CREW IS STILL ON INTERPHONE.

Narrative: PREFLT AND PREPARATION WERE NORMAL UNTIL FLT ATTENDANT HAD A CABIN DISCREPANCY AT ABOUT XA15L. CALLED MAINT; WHICH CAME OUT PROMPTLY AND ADDRESSED THE ISSUE AND WAS COMPLETE ABOUT XA30L. THE MECH STOPPED BY THE COCKPIT AND SAID FIX WAS COMPLETE AND WOULD SEND NEW MRD IMMEDIATELY. DOOR WAS CLOSED AND BEFORE PUSHBACK CHKLIST COMPLETED. PUSHED AT XA33 AND SET BRAKE. I BROKE MY HABIT PATTERN AND REVERTED TO OLD PROC AND HAD PUSH CREW STAY CONNECTED AFTER TOW BAR WAS DISCONNECTED UNTIL WE RECEIVED OUR NEW MRD (CRITICAL MISTAKE #1). I HAD NEVER DONE THIS BEFORE AND HAD ALWAYS HAD THE PUSH CREW DISCONNECT AND RECEIVED MY SALUTE/RELEASE FROM GUIDANCE WHILE I WAITED FOR A NEW MRD. WE HAD A MUCH LONGER THAN EXPECTED DELAY IN AWAITING MRD (7 MINS; MRD ARRIVED AT XA41) AND I HAD NOT TALKED TO THE PUSH CREW IN OVER 5 MINS. WHEN MRD ARRIVED I TOLD FO I HAD A SALUTE/RELEASE FROM GUIDANCE; TAXI CLRNC (2ND CRITICAL MISTAKE) WHEN IN FACT I HAD NOT. AS PER SOP; I SELECTED VHF #2 AND LEFT THE INTERPHONE VOLUME STILL UP. WE RECEIVED TAXI CLRNC; I TURNED ON THE TAXI LIGHT; RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE AND STARTED TO ADD PWR ON THE #1 ENG. JUST AS THE ACFT STARTED TO MOVE; I HEARD 'WHOA; WHOA' ON THE INTERPHONE. I IMMEDIATELY REALIZED WHAT WAS GOING ON AND AGGRESSIVELY APPLIED WHEEL BRAKES AND RETARDED THE PWR TO IDLE. WE HAD MOVED ABOUT 2-3 FT STRAIGHT AHEAD. I ASKED THE GND CREW IF WE HAD HIT ANYTHING AND HE REPLIED NEGATIVE. I HAD HIM DISCONNECT; RECEIVED THE SALUTE/RELEASE FROM GUIDANCE AND CONTINUED TAXI. HAD THE INTERPHONE NOT BEEN LEFT ON THIS COULD HAVE HAD A MUCH WORSE OUTCOME. HUMAN FACTORS: MISTAKE #1 -- REVERTING TO AN OLD PROC. FATIGUE PLAYED AN UNDERLYING ROLE AS I HAD BEEN UP FOR OVER 15 HRS AND ON DUTY ALMOST 9 HRS ON DAY 3 OF 4 DAYS OF RESERVE. I HAD NOT PUSHED BACK WITHOUT AN MRD VERY RECENTLY; HOWEVER; I HAVE MANY TIMES. BOTTOM-LINE; I DON'T KNOW WHY I REVERTED TO THE OLD PROC. MISTAKE #2 -- THE LONG DELAY IN AWAITING THE MRD COMBINED WITH THE LATE TIME OF NIGHT CONTRIBUTED TO ME BELIEVING I HAD MY SALUTE/RELEASE FROM GUIDANCE; BUT THIS WAS MY RESPONSIBILITY. WE GET INTO THE HABIT OF READING A SCRIPT (IE; '1000 FT CLRED TO LAND;' 'I'VE GOT A SALUTE/RELEASE FROM GUIDANCE TAXI CLRNC'); BUT WHEN SOMETHING KNOCKS US OUT OF OUR NORMAL SEQUENCE (AWAITING AN MRD) EXTRA VIGILANCE IS REQUIRED. SOP SAVE THE DAY -- WHEN I FIRST UPGRADED TO CAPT; IT WAS HARD TO REMEMBER TO LEAVE THE INTERPHONE UP. ALTHOUGH; THIS SITUATION IS NOT THE REASONING BEHIND LEAVING THE INTERPHONE UP; IT GAVE US ONE MORE CHANCE TO BREAK THIS CHAIN OF EVENTS AND SAVED A MUCH WORSE SITUATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.