Narrative:

This was the second flight and instruction session with me and the student. The purpose of this flight was to provide more familiarization with the aircraft for the student and to provide takeoff and landing practice. During this instruction session; I (the CFI/PIC) was stressing the need for checklists; especially the post takeoff checklist at the first power reduction; the landing checklist (gumps) at or before the downwind leg; and a final gear down check in the base to final turn (or on final approach if a straight-in approach is performed). During this flight; the student had performed 3 takeoffs and lndgs (touch-and-goes) with my coaching. His lndgs were safe; but not consistent in terms of power use in the round-out and attitude at touchdown. So I elected to demonstrate a touch-and-go to give the student a visual image of what I expected. For the fourth circuit of the pattern; I took the controls just after turning onto the downwind leg. I proceeded with the gumps check (gas on proper tank; boost pump on; undercarriage down; mixture rich; propeller to high RPM; seatbelts fastened). After doublechking 3 green gear lights; I stated aloud; '3 green; landing checklist complete.' the approach was normal; with a progressive application of flaps and reduction of power until the base to final turn. In the base to final turn; I doublechked the landing gear indicators and stated aloud '3 green.' the final approach was conventional with the airspeed stable at 75 KTS; using about 18 inches of manifold pressure and full flaps. The landing itself was uneventful. I slowly closed the throttle during the round-out and held the plane a few inches or so off the ground until the stall warning sounded. The airplane settled onto the mains at approximately 55 KTS; not a full stall; but definitely slow. It was perfectly on centerline; aligned with the runway; and no drift. I held the nosewheel off for a deliberately long period (about 3 seconds or so) to demonstrate aerodynamic braking; until I ran out of elevator authority/authorized and the nosewheel settled. Overall; it was a very good landing. We then rolled for a few seconds; during which I commented to the student about the pitch and airspeed at touchdown; and the power reduction through the round-out. After that; we were rolling along rather slowly; probably around 30 KTS of airspeed. In preparation for the takeoff; I either said aloud or thought to myself (I'm not sure which) 'flaps up.' at that; I reached for and activated the landing gear switch. Before I had completed that action; with the switch between the down and up position; I realized the error and put the switch back in the down position. The airplane rolled on about 1/2 second or so; and then the right main landing gear collapsed. The airplane slid a short distance to a stop on the right edge of the runway (runway 17). We shut down the airplane; turned the fuel valve and all electrical switches off and exited the airplane through the normal door. We then waited well clear of the aircraft for the emergency equipment to arrive. There were no injuries to anyone. The aircraft damage was mainly to the right flap; right aileron; and underside of the right wing. The damage; while not minor; was not sufficient to classify the event as an accident. The airport manager arrived and stated that he had called the FAA and the NTSB; that the event was being classified as an incident; and that he would clear the airplane from the runway. We then left the scene. I have thought long and hard about this incident and why it occurred. Mainly; it occurred because I performed a 'flaps up' operation automatically; without deliberate thought about what I was doing. Certainly; in certain circumstances; automatic responses are required. But in a normal takeoff; there is no urgency requiring this. There is plenty of time for slow; deliberate operations. Pilots and CFI's must force themselves to be deliberate in these operations. Complex airplanes are just that -- complex. There are more things to do and more things that can go wrong. After experiencing this landing gear incident; I now believe that it is tempting disaster to conduct touch-and-go operations in a complex aircraft. A better;safer method is to use full stop lndgs with taxi-backs to the active runway for another takeoff. This gives the opportunity to practice and read the 'post landing' checklist -- cowl flaps open; flaps up; transponder to standby; mixture leaned for taxi. Most importantly; it removes all of the possible reasons and perceptions to not be deliberate with the operations. Once clear of the runway; there is no perceived or actual urgency; so every move should be with deliberate thought. I plan to use this procedure for all future complex takeoff and landing practice. That is no guarantee; of course. Vigilance and deliberate actions in the cockpit are still required on my part. Hopefully; these changes in procedure; along with the sting of this incident; will prevent a future recurrence.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA28-201 CFI DEMONSTRATING A LNDG AND TKOF FOR THE STUDENT RAISED THE LNDG GEAR LEVER INSTEAD OF THE FLAP LEVER ON THE GND.

Narrative: THIS WAS THE SECOND FLT AND INSTRUCTION SESSION WITH ME AND THE STUDENT. THE PURPOSE OF THIS FLT WAS TO PROVIDE MORE FAMILIARIZATION WITH THE ACFT FOR THE STUDENT AND TO PROVIDE TKOF AND LNDG PRACTICE. DURING THIS INSTRUCTION SESSION; I (THE CFI/PIC) WAS STRESSING THE NEED FOR CHKLISTS; ESPECIALLY THE POST TKOF CHKLIST AT THE FIRST PWR REDUCTION; THE LNDG CHKLIST (GUMPS) AT OR BEFORE THE DOWNWIND LEG; AND A FINAL GEAR DOWN CHK IN THE BASE TO FINAL TURN (OR ON FINAL APCH IF A STRAIGHT-IN APCH IS PERFORMED). DURING THIS FLT; THE STUDENT HAD PERFORMED 3 TKOFS AND LNDGS (TOUCH-AND-GOES) WITH MY COACHING. HIS LNDGS WERE SAFE; BUT NOT CONSISTENT IN TERMS OF PWR USE IN THE ROUND-OUT AND ATTITUDE AT TOUCHDOWN. SO I ELECTED TO DEMONSTRATE A TOUCH-AND-GO TO GIVE THE STUDENT A VISUAL IMAGE OF WHAT I EXPECTED. FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT OF THE PATTERN; I TOOK THE CTLS JUST AFTER TURNING ONTO THE DOWNWIND LEG. I PROCEEDED WITH THE GUMPS CHK (GAS ON PROPER TANK; BOOST PUMP ON; UNDERCARRIAGE DOWN; MIXTURE RICH; PROP TO HIGH RPM; SEATBELTS FASTENED). AFTER DOUBLECHKING 3 GREEN GEAR LIGHTS; I STATED ALOUD; '3 GREEN; LNDG CHKLIST COMPLETE.' THE APCH WAS NORMAL; WITH A PROGRESSIVE APPLICATION OF FLAPS AND REDUCTION OF PWR UNTIL THE BASE TO FINAL TURN. IN THE BASE TO FINAL TURN; I DOUBLECHKED THE LNDG GEAR INDICATORS AND STATED ALOUD '3 GREEN.' THE FINAL APCH WAS CONVENTIONAL WITH THE AIRSPD STABLE AT 75 KTS; USING ABOUT 18 INCHES OF MANIFOLD PRESSURE AND FULL FLAPS. THE LNDG ITSELF WAS UNEVENTFUL. I SLOWLY CLOSED THE THROTTLE DURING THE ROUND-OUT AND HELD THE PLANE A FEW INCHES OR SO OFF THE GND UNTIL THE STALL WARNING SOUNDED. THE AIRPLANE SETTLED ONTO THE MAINS AT APPROX 55 KTS; NOT A FULL STALL; BUT DEFINITELY SLOW. IT WAS PERFECTLY ON CTRLINE; ALIGNED WITH THE RWY; AND NO DRIFT. I HELD THE NOSEWHEEL OFF FOR A DELIBERATELY LONG PERIOD (ABOUT 3 SECONDS OR SO) TO DEMONSTRATE AERODYNAMIC BRAKING; UNTIL I RAN OUT OF ELEVATOR AUTH AND THE NOSEWHEEL SETTLED. OVERALL; IT WAS A VERY GOOD LNDG. WE THEN ROLLED FOR A FEW SECONDS; DURING WHICH I COMMENTED TO THE STUDENT ABOUT THE PITCH AND AIRSPD AT TOUCHDOWN; AND THE PWR REDUCTION THROUGH THE ROUND-OUT. AFTER THAT; WE WERE ROLLING ALONG RATHER SLOWLY; PROBABLY AROUND 30 KTS OF AIRSPD. IN PREPARATION FOR THE TKOF; I EITHER SAID ALOUD OR THOUGHT TO MYSELF (I'M NOT SURE WHICH) 'FLAPS UP.' AT THAT; I REACHED FOR AND ACTIVATED THE LNDG GEAR SWITCH. BEFORE I HAD COMPLETED THAT ACTION; WITH THE SWITCH BTWN THE DOWN AND UP POS; I REALIZED THE ERROR AND PUT THE SWITCH BACK IN THE DOWN POS. THE AIRPLANE ROLLED ON ABOUT 1/2 SECOND OR SO; AND THEN THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR COLLAPSED. THE AIRPLANE SLID A SHORT DISTANCE TO A STOP ON THE R EDGE OF THE RWY (RWY 17). WE SHUT DOWN THE AIRPLANE; TURNED THE FUEL VALVE AND ALL ELECTRICAL SWITCHES OFF AND EXITED THE AIRPLANE THROUGH THE NORMAL DOOR. WE THEN WAITED WELL CLR OF THE ACFT FOR THE EMER EQUIP TO ARRIVE. THERE WERE NO INJURIES TO ANYONE. THE ACFT DAMAGE WAS MAINLY TO THE R FLAP; R AILERON; AND UNDERSIDE OF THE R WING. THE DAMAGE; WHILE NOT MINOR; WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CLASSIFY THE EVENT AS AN ACCIDENT. THE ARPT MGR ARRIVED AND STATED THAT HE HAD CALLED THE FAA AND THE NTSB; THAT THE EVENT WAS BEING CLASSIFIED AS AN INCIDENT; AND THAT HE WOULD CLR THE AIRPLANE FROM THE RWY. WE THEN LEFT THE SCENE. I HAVE THOUGHT LONG AND HARD ABOUT THIS INCIDENT AND WHY IT OCCURRED. MAINLY; IT OCCURRED BECAUSE I PERFORMED A 'FLAPS UP' OP AUTOMATICALLY; WITHOUT DELIBERATE THOUGHT ABOUT WHAT I WAS DOING. CERTAINLY; IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; AUTOMATIC RESPONSES ARE REQUIRED. BUT IN A NORMAL TKOF; THERE IS NO URGENCY REQUIRING THIS. THERE IS PLENTY OF TIME FOR SLOW; DELIBERATE OPS. PLTS AND CFI'S MUST FORCE THEMSELVES TO BE DELIBERATE IN THESE OPS. COMPLEX AIRPLANES ARE JUST THAT -- COMPLEX. THERE ARE MORE THINGS TO DO AND MORE THINGS THAT CAN GO WRONG. AFTER EXPERIENCING THIS LNDG GEAR INCIDENT; I NOW BELIEVE THAT IT IS TEMPTING DISASTER TO CONDUCT TOUCH-AND-GO OPS IN A COMPLEX ACFT. A BETTER;SAFER METHOD IS TO USE FULL STOP LNDGS WITH TAXI-BACKS TO THE ACTIVE RWY FOR ANOTHER TKOF. THIS GIVES THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRACTICE AND READ THE 'POST LNDG' CHKLIST -- COWL FLAPS OPEN; FLAPS UP; XPONDER TO STANDBY; MIXTURE LEANED FOR TAXI. MOST IMPORTANTLY; IT REMOVES ALL OF THE POSSIBLE REASONS AND PERCEPTIONS TO NOT BE DELIBERATE WITH THE OPS. ONCE CLR OF THE RWY; THERE IS NO PERCEIVED OR ACTUAL URGENCY; SO EVERY MOVE SHOULD BE WITH DELIBERATE THOUGHT. I PLAN TO USE THIS PROC FOR ALL FUTURE COMPLEX TKOF AND LNDG PRACTICE. THAT IS NO GUARANTEE; OF COURSE. VIGILANCE AND DELIBERATE ACTIONS IN THE COCKPIT ARE STILL REQUIRED ON MY PART. HOPEFULLY; THESE CHANGES IN PROC; ALONG WITH THE STING OF THIS INCIDENT; WILL PREVENT A FUTURE RECURRENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.