Narrative:

I was working the departure east (drv) sector during light traffic between pushes. The departure west (dra) was open; and the departure coordinator (cia) was closed. Dra pointed out a PA32 that was being vectored south of the memphis airport at 4000 ft; right through the departure corridor. I approved the pointout; but asked if tower was watching the traffic because our jet departures climb to 5000 ft initially. The dra controller said that tower was watching the PA32. An E135 tagged up on my position symbol heading right for the PA32. Local control #2 called and said that I would have to stop the E135 at 3000 ft because the E135 did not get the new altitude assignment. I told dra what was happening and waited for the E135 to call me. The E135 went through 3000 ft and dra had to turn the PA32 north to avoid a loss of separation. When the E135 finally checked in; he was on the wrong frequency; and had called dra! During this entire process; the supervisor was standing behind the departure sectors joking and kidding with us about some unknown subject that he found funny. Separation was never lost; but it was only due to the quick turn by the dra controller; and maybe a little luck. Once again; a lack of coordination almost causes a disaster. Once again; an aircraft departs on the wrong frequency due to a departure procedure that is confusing and ambiguous. Mem FAA management refuses to address the issue surrounding our departure frequency woes. They say that there's just nothing that they can do. We have suggested that clearance delivery be mandated to issue the appropriate frequencys; but management says that this would defeat the purpose of the departure procedure. We have suggested designing a new departure procedure or creating 2 departure procedures based on direction of flight; but this has been denied as well. We have suggested having clearance delivery use automation methods to enter the frequency via the preferential departure clearance equipment; but mem FAA management thinks that this will place too much work on clearance delivery. Too much work to be safe? Unable to be safe? Unwilling to be safe? Unacceptable!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MEM CTLR DESCRIBED COORD ERROR THAT ALMOST RESULTED IN A LOSS OF SEPARATION AND LISTED FACILITY FREQ ASSIGNMENT ANOMALIES.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE DEP E (DRV) SECTOR DURING LIGHT TFC BTWN PUSHES. THE DEP W (DRA) WAS OPEN; AND THE DEP COORDINATOR (CIA) WAS CLOSED. DRA POINTED OUT A PA32 THAT WAS BEING VECTORED S OF THE MEMPHIS ARPT AT 4000 FT; RIGHT THROUGH THE DEP CORRIDOR. I APPROVED THE POINTOUT; BUT ASKED IF TWR WAS WATCHING THE TFC BECAUSE OUR JET DEPS CLB TO 5000 FT INITIALLY. THE DRA CTLR SAID THAT TWR WAS WATCHING THE PA32. AN E135 TAGGED UP ON MY POS SYMBOL HEADING RIGHT FOR THE PA32. LCL CTL #2 CALLED AND SAID THAT I WOULD HAVE TO STOP THE E135 AT 3000 FT BECAUSE THE E135 DID NOT GET THE NEW ALT ASSIGNMENT. I TOLD DRA WHAT WAS HAPPENING AND WAITED FOR THE E135 TO CALL ME. THE E135 WENT THROUGH 3000 FT AND DRA HAD TO TURN THE PA32 N TO AVOID A LOSS OF SEPARATION. WHEN THE E135 FINALLY CHKED IN; HE WAS ON THE WRONG FREQ; AND HAD CALLED DRA! DURING THIS ENTIRE PROCESS; THE SUPVR WAS STANDING BEHIND THE DEP SECTORS JOKING AND KIDDING WITH US ABOUT SOME UNKNOWN SUBJECT THAT HE FOUND FUNNY. SEPARATION WAS NEVER LOST; BUT IT WAS ONLY DUE TO THE QUICK TURN BY THE DRA CTLR; AND MAYBE A LITTLE LUCK. ONCE AGAIN; A LACK OF COORD ALMOST CAUSES A DISASTER. ONCE AGAIN; AN ACFT DEPARTS ON THE WRONG FREQ DUE TO A DEP PROC THAT IS CONFUSING AND AMBIGUOUS. MEM FAA MGMNT REFUSES TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE SURROUNDING OUR DEP FREQ WOES. THEY SAY THAT THERE'S JUST NOTHING THAT THEY CAN DO. WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT CLRNC DELIVERY BE MANDATED TO ISSUE THE APPROPRIATE FREQS; BUT MGMNT SAYS THAT THIS WOULD DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF THE DEP PROC. WE HAVE SUGGESTED DESIGNING A NEW DEP PROC OR CREATING 2 DEP PROCS BASED ON DIRECTION OF FLT; BUT THIS HAS BEEN DENIED AS WELL. WE HAVE SUGGESTED HAVING CLRNC DELIVERY USE AUTOMATION METHODS TO ENTER THE FREQ VIA THE PREFERENTIAL DEP CLRNC EQUIP; BUT MEM FAA MGMNT THINKS THAT THIS WILL PLACE TOO MUCH WORK ON CLRNC DELIVERY. TOO MUCH WORK TO BE SAFE? UNABLE TO BE SAFE? UNWILLING TO BE SAFE? UNACCEPTABLE!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.