Narrative:

The trip on which the problem arose was a cpr trip to hnl. Prior to landing in hnl; we received the current ATIS and did a complete brief on the type of approach; landing runway and the location of the FBO. The first officer was a new hire but with approximately 7000 hours and 5000 hours jet experience. And experience at this airport. I had briefed that we would land runway 4R and that it would be a left turn off the runway for the FBO. The first officer did not disagree nor did he add anything to the briefing. The proper exit would have been to the right (south) and not the left. All approach plates were ready on our electronic flight bags. After landing runway 4R I exited to the left (north) as briefed. The ATC controller then informed us we should have turned right and gave us a lengthy taxi clearance to the FBO all the way to destination. My first officer replied; 'roger' and did not give a complete readback of the taxi clearance. I queried if he gave a readback and he said no. The controller was working both ground and tower frequencys and seemed too busy for further questions or a progressive as I would have liked as we were tired at the time also. I began to taxi as what I believed was the correct direction although that area was poorly marked and dimly lit. The controller informed us we had taxied on the wrong runway and I then insisted on a progressive as it was obvious we were disoriented. Once reaching the FBO area I apologized for the confusion and nothing further was indicated from the controller as there having been a problem. To my knowledge there was no evasive action or inconvenience to any other aircraft. In review of the chain of events my evaluation is such that firstly I should have insisted that my first officer give a complete readback of the clearance. I should not have begun to taxi until we positively were oriented on the chart and understood the directions. The controller also sounded displeased and did not lend himself to further inquiries. The controller working 2 frequencys at the time may have added to his ability to discern that we were not sure of our location nor did he insist on a full readback. The duty day was at least 12 hours prior to the situation occurring with the crew being awake an additional 4-5 hours prior to this. Fatigue definitely was a factor. Immediately after the hnl flight I evaluated the situation and immediately implemented some new procedures and reinforced others that I have utilized most of my flying career. These procedures I believe will eliminate another situation like this occurring again in our department. I also felt there was a problem with my first officer's procedures and reviewed everything with him again. Firstly; all taxi clrncs will be fully read back and copied down. (This is a procedure I have adhered to in the past). Secondly; I have reiterated that no checklists will be commenced until a) the aircraft is clear of the runway; B) taxi clrncs are copied; read back and understood by both pilots; C) the PF is oriented and comfortable with the taxi clearance. Thirdly; should there be any confusion or question as to the taxi clearance the aircraft will stop until it is rectified. I also feel that there are some problems with the electronic flight bgs in that they are difficult to switch pages as well as magnification for the area that you are working. We are now printing the charts whenever possible and feel paper is still much more manageable and efficient.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW TAXIES ONTO WRONG RWY AT HNL AFTER LONG PACIFIC FLT.

Narrative: THE TRIP ON WHICH THE PROB AROSE WAS A CPR TRIP TO HNL. PRIOR TO LNDG IN HNL; WE RECEIVED THE CURRENT ATIS AND DID A COMPLETE BRIEF ON THE TYPE OF APCH; LNDG RWY AND THE LOCATION OF THE FBO. THE FO WAS A NEW HIRE BUT WITH APPROX 7000 HRS AND 5000 HRS JET EXPERIENCE. AND EXPERIENCE AT THIS ARPT. I HAD BRIEFED THAT WE WOULD LAND RWY 4R AND THAT IT WOULD BE A L TURN OFF THE RWY FOR THE FBO. THE FO DID NOT DISAGREE NOR DID HE ADD ANYTHING TO THE BRIEFING. THE PROPER EXIT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO THE R (S) AND NOT THE L. ALL APCH PLATES WERE READY ON OUR ELECTRONIC FLT BAGS. AFTER LNDG RWY 4R I EXITED TO THE L (N) AS BRIEFED. THE ATC CTLR THEN INFORMED US WE SHOULD HAVE TURNED R AND GAVE US A LENGTHY TAXI CLRNC TO THE FBO ALL THE WAY TO DEST. MY FO REPLIED; 'ROGER' AND DID NOT GIVE A COMPLETE READBACK OF THE TAXI CLRNC. I QUERIED IF HE GAVE A READBACK AND HE SAID NO. THE CTLR WAS WORKING BOTH GND AND TWR FREQS AND SEEMED TOO BUSY FOR FURTHER QUESTIONS OR A PROGRESSIVE AS I WOULD HAVE LIKED AS WE WERE TIRED AT THE TIME ALSO. I BEGAN TO TAXI AS WHAT I BELIEVED WAS THE CORRECT DIRECTION ALTHOUGH THAT AREA WAS POORLY MARKED AND DIMLY LIT. THE CTLR INFORMED US WE HAD TAXIED ON THE WRONG RWY AND I THEN INSISTED ON A PROGRESSIVE AS IT WAS OBVIOUS WE WERE DISORIENTED. ONCE REACHING THE FBO AREA I APOLOGIZED FOR THE CONFUSION AND NOTHING FURTHER WAS INDICATED FROM THE CTLR AS THERE HAVING BEEN A PROB. TO MY KNOWLEDGE THERE WAS NO EVASIVE ACTION OR INCONVENIENCE TO ANY OTHER ACFT. IN REVIEW OF THE CHAIN OF EVENTS MY EVALUATION IS SUCH THAT FIRSTLY I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED THAT MY FO GIVE A COMPLETE READBACK OF THE CLRNC. I SHOULD NOT HAVE BEGUN TO TAXI UNTIL WE POSITIVELY WERE ORIENTED ON THE CHART AND UNDERSTOOD THE DIRECTIONS. THE CTLR ALSO SOUNDED DISPLEASED AND DID NOT LEND HIMSELF TO FURTHER INQUIRIES. THE CTLR WORKING 2 FREQS AT THE TIME MAY HAVE ADDED TO HIS ABILITY TO DISCERN THAT WE WERE NOT SURE OF OUR LOCATION NOR DID HE INSIST ON A FULL READBACK. THE DUTY DAY WAS AT LEAST 12 HRS PRIOR TO THE SITUATION OCCURRING WITH THE CREW BEING AWAKE AN ADDITIONAL 4-5 HRS PRIOR TO THIS. FATIGUE DEFINITELY WAS A FACTOR. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE HNL FLT I EVALUATED THE SITUATION AND IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENTED SOME NEW PROCS AND REINFORCED OTHERS THAT I HAVE UTILIZED MOST OF MY FLYING CAREER. THESE PROCS I BELIEVE WILL ELIMINATE ANOTHER SITUATION LIKE THIS OCCURRING AGAIN IN OUR DEPT. I ALSO FELT THERE WAS A PROB WITH MY FO'S PROCS AND REVIEWED EVERYTHING WITH HIM AGAIN. FIRSTLY; ALL TAXI CLRNCS WILL BE FULLY READ BACK AND COPIED DOWN. (THIS IS A PROC I HAVE ADHERED TO IN THE PAST). SECONDLY; I HAVE REITERATED THAT NO CHKLISTS WILL BE COMMENCED UNTIL A) THE ACFT IS CLR OF THE RWY; B) TAXI CLRNCS ARE COPIED; READ BACK AND UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH PLTS; C) THE PF IS ORIENTED AND COMFORTABLE WITH THE TAXI CLRNC. THIRDLY; SHOULD THERE BE ANY CONFUSION OR QUESTION AS TO THE TAXI CLRNC THE ACFT WILL STOP UNTIL IT IS RECTIFIED. I ALSO FEEL THAT THERE ARE SOME PROBS WITH THE ELECTRONIC FLT BGS IN THAT THEY ARE DIFFICULT TO SWITCH PAGES AS WELL AS MAGNIFICATION FOR THE AREA THAT YOU ARE WORKING. WE ARE NOW PRINTING THE CHARTS WHENEVER POSSIBLE AND FEEL PAPER IS STILL MUCH MORE MANAGEABLE AND EFFICIENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.