Narrative:

This was air carrier X from dca to ZZZ on oct/tue/06. It was night and sky conditions below 2000 ft were clear. Preflight and pushback from dca gate was uneventful. We were cleared by ground to taxi taxiway K1 then taxiway J and hold short of runway 15. Upon reaching the hold short of runway 15 we were cleared to continue to taxi across runway 15 and were told we would be the next to get right out. We were then told to switch to tower. We taxied to the hold short of runway 19 and contacted the tower as instructed. Our aircraft was positioned on the hold short line on taxiway J. Looking at the 10-7 page there is also a holding area for runway 19 on taxiway K that merges with taxiway J before the hold short line for runway 19. When we contacted tower on 119.1 prior to reaching the hold short line and tower seemed surprised that we were not in sequence behind the other 2 aircraft that were already in queue on the taxiway K line 'pad' for runway 19. We were surprised since we were told by ground that we would be the next to go. Obviously; there appears to have been a breakdown of handoff communication between ground control and tower. As a result; we held in position for 10-15 mins as all other aircraft were cleared in sequence from the 'pad' on taxiway K to takeoff. We sat there in dismay. Towards the end of our wait; there were 2 aircraft remaining on the 'pad' on taxiway K; a B737 and an rj; leaving little room between us and the other aircraft. Then tower cleared a B737 from behind us for position and hold. All of a sudden; the B737 came motoring through us and the other 2 aircraft. The captain and I both commented to each other that the B737 appeared close to us; so we monitored closely as it 'squeezed' through. Now it gets interesting. Once the B737 is positioned on the runway; tower cancels the B737's clearance and directs the B737 to immediately exit the runway at taxiway J. The B737; at a very high speed; exited the runway and taxies directly back towards us. Its left wing seemed uncomfortably close to us; so I shouted at my captain; 'the B737's too close.' my captain looked with heightened interest. I then stated; 'is he going to make it?' at this point; my captain jumped out of his seat; opened his window and leaned out to get a better look. I then said 'let's get on the radio and stop him.' I then made a decision to make the radio call. But my captain was already broadcasting on tower frequency to the B737 to check their clearance. Immediately; the B737 slowed to a crawl but continued their taxi. The captain; still leaning out the window; was yelling at me; 'they passed under our wing!' I stated; 'did they hit?' he said 'no!' once the B737 went by us; my captain came back into the cockpit; closed his window; and proceeded to explain to me how close the B737 came to hitting our wingtip. Again; I questioned him about any contact and he replied that there had been none. I then said 'we should call someone right now!' he replied; 'not now.' we both sat there discussing what had happened but made no other external calls. The captain was confident there was no wingtip contact. I stopped advocating and the tower cleared us for takeoff. I'm writing this report the day after completing this flight; which was toward the end of a 15-hour duty day and 8 hours 30 mins of flight time -- all due to delays out of ZZZ for WX. My point is this: I now feel I should have advocated a little stronger and stopped the mission the moment the B737's wing may have passed under our wing; which we are still not certain about. The captain was the only one in position to see it and later said it's possible it was only close and not an over/under. I understand that at night; depth perception can be limited. In hindsight; I think I may have been somewhat fatigued. It was a very long day. I could have advocated stopping the mission; going back to the gate; getting the wing looked at and notifying the tower of the incident. Did we do the right thing; or did fatigue cloud our better judgement? I think fatigue was a factor in our follow-up.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 FO RPTS AN ACR ACFT'S WINGTIP PASSED VERY NEAR HIS ACFT'S WINGTIP. DUE TO FATIGUE THE CREW DID NOT RETURN FOR INSPECTION OF POSSIBLE CONTACT.

Narrative: THIS WAS ACR X FROM DCA TO ZZZ ON OCT/TUE/06. IT WAS NIGHT AND SKY CONDITIONS BELOW 2000 FT WERE CLR. PREFLT AND PUSHBACK FROM DCA GATE WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE WERE CLRED BY GND TO TAXI TXWY K1 THEN TXWY J AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 15. UPON REACHING THE HOLD SHORT OF RWY 15 WE WERE CLRED TO CONTINUE TO TAXI ACROSS RWY 15 AND WERE TOLD WE WOULD BE THE NEXT TO GET RIGHT OUT. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO SWITCH TO TWR. WE TAXIED TO THE HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19 AND CONTACTED THE TWR AS INSTRUCTED. OUR ACFT WAS POSITIONED ON THE HOLD SHORT LINE ON TXWY J. LOOKING AT THE 10-7 PAGE THERE IS ALSO A HOLDING AREA FOR RWY 19 ON TXWY K THAT MERGES WITH TXWY J BEFORE THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 19. WHEN WE CONTACTED TWR ON 119.1 PRIOR TO REACHING THE HOLD SHORT LINE AND TWR SEEMED SURPRISED THAT WE WERE NOT IN SEQUENCE BEHIND THE OTHER 2 ACFT THAT WERE ALREADY IN QUEUE ON THE TXWY K LINE 'PAD' FOR RWY 19. WE WERE SURPRISED SINCE WE WERE TOLD BY GND THAT WE WOULD BE THE NEXT TO GO. OBVIOUSLY; THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A BREAKDOWN OF HDOF COM BTWN GND CTL AND TWR. AS A RESULT; WE HELD IN POS FOR 10-15 MINS AS ALL OTHER ACFT WERE CLRED IN SEQUENCE FROM THE 'PAD' ON TXWY K TO TKOF. WE SAT THERE IN DISMAY. TOWARDS THE END OF OUR WAIT; THERE WERE 2 ACFT REMAINING ON THE 'PAD' ON TXWY K; A B737 AND AN RJ; LEAVING LITTLE ROOM BTWN US AND THE OTHER ACFT. THEN TWR CLRED A B737 FROM BEHIND US FOR POS AND HOLD. ALL OF A SUDDEN; THE B737 CAME MOTORING THROUGH US AND THE OTHER 2 ACFT. THE CAPT AND I BOTH COMMENTED TO EACH OTHER THAT THE B737 APPEARED CLOSE TO US; SO WE MONITORED CLOSELY AS IT 'SQUEEZED' THROUGH. NOW IT GETS INTERESTING. ONCE THE B737 IS POSITIONED ON THE RWY; TWR CANCELS THE B737'S CLRNC AND DIRECTS THE B737 TO IMMEDIATELY EXIT THE RWY AT TXWY J. THE B737; AT A VERY HIGH SPD; EXITED THE RWY AND TAXIES DIRECTLY BACK TOWARDS US. ITS L WING SEEMED UNCOMFORTABLY CLOSE TO US; SO I SHOUTED AT MY CAPT; 'THE B737'S TOO CLOSE.' MY CAPT LOOKED WITH HEIGHTENED INTEREST. I THEN STATED; 'IS HE GOING TO MAKE IT?' AT THIS POINT; MY CAPT JUMPED OUT OF HIS SEAT; OPENED HIS WINDOW AND LEANED OUT TO GET A BETTER LOOK. I THEN SAID 'LET'S GET ON THE RADIO AND STOP HIM.' I THEN MADE A DECISION TO MAKE THE RADIO CALL. BUT MY CAPT WAS ALREADY BROADCASTING ON TWR FREQ TO THE B737 TO CHK THEIR CLRNC. IMMEDIATELY; THE B737 SLOWED TO A CRAWL BUT CONTINUED THEIR TAXI. THE CAPT; STILL LEANING OUT THE WINDOW; WAS YELLING AT ME; 'THEY PASSED UNDER OUR WING!' I STATED; 'DID THEY HIT?' HE SAID 'NO!' ONCE THE B737 WENT BY US; MY CAPT CAME BACK INTO THE COCKPIT; CLOSED HIS WINDOW; AND PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN TO ME HOW CLOSE THE B737 CAME TO HITTING OUR WINGTIP. AGAIN; I QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT ANY CONTACT AND HE REPLIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NONE. I THEN SAID 'WE SHOULD CALL SOMEONE RIGHT NOW!' HE REPLIED; 'NOT NOW.' WE BOTH SAT THERE DISCUSSING WHAT HAD HAPPENED BUT MADE NO OTHER EXTERNAL CALLS. THE CAPT WAS CONFIDENT THERE WAS NO WINGTIP CONTACT. I STOPPED ADVOCATING AND THE TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF. I'M WRITING THIS RPT THE DAY AFTER COMPLETING THIS FLT; WHICH WAS TOWARD THE END OF A 15-HR DUTY DAY AND 8 HRS 30 MINS OF FLT TIME -- ALL DUE TO DELAYS OUT OF ZZZ FOR WX. MY POINT IS THIS: I NOW FEEL I SHOULD HAVE ADVOCATED A LITTLE STRONGER AND STOPPED THE MISSION THE MOMENT THE B737'S WING MAY HAVE PASSED UNDER OUR WING; WHICH WE ARE STILL NOT CERTAIN ABOUT. THE CAPT WAS THE ONLY ONE IN POS TO SEE IT AND LATER SAID IT'S POSSIBLE IT WAS ONLY CLOSE AND NOT AN OVER/UNDER. I UNDERSTAND THAT AT NIGHT; DEPTH PERCEPTION CAN BE LIMITED. IN HINDSIGHT; I THINK I MAY HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT FATIGUED. IT WAS A VERY LONG DAY. I COULD HAVE ADVOCATED STOPPING THE MISSION; GOING BACK TO THE GATE; GETTING THE WING LOOKED AT AND NOTIFYING THE TWR OF THE INCIDENT. DID WE DO THE RIGHT THING; OR DID FATIGUE CLOUD OUR BETTER JUDGEMENT? I THINK FATIGUE WAS A FACTOR IN OUR FOLLOW-UP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.