Narrative:

We took off from sdf on runway 17R and just seconds after liftoff; we both noticed hundreds maybe even thousands of blackbirds that started to scatter in front of us. They were on the runway as well as on the grass. We had minimal time to react safely. Just about the time we started to raise the gear we took at least 5-6 bird strikes all over the aircraft. Engine indications remained normal and I maintained normal climb attitude. 10 seconds after the impact; all 3 of us smelled smoke inside the cockpit. I asked the first officer to call the flight attendants in back and ask them if they smell or see any smoke. They both saw and smelled it in the cabin. At 1000 ft I called for 'flaps 1 degree; climb thrust.' due to possible structural damage to the airframe and given that smoke was present in the cabin and cockpit; I then directed the first officer to tell the controller that we are returning back sdf. As I climbed the aircraft and accelerated I called for 'flaps up' and also motioned to the first officer. As I said and did this; the first officer was talking to the controller on the radio for turn-back heading and altitude. They assigned us 3000 ft and a 360 degree heading for a landing on runway 17L. During this time the first officer did not hear the command and did not retract the flaps. Since I was busy flying the airplane; I did not notice that he did not raise the flaps. We turned to a northerly heading and leveled off at 3000 ft. On the downwind leg; we noticed that we still had the flaps at 1 degree and we were doing 240 KIAS. I immediately reduced our speed and called for 'flaps up.' I told the first officer to tell the flight attendants to keep the cabin secure; and we will let them know about a possible evacuate/evacuation. At this time they told us that they no longer could smell or see smoke in the cabin and we also did not smell any more smoke. After the call to the flight attendants; I told the first officer to make a PA explaining our situation and to remain seated. I had the first officer do most of the radio and PA work while I flew the aircraft. We completed the descent checklist and were given a visual approach to runway 17L. At this time we were overweight but because we initially had smoke inside the cabin; I decided to make a landing in excess of our 114000 pound limitation as soon as possible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 FLT CREW HAS MULTIPLE BIRD STRIKES ON TKOF AND RETURNS TO LAND AT SDF.

Narrative: WE TOOK OFF FROM SDF ON RWY 17R AND JUST SECONDS AFTER LIFTOFF; WE BOTH NOTICED HUNDREDS MAYBE EVEN THOUSANDS OF BLACKBIRDS THAT STARTED TO SCATTER IN FRONT OF US. THEY WERE ON THE RWY AS WELL AS ON THE GRASS. WE HAD MINIMAL TIME TO REACT SAFELY. JUST ABOUT THE TIME WE STARTED TO RAISE THE GEAR WE TOOK AT LEAST 5-6 BIRD STRIKES ALL OVER THE ACFT. ENG INDICATIONS REMAINED NORMAL AND I MAINTAINED NORMAL CLB ATTITUDE. 10 SECONDS AFTER THE IMPACT; ALL 3 OF US SMELLED SMOKE INSIDE THE COCKPIT. I ASKED THE FO TO CALL THE FLT ATTENDANTS IN BACK AND ASK THEM IF THEY SMELL OR SEE ANY SMOKE. THEY BOTH SAW AND SMELLED IT IN THE CABIN. AT 1000 FT I CALLED FOR 'FLAPS 1 DEG; CLB THRUST.' DUE TO POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO THE AIRFRAME AND GIVEN THAT SMOKE WAS PRESENT IN THE CABIN AND COCKPIT; I THEN DIRECTED THE FO TO TELL THE CTLR THAT WE ARE RETURNING BACK SDF. AS I CLBED THE ACFT AND ACCELERATED I CALLED FOR 'FLAPS UP' AND ALSO MOTIONED TO THE FO. AS I SAID AND DID THIS; THE FO WAS TALKING TO THE CTLR ON THE RADIO FOR TURN-BACK HDG AND ALT. THEY ASSIGNED US 3000 FT AND A 360 DEG HDG FOR A LNDG ON RWY 17L. DURING THIS TIME THE FO DID NOT HEAR THE COMMAND AND DID NOT RETRACT THE FLAPS. SINCE I WAS BUSY FLYING THE AIRPLANE; I DID NOT NOTICE THAT HE DID NOT RAISE THE FLAPS. WE TURNED TO A NORTHERLY HDG AND LEVELED OFF AT 3000 FT. ON THE DOWNWIND LEG; WE NOTICED THAT WE STILL HAD THE FLAPS AT 1 DEG AND WE WERE DOING 240 KIAS. I IMMEDIATELY REDUCED OUR SPD AND CALLED FOR 'FLAPS UP.' I TOLD THE FO TO TELL THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO KEEP THE CABIN SECURE; AND WE WILL LET THEM KNOW ABOUT A POSSIBLE EVAC. AT THIS TIME THEY TOLD US THAT THEY NO LONGER COULD SMELL OR SEE SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND WE ALSO DID NOT SMELL ANY MORE SMOKE. AFTER THE CALL TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS; I TOLD THE FO TO MAKE A PA EXPLAINING OUR SITUATION AND TO REMAIN SEATED. I HAD THE FO DO MOST OF THE RADIO AND PA WORK WHILE I FLEW THE ACFT. WE COMPLETED THE DSCNT CHKLIST AND WERE GIVEN A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 17L. AT THIS TIME WE WERE OVERWT BUT BECAUSE WE INITIALLY HAD SMOKE INSIDE THE CABIN; I DECIDED TO MAKE A LNDG IN EXCESS OF OUR 114000 LB LIMITATION ASAP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.