Narrative:

This event involved a chain of events which resulted in my landing without clearance from the tower. I have concluded that my first mistake was allowing myself to get into a stressful situation which I did not have the proper experience to handle. The purpose of this flight was to take my parents; who are both in their 80's; on a pleasure flight to see their old home from the air. They were anxious to make the flight even though I warned that the conditions on this day would make for a bumpy ride. In hindsight; I should have made a no-go decision before the flight began. We departed osh and flew approximately 30 mins to view the old home place. In beginning the return to oshkosh; I checked the metars at osh and at appleton and made the decision to land at appleton. The overcast skies were descending although both airports were clearly VMC. My stressful situation then began by placing myself in deteriorating WX conditions with what I would term as high-maintenance passenger. This led to approaching appleton airport without descending to the proper approach altitude and reducing my speed to my normal approach speed. I contacted the tower just over 10 NM from the airport and was instructed to report at 3 NM for a right base on runway 21. As I continued toward the airport; I began to be overwhelmed by the workload. I was at a higher altitude and a higher speed than proper planning would have allowed and I was giving too much attention to my passenger to assure their preparation for landing. When I reported to the tower that I was 3 NM out; I did not get a direct response; which at the time I believed was because the controller was talking to other traffic and would get to me next. At this point things apparently moved faster than I was capable of handling properly. I called the tower once again; but only heard the tower acknowledge to traffic behind me that he was #2 for landing behind a cirrus that was turning final; which I knew to be me. At about this point; it was occurring to me that I did not have proper communication with the tower. I was on final and on overload. I knew from what I was hearing that the tower knew exactly where I was and that other traffic was aware; but I could not get a response from my xmissions. I knew something was wrong; but I did not process the information fast enough to take action such as a NORDO signal. What was flashing through my mind was 'aviation; navigation; communication' which had been drilled into my mind in training. I landed the plane safely and it was only on the rollout that I heard the tower ask if I could read his transmission. I replied in the affirmative and was given taxi instructions and instructed by the controller to contact the tower by landline after reaching the FBO. FBO personnel gave me the tower number and I immediately called the tower. Once again in hindsight; I probably should have collected my thoughts before calling the tower; because I was still trying to replay the chain of events to understand myself what had happened. I'm sure I must have sounded confused because I certainly was at the point. I tried to explain that I was trying to call the tower and was receiving no response. I was accused of lying and to say I was severely reprimanded would be a huge understatement. I first concluded that my push-to-talk switch had failed. Thinking it through further; that seemed implausible; because I was able to communicate after landing and could not replicate the supposed failure. It was not until I replayed the scenario many times that I came to the conclusion that I must have allowed myself to get into such a stressful situation that I may have not been keying the push-to-talk as I thought I was. Whatever the malfunction was; I learned an enormous amount from this event. I had trained diligently; both through safety training courses and with a great flight instructor and believed that I was prepared for the type of situation that occurred. I now have changed my personal minimums required for any flight to consider more carefully the external factors affecting my stress level and; therefore; my performance as a safe pilot. I will also spend many more hours with an instructor working on proper procedures in unexpected scenarios; so that I will have the experience to react properly and detect more quickly the source of any abnormal situation that may arise in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SR20 PLT LWOC AT ATW ARPT.

Narrative: THIS EVENT INVOLVED A CHAIN OF EVENTS WHICH RESULTED IN MY LWOC FROM THE TWR. I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT MY FIRST MISTAKE WAS ALLOWING MYSELF TO GET INTO A STRESSFUL SITUATION WHICH I DID NOT HAVE THE PROPER EXPERIENCE TO HANDLE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS FLT WAS TO TAKE MY PARENTS; WHO ARE BOTH IN THEIR 80'S; ON A PLEASURE FLT TO SEE THEIR OLD HOME FROM THE AIR. THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO MAKE THE FLT EVEN THOUGH I WARNED THAT THE CONDITIONS ON THIS DAY WOULD MAKE FOR A BUMPY RIDE. IN HINDSIGHT; I SHOULD HAVE MADE A NO-GO DECISION BEFORE THE FLT BEGAN. WE DEPARTED OSH AND FLEW APPROX 30 MINS TO VIEW THE OLD HOME PLACE. IN BEGINNING THE RETURN TO OSHKOSH; I CHKED THE METARS AT OSH AND AT APPLETON AND MADE THE DECISION TO LAND AT APPLETON. THE OVCST SKIES WERE DSNDING ALTHOUGH BOTH ARPTS WERE CLRLY VMC. MY STRESSFUL SITUATION THEN BEGAN BY PLACING MYSELF IN DETERIORATING WX CONDITIONS WITH WHAT I WOULD TERM AS HIGH-MAINT PAX. THIS LED TO APCHING APPLETON ARPT WITHOUT DSNDING TO THE PROPER APCH ALT AND REDUCING MY SPD TO MY NORMAL APCH SPD. I CONTACTED THE TWR JUST OVER 10 NM FROM THE ARPT AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO RPT AT 3 NM FOR A R BASE ON RWY 21. AS I CONTINUED TOWARD THE ARPT; I BEGAN TO BE OVERWHELMED BY THE WORKLOAD. I WAS AT A HIGHER ALT AND A HIGHER SPD THAN PROPER PLANNING WOULD HAVE ALLOWED AND I WAS GIVING TOO MUCH ATTN TO MY PAX TO ASSURE THEIR PREPARATION FOR LNDG. WHEN I RPTED TO THE TWR THAT I WAS 3 NM OUT; I DID NOT GET A DIRECT RESPONSE; WHICH AT THE TIME I BELIEVED WAS BECAUSE THE CTLR WAS TALKING TO OTHER TFC AND WOULD GET TO ME NEXT. AT THIS POINT THINGS APPARENTLY MOVED FASTER THAN I WAS CAPABLE OF HANDLING PROPERLY. I CALLED THE TWR ONCE AGAIN; BUT ONLY HEARD THE TWR ACKNOWLEDGE TO TFC BEHIND ME THAT HE WAS #2 FOR LNDG BEHIND A CIRRUS THAT WAS TURNING FINAL; WHICH I KNEW TO BE ME. AT ABOUT THIS POINT; IT WAS OCCURRING TO ME THAT I DID NOT HAVE PROPER COM WITH THE TWR. I WAS ON FINAL AND ON OVERLOAD. I KNEW FROM WHAT I WAS HEARING THAT THE TWR KNEW EXACTLY WHERE I WAS AND THAT OTHER TFC WAS AWARE; BUT I COULD NOT GET A RESPONSE FROM MY XMISSIONS. I KNEW SOMETHING WAS WRONG; BUT I DID NOT PROCESS THE INFO FAST ENOUGH TO TAKE ACTION SUCH AS A NORDO SIGNAL. WHAT WAS FLASHING THROUGH MY MIND WAS 'AVIATION; NAV; COM' WHICH HAD BEEN DRILLED INTO MY MIND IN TRAINING. I LANDED THE PLANE SAFELY AND IT WAS ONLY ON THE ROLLOUT THAT I HEARD THE TWR ASK IF I COULD READ HIS XMISSION. I REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE AND WAS GIVEN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND INSTRUCTED BY THE CTLR TO CONTACT THE TWR BY LANDLINE AFTER REACHING THE FBO. FBO PERSONNEL GAVE ME THE TWR NUMBER AND I IMMEDIATELY CALLED THE TWR. ONCE AGAIN IN HINDSIGHT; I PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE COLLECTED MY THOUGHTS BEFORE CALLING THE TWR; BECAUSE I WAS STILL TRYING TO REPLAY THE CHAIN OF EVENTS TO UNDERSTAND MYSELF WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I'M SURE I MUST HAVE SOUNDED CONFUSED BECAUSE I CERTAINLY WAS AT THE POINT. I TRIED TO EXPLAIN THAT I WAS TRYING TO CALL THE TWR AND WAS RECEIVING NO RESPONSE. I WAS ACCUSED OF LYING AND TO SAY I WAS SEVERELY REPRIMANDED WOULD BE A HUGE UNDERSTATEMENT. I FIRST CONCLUDED THAT MY PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH HAD FAILED. THINKING IT THROUGH FURTHER; THAT SEEMED IMPLAUSIBLE; BECAUSE I WAS ABLE TO COMMUNICATE AFTER LNDG AND COULD NOT REPLICATE THE SUPPOSED FAILURE. IT WAS NOT UNTIL I REPLAYED THE SCENARIO MANY TIMES THAT I CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT I MUST HAVE ALLOWED MYSELF TO GET INTO SUCH A STRESSFUL SITUATION THAT I MAY HAVE NOT BEEN KEYING THE PUSH-TO-TALK AS I THOUGHT I WAS. WHATEVER THE MALFUNCTION WAS; I LEARNED AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT FROM THIS EVENT. I HAD TRAINED DILIGENTLY; BOTH THROUGH SAFETY TRAINING COURSES AND WITH A GREAT FLT INSTRUCTOR AND BELIEVED THAT I WAS PREPARED FOR THE TYPE OF SITUATION THAT OCCURRED. I NOW HAVE CHANGED MY PERSONAL MINIMUMS REQUIRED FOR ANY FLT TO CONSIDER MORE CAREFULLY THE EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING MY STRESS LEVEL AND; THEREFORE; MY PERFORMANCE AS A SAFE PLT. I WILL ALSO SPEND MANY MORE HRS WITH AN INSTRUCTOR WORKING ON PROPER PROCS IN UNEXPECTED SCENARIOS; SO THAT I WILL HAVE THE EXPERIENCE TO REACT PROPERLY AND DETECT MORE QUICKLY THE SOURCE OF ANY ABNORMAL SITUATION THAT MAY ARISE IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.