37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 714976 |
Time | |
Date | 200610 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sua.airport |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | msl single value : 5000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : pbi.tracon |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Premier 1 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial |
Route In Use | departure : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : pbi.tracon |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 1000 |
ASRS Report | 714976 |
Person 2 | |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : nmac |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment : tcas |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Miss Distance | vertical : 150 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Airspace Structure Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Ambiguous |
Narrative:
Departing sua; I was given an initial heading of 290 degrees and a climb to 2000 ft after takeoff on runway 30 and told to contact palm beach departure. Palm beach departure instructed a climb to 5000 ft and a turn to a heading of 310. Upon reaching 5000 ft; I immediately received a TCAS ii warning with corrective action being demanded. I received a 'pull up pull up' directive from the aircraft due to a small multi-engine aircraft closing in on our flight path. After taking proactive measures; I was able to visually verify this multi-engine aircraft passing only 100-200 ft below. Had it not been for the installation of a TCAS ii system in my aircraft; there is no doubt in my mind there would have been an in flight collision. Upon reaching 5000 ft; when I initially received TCAS ii warnings; the palm beach controller came on the frequency attempting to contact me. It was at this point that he was stepped on by other aircraft on frequency; resulting in a garbled and unreadable communication. In my opinion there are several contributing factors to this incident. The multiple radar (stuart tower; palm beach approach; miami center) facilities responsible for the airspace over and around sua leads to numerous hand offs within a short period of time; causing delayed instructions. The large amount of aircraft; to include large jets and small single engine piston make the airspace congested and therefore decreases safety. The miscommunication/lack of communication from the palm beach departure controller; and the unsafe vector and altitude he assigned me were also an area of concern. It is my opinion that control of the airspace should be delegated to one facility to increase safety; pilot and controller communication; and decrease both pilot and controller confusion.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the encroaching aircraft had departed sua a few minutes before the reporter then turned back toward the airport and continued to climb. This caught the controller off guard and he was unable to communicate in a timely manner due to the frequency congestion. The reporter obtained this information from pbi approach via telephone.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: NMAC AT 5000 FT NW OF SUA BETWEEN PRM1 AND LIGHT TWIN.
Narrative: DEPARTING SUA; I WAS GIVEN AN INITIAL HDG OF 290 DEGS AND A CLIMB TO 2000 FT AFTER TAKEOFF ON RWY 30 AND TOLD TO CONTACT PALM BEACH DEP. PALM BEACH DEP INSTRUCTED A CLIMB TO 5000 FT AND A TURN TO A HDG OF 310. UPON REACHING 5000 FT; I IMMEDIATELY RECEIVED A TCAS II WARNING WITH CORRECTIVE ACTION BEING DEMANDED. I RECEIVED A 'PULL UP PULL UP' DIRECTIVE FROM THE ACFT DUE TO A SMALL MULTI-ENG ACFT CLOSING IN ON OUR FLIGHT PATH. AFTER TAKING PROACTIVE MEASURES; I WAS ABLE TO VISUALLY VERIFY THIS MULTI-ENG ACFT PASSING ONLY 100-200 FT BELOW. HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE INSTALLATION OF A TCAS II SYSTEM IN MY ACFT; THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN AN IN FLIGHT COLLISION. UPON REACHING 5000 FT; WHEN I INITIALLY RECEIVED TCAS II WARNINGS; THE PALM BEACH CTLR CAME ON THE FREQUENCY ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT ME. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT HE WAS STEPPED ON BY OTHER ACFT ON FREQUENCY; RESULTING IN A GARBLED AND UNREADABLE COMMUNICATION. IN MY OPINION THERE ARE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT. THE MULTIPLE RADAR (STUART TOWER; PALM BEACH APCH; MIAMI CENTER) FACILITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE AIRSPACE OVER AND AROUND SUA LEADS TO NUMEROUS HAND OFFS WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME; CAUSING DELAYED INSTRUCTIONS. THE LARGE AMOUNT OF ACFT; TO INCLUDE LARGE JETS AND SMALL SINGLE ENG PISTON MAKE THE AIRSPACE CONGESTED AND THEREFORE DECREASES SAFETY. THE MISCOMMUNICATION/LACK OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE PALM BEACH DEP CTLR; AND THE UNSAFE VECTOR AND ALTITUDE HE ASSIGNED ME WERE ALSO AN AREA OF CONCERN. IT IS MY OPINION THAT CONTROL OF THE AIRSPACE SHOULD BE DELEGATED TO ONE FACILITY TO INCREASE SAFETY; PLT AND CTLR COMMUNICATION; AND DECREASE BOTH PLT AND CTLR CONFUSION.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE ENCROACHING ACFT HAD DEPARTED SUA A FEW MINUTES BEFORE THE RPTR THEN TURNED BACK TOWARD THE ARPT AND CONTINUED TO CLB. THIS CAUGHT THE CTLR OFF GUARD AND HE WAS UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE IN A TIMELY MANNER DUE TO THE FREQ CONGESTION. THE RPTR OBTAINED THIS INFO FROM PBI APCH VIA TELEPHONE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.