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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 716046 |
Time | |
Date | 200611 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001 To 0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mem.airport |
State Reference | TN |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A310 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer pilot : multi engine pilot : commercial pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 50 flight time total : 9600 flight time type : 300 |
ASRS Report | 716046 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : non compliance with mel non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : ecam warning other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft Company |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
During taxi for takeoff; we received an ECAM warning that the #1 air conditioning pack had faulted. We attempted one reset per procedures; but it was unsuccessful. The MEL permitted continued flight with several restrs including limiting the cruise altitude to FL310 and the notation that no live cargo could be on board. We called operations on the radio to discuss the situation as our hazardous cargo paperwork included the notation that live cargo had been loaded on the aircraft. The operations specialist informed us that he would recalculate our flight plan for FL310 and that our other freight had a higher priority than the live cargo so that we were authority/authorized to continue. I asked to speak to the duty officer to discuss operating in opposition to the MEL. The duty officer then came on the radio and said that the live cargo was of very low priority and that we were authority/authorized to continue the flight. I asked again about operating in opposition to the MEL and the duty officer again assured me that this operation was authority/authorized. We continued the taxi at this point; and departed for bwi. Once at cruise altitude; I pulled out the MEL again and read through the front matter which gives instructions on the use of the MEL. By this point; of course; I knew that the duty officer is not empowered to authority/authorized deviations from the MEL; but I wanted to make sure. My desire to accomplish the mission; aided by the encouragement of both the operations specialist and the duty officer caused me to override my own knowledge of MEL usage and to operate the trip against the MEL instructions. I should have taxied back to the gate to unload the live cargo prior to departing. The carriage of live freight of this nature and for this customer is relatively new to our operation. The customer has indicated that they will accept some unspecified amount of cargo loss in this contract; therefore our management has indicated to the pilots that this freight is of low priority. However; this does not relieve the pilots of the overriding responsibility to operate the aircraft in a legal manner. Lesson learned.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLT CREW OF A310 ALLOW LOAD PLANNERS TO CONVINCE THEM THAT AN MEL ITEM PROHIBITING THE CARRIAGE OF LIVE ANIMALS WITH A FAILED AC PACK COULD BE IGNORED.
Narrative: DURING TAXI FOR TKOF; WE RECEIVED AN ECAM WARNING THAT THE #1 AIR CONDITIONING PACK HAD FAULTED. WE ATTEMPTED ONE RESET PER PROCS; BUT IT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. THE MEL PERMITTED CONTINUED FLT WITH SEVERAL RESTRS INCLUDING LIMITING THE CRUISE ALT TO FL310 AND THE NOTATION THAT NO LIVE CARGO COULD BE ON BOARD. WE CALLED OPS ON THE RADIO TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION AS OUR HAZARDOUS CARGO PAPERWORK INCLUDED THE NOTATION THAT LIVE CARGO HAD BEEN LOADED ON THE ACFT. THE OPS SPECIALIST INFORMED US THAT HE WOULD RECALCULATE OUR FLT PLAN FOR FL310 AND THAT OUR OTHER FREIGHT HAD A HIGHER PRIORITY THAN THE LIVE CARGO SO THAT WE WERE AUTH TO CONTINUE. I ASKED TO SPEAK TO THE DUTY OFFICER TO DISCUSS OPERATING IN OPPOSITION TO THE MEL. THE DUTY OFFICER THEN CAME ON THE RADIO AND SAID THAT THE LIVE CARGO WAS OF VERY LOW PRIORITY AND THAT WE WERE AUTH TO CONTINUE THE FLT. I ASKED AGAIN ABOUT OPERATING IN OPPOSITION TO THE MEL AND THE DUTY OFFICER AGAIN ASSURED ME THAT THIS OP WAS AUTH. WE CONTINUED THE TAXI AT THIS POINT; AND DEPARTED FOR BWI. ONCE AT CRUISE ALT; I PULLED OUT THE MEL AGAIN AND READ THROUGH THE FRONT MATTER WHICH GIVES INSTRUCTIONS ON THE USE OF THE MEL. BY THIS POINT; OF COURSE; I KNEW THAT THE DUTY OFFICER IS NOT EMPOWERED TO AUTH DEVS FROM THE MEL; BUT I WANTED TO MAKE SURE. MY DESIRE TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION; AIDED BY THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF BOTH THE OPS SPECIALIST AND THE DUTY OFFICER CAUSED ME TO OVERRIDE MY OWN KNOWLEDGE OF MEL USAGE AND TO OPERATE THE TRIP AGAINST THE MEL INSTRUCTIONS. I SHOULD HAVE TAXIED BACK TO THE GATE TO UNLOAD THE LIVE CARGO PRIOR TO DEPARTING. THE CARRIAGE OF LIVE FREIGHT OF THIS NATURE AND FOR THIS CUSTOMER IS RELATIVELY NEW TO OUR OP. THE CUSTOMER HAS INDICATED THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT SOME UNSPECIFIED AMOUNT OF CARGO LOSS IN THIS CONTRACT; THEREFORE OUR MGMNT HAS INDICATED TO THE PLTS THAT THIS FREIGHT IS OF LOW PRIORITY. HOWEVER; THIS DOES NOT RELIEVE THE PLTS OF THE OVERRIDING RESPONSIBILITY TO OPERATE THE ACFT IN A LEGAL MANNER. LESSON LEARNED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.