Narrative:

Departed eggw. SID assigned was the detling 4C. As the monitoring pilot and the one who set up the departure I was familiar with the turns and altitude restrs that were published. I did set the altitude selector knob to the highest altitude on the SID; knowing that there were lower 'hard' altitudes that needed to be adhered to. The captain had reviewed the departure and was falsely comfortable since he had been in and out of the airport many times. Company operations has the captain out of the cockpit 30 mins prior greeting and meeting passenger and basically leaves them out of the loop for setting up the entire flight; including the clearance (with exception of europe). I feel that this is a very large contributing factor with the altitude excursion; since he wasn't familiar with it enough to disregard the flight director bars and just fly the departure. During taxi out the 'flight instruments/navigation' was briefed; but what he missed in his scan was the needle on his HSI that was missing. There was nothing there; no white needle for the FMS; nor green for VOR; or yellow for x-side reference; nothing. To add to confusion; his radar was painting a horrible bright red and yellow picture from the aircraft position out over 50% of the screen. The distance selected was not useable for departure; I think; 25 NM; which made it almost impossible to read the information on the screen. The captain is also the director of aviation who has tens of thousands of hours and was giving me the europe check out. He frequently under-utilizes the resources in the FMS; and has his screens set out of range for arrs and departures; as well as looks through a lot of nonsense with the radar. The red and yellow he was painting this night; all ground clutter. No need for radar. After takeoff when he went to arm the navigation mode of the FMS and fly the bars; it didn't follow anything. It stayed on heading mode. He began to panic as he climbed rapidly through 3000 ft. I said he needed to stop at 4000 ft until passing bpk VOR. At this point; the flying has deteriorated; with bank angles of 45 degrees at one point; airspeed fluctuations in excess of 40 KTS. I could see it all so clear on my side; and yet he couldn't process or see through the 'junk' to interpret anything. As we leveled at 5000 ft; confused and extremely frustrated (an ice light chimed as well); ATC started giving us heading and reclred us to 4000 ft. I did exacerbate the problem by going to flight level too early on the climb. The appropriate transition level was 6000 ft; and I hit the 29.92 around 4500 ft. After much confusion and tension in the cockpit; we leveled at the requested altitude assigned by ATC. The controling sector did ask us why we had continued to climb when it was depicted 4000 ft for several mi and then a climb to 5000 ft; and to verify we had the SID. We didn't explain nor make any further comment regarding the departure. I learned a lot! Vigilance; vigilance! Even after many time zone changes; lengthy duty days and just being tired; you must rise to the occasion and do it right every time! I won't let a PF depart with information that is useless or distracting. It must be pertinent and helpful otherwise it's no good and can actually make things much worse. I will also be sure that he or she is very familiar with the departure and can recite the critical areas that they should remember in the event the FMS navigation bars don't work.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF CL60 EXPERIENCE ALTDEV ON SID FROM EGGW.

Narrative: DEPARTED EGGW. SID ASSIGNED WAS THE DETLING 4C. AS THE MONITORING PLT AND THE ONE WHO SET UP THE DEP I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE TURNS AND ALT RESTRS THAT WERE PUBLISHED. I DID SET THE ALT SELECTOR KNOB TO THE HIGHEST ALT ON THE SID; KNOWING THAT THERE WERE LOWER 'HARD' ALTS THAT NEEDED TO BE ADHERED TO. THE CAPT HAD REVIEWED THE DEP AND WAS FALSELY COMFORTABLE SINCE HE HAD BEEN IN AND OUT OF THE ARPT MANY TIMES. COMPANY OPS HAS THE CAPT OUT OF THE COCKPIT 30 MINS PRIOR GREETING AND MEETING PAX AND BASICALLY LEAVES THEM OUT OF THE LOOP FOR SETTING UP THE ENTIRE FLT; INCLUDING THE CLRNC (WITH EXCEPTION OF EUROPE). I FEEL THAT THIS IS A VERY LARGE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WITH THE ALT EXCURSION; SINCE HE WASN'T FAMILIAR WITH IT ENOUGH TO DISREGARD THE FLT DIRECTOR BARS AND JUST FLY THE DEP. DURING TAXI OUT THE 'FLT INSTS/NAV' WAS BRIEFED; BUT WHAT HE MISSED IN HIS SCAN WAS THE NEEDLE ON HIS HSI THAT WAS MISSING. THERE WAS NOTHING THERE; NO WHITE NEEDLE FOR THE FMS; NOR GREEN FOR VOR; OR YELLOW FOR X-SIDE REF; NOTHING. TO ADD TO CONFUSION; HIS RADAR WAS PAINTING A HORRIBLE BRIGHT RED AND YELLOW PICTURE FROM THE ACFT POS OUT OVER 50% OF THE SCREEN. THE DISTANCE SELECTED WAS NOT USEABLE FOR DEP; I THINK; 25 NM; WHICH MADE IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO READ THE INFO ON THE SCREEN. THE CAPT IS ALSO THE DIRECTOR OF AVIATION WHO HAS TENS OF THOUSANDS OF HRS AND WAS GIVING ME THE EUROPE CHK OUT. HE FREQUENTLY UNDER-UTILIZES THE RESOURCES IN THE FMS; AND HAS HIS SCREENS SET OUT OF RANGE FOR ARRS AND DEPS; AS WELL AS LOOKS THROUGH A LOT OF NONSENSE WITH THE RADAR. THE RED AND YELLOW HE WAS PAINTING THIS NIGHT; ALL GND CLUTTER. NO NEED FOR RADAR. AFTER TKOF WHEN HE WENT TO ARM THE NAV MODE OF THE FMS AND FLY THE BARS; IT DIDN'T FOLLOW ANYTHING. IT STAYED ON HDG MODE. HE BEGAN TO PANIC AS HE CLBED RAPIDLY THROUGH 3000 FT. I SAID HE NEEDED TO STOP AT 4000 FT UNTIL PASSING BPK VOR. AT THIS POINT; THE FLYING HAS DETERIORATED; WITH BANK ANGLES OF 45 DEGS AT ONE POINT; AIRSPD FLUCTUATIONS IN EXCESS OF 40 KTS. I COULD SEE IT ALL SO CLR ON MY SIDE; AND YET HE COULDN'T PROCESS OR SEE THROUGH THE 'JUNK' TO INTERPRET ANYTHING. AS WE LEVELED AT 5000 FT; CONFUSED AND EXTREMELY FRUSTRATED (AN ICE LIGHT CHIMED AS WELL); ATC STARTED GIVING US HDG AND RECLRED US TO 4000 FT. I DID EXACERBATE THE PROB BY GOING TO FLT LEVEL TOO EARLY ON THE CLB. THE APPROPRIATE TRANSITION LEVEL WAS 6000 FT; AND I HIT THE 29.92 AROUND 4500 FT. AFTER MUCH CONFUSION AND TENSION IN THE COCKPIT; WE LEVELED AT THE REQUESTED ALT ASSIGNED BY ATC. THE CTLING SECTOR DID ASK US WHY WE HAD CONTINUED TO CLB WHEN IT WAS DEPICTED 4000 FT FOR SEVERAL MI AND THEN A CLB TO 5000 FT; AND TO VERIFY WE HAD THE SID. WE DIDN'T EXPLAIN NOR MAKE ANY FURTHER COMMENT REGARDING THE DEP. I LEARNED A LOT! VIGILANCE; VIGILANCE! EVEN AFTER MANY TIME ZONE CHANGES; LENGTHY DUTY DAYS AND JUST BEING TIRED; YOU MUST RISE TO THE OCCASION AND DO IT RIGHT EVERY TIME! I WON'T LET A PF DEPART WITH INFO THAT IS USELESS OR DISTRACTING. IT MUST BE PERTINENT AND HELPFUL OTHERWISE IT'S NO GOOD AND CAN ACTUALLY MAKE THINGS MUCH WORSE. I WILL ALSO BE SURE THAT HE OR SHE IS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE DEP AND CAN RECITE THE CRITICAL AREAS THAT THEY SHOULD REMEMBER IN THE EVENT THE FMS NAV BARS DON'T WORK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.